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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1996, the state of South Carolina launched a new comprehensive funding 
policy for its public higher education, which drew a lot of attention.  The state legislature 
passed Bill 1195, Act 359, mandating that all funding for public higher education 
institutions be based solely on performance.  The policy was to be phased-in over three 
years so that 100 percent of state appropriations would be determined by institutional 
performance by the year 2000.  To assess performance of public colleges and 
universities, the South Carolina General Assembly prescribed 37 indicators grouped in 
nine categories.  Although the concept of performance funding in higher education was 
not new at that time, the goals, scope, and speed of implementation of South Carolina’s 
policy were unprecedented (Burke, 2002d; China, 1998; Fore, 1998; Phillips, 2002).  
Both advocates and opponents of performance funding held their breath watching the 
development of this policy experiment. 
Although the state legislature mandated the policy and prescribed performance 
indicators, the specific details of the program implementation were left to the discretion 
of the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education (SCCHE).  Facing both time 
constraints and institutional opposition, the SCCHE did it best to comply with the 
legislative requirements.  However, higher education institutions found many of the 
policy goals to be unattainable and unrealistic (Phillips, 2002; Fore, 1998).  In response, 
instead of changing the policy core, South Carolina attempted to adjust the controls; 
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nevertheless, the policy continued to flounder (Burke, 2002d).  The drastic changes came 
in 1999: The number of indicators was reduced and the scoring system and benchmarking 
guidelines were altered (Phillips, 2002).  Most important, the state abandoned the idea of 
100 percent performance-based funding. 
In 2003, a budget proviso redirected performance funds to the Experimental 
Program to Stimulate Competitive Research funding.  In 2006, institutional scoring was 
discontinued.  The policy continued to exist legally but was not funded.  The budget 
included an item titled “Performance Funding”; however, that money was not related to 
institutional performance.  Thus, the policy failed to deliver on its stated goals and was 
defunded; its failure probably deterred other states from policy experimentation in this 
area.  At present, South Carolina is considering a new approach to outcomes-based 
funding under a new name to avoid any association with the failed policy experiment. 
Performance funding evolution in South Carolina poses a host of intriguing 
questions: Was the original policy a fiasco because its original goals were never attained 
and the program was eventually abandoned?  Was it a partial success—even if for a short 
time—because it reportedly altered institutional behavior in accord with its intent and 
objectives?  What factors determined the policy emergence, development, and failure?  
Did these factors have to do mostly with forces external or internal to state higher 
education?  How is South Carolina’s experience similar to, or different from, that of other 
states?  Could it be considered an existing policy when the mandate persisted but its 
funding was suspended?  How do we know when performance funding has operational or 
nonoperational status and what criteria are useful for drawing this distinction? 
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Although unprecedented in scope, South Carolina’s experience is by no means 
unique.  By 2009, 27 states had experimented with performance funding in higher 
education.  Some policies have persisted until today, some have been terminated or 
defunded, and others have experienced several transitions between failure and readoption.  
All these policies have had setbacks and changes in scope, faced implementation and 
funding issues, and failed to completely meet all their stated goals—especially in terms of 
altering institutional behavior and improving college performance and outcomes (Burke 
& Associates, 2002; Dougherty & Hong, 2006; Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Sanford & 
Hunter, 2011).  This gap between policy intent and policy effects makes the task of 
defining and measuring policy success and failure extremely difficult and, to some extent, 
subjective in nature (Bovens, ‘t Hart, & Peters, 2001).  Therefore, the above questions 
about performance funding in South Carolina are also applicable to this policy 
development in other states. 
Examining performance funding evolution in public higher education, the key 
issue is to explain what accounts for different trajectories that this policy has taken across 
states and over time.  In other words, an analyst must understand what factors have 
influenced the policy lifecycle of performance funding and gather empirical evidence of 
this influence. 
Thus, I pose the following research question for this study: What are the specific 
antecedents of performance funding policy shifts across states?  
Linking allocations to achieved results and organizational and individual 
responses to this policy have long been of keen interest to researchers in organizational 
and governmental studies (Anders, 2001; Balmaceda, 2008; Forsythe, 2001; Iversen, 
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2004; Jordan & Hackbart, 1999; Mehrotra, Damberg, Sorbero, & Teleki, 2009; Meyer, 
1975; Prendergast, 2002).  Due to the Reinventing Government movement (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992; Thompson & Riccucci, 1998), performance and accountability of 
government actors, performance assessment, and performance-based budgeting moved to 
the center of attention of political scientists.  This shift in academic interests reflected a 
growing adoption of management-for-results practices and an increasing use of 
performance-based funding schemes in government operations (Anders, 2001; Ingraham 
& Moynihan, 2001; Klein, 2005; Willoughby & Melkers, 2001). 
In higher education, performance funding denotes specified allocations provided 
to public institutions for demonstrable results and measurable changes in their behavior.  
Specifically, it means tying “specified state funding directly and tightly to the 
performance of public campuses on individual indicators” (Burke & Minassians, 2003, p. 
3, emphasis in the original). 
Analytical interest in performance funding in higher education arena emerged in 
the 1990s, when many states adopted this policy for their public institutions (Burke & 
Associates, 2002).  The rising popularity of performance accountability programs 
required theoretical conceptualization of employed approaches and processes.  In 
response to this demand, researchers conducted case studies of state performance funding 
programs, mostly based on surveys of key policy actors and qualitative investigations 
(Bell, 2005; Bridges, 1999; Burke, 1998a; Burke & Minassians, 2001; Burke & 
Modarresi, 2000, 2001; Coulson-Clark, 1999; Dougherty & Hong, 2006; Noland, 
Johnson, & Skolits, 2004; Serban, 1997a; China, 1998; Tanner, 2005; Williams, 2005).  
In addition, a number of studies examined the impacts of performance funding on various 
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outcomes (Belfield, 2012; Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Doyle & Noland, 2006; Ehlert, 
1998; Fryar, 2011; Garrick, 1998; Huang, 2010; Polatajko, 2011; Rabovsky, 2012; 
Sanford & Hunter, 2011; Shin, 2010; Shin & Milton, 2004; Strawn, 2003; Woodley, 
2005; Yancey, 2002). 
Individual researchers investigated why and how performance funding emerged 
and spread across the states.  Usually, this question is considered within the context of the 
general Accountability Movement and other socio-political changes in the environment 
(Burke & Associates, 2002, 2005).  Both qualitatively and quantitatively, analysts 
examined the issues of performance funding adoption and failure.  They identified 
general and state-specific factors that provided for these policy changes (Burke & 
Associates, 2002; Burke & Serban, 1998a; Dougherty, Natow, & Vega, 2012; 
McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006).  However, the knowledge of the common 
determinants of policy adoption is currently limited to the results of one study, which 
empirically tested several propositions concerning the enactment of performance 
accountability policies in higher education (McLendon et al., 2006). 
Burke and associates from the Rockefeller Institute of Government and 
Dougherty and colleagues of Columbia University have significantly contributed to our 
understanding of the forces behind performance funding evolution (Burke & Associates, 
2002; Burke & Minassians, 2003; Burke & Modarresi, 2001; Burke & Serban, 1998a, 
1998c; Dougherty & Hong, 2005, 2006; Dougherty, Natow, Hare, Jones, & Vega, 2011; 
Dougherty et al., 2012; Natow & Dougherty, 2008).  Due to their input, the research 
community has a good understanding of the forces that shaped this policy development in 
specific states.  Their thorough investigations identified determinants of performance 
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funding policy changes in different contexts.  However, this line of research is rooted 
almost exclusively in direct observation, archival work, interviews, and surveys; it is 
generally unknown whether their research assumptions and conclusions hold for other 
states.  Thus, the assertions and findings of the above studies need to be validated with a 
quantitative empirical test on a larger scale. 
There are two major gaps in the existing literature on performance funding 
development and policy changes in higher education in general.  The first gap concerns 
the common forces that affect emergence, development, and failure of performance 
funding.  Performance funding has been a volatile policy: Many states have adopted, 
modified, shrank, defunded, supplanted, terminated, and readopted it at different times 
(Burke & Associates, 2002).  What factors drive states to experiment with this policy in 
such an erratic way remains largely unclear.  The issue of frequent mortality and 
resurrection of performance funding is especially intriguing; however, it remains 
understudied.  To the best of my knowledge, no research has systematically and 
comprehensively examined the entire performance funding policy lifecycle.  In other 
words, no one has yet considered determinants of all policy shifts regarding performance 
funding across all states and over a sufficiently long period. 
The second gap concerns the nature and drivers of policy changes in higher 
education, especially of policy failures.  I argue that the phenomenon of policy failure in 
higher education has been poorly studied and is inadequately understood.  The literature 
includes isolated case studies of failed policies, including abandoned performance 
funding programs (Dougherty et al., 2011; Dougherty et al., 2012; Dougherty & Natow, 
2009; Burke, 2002b), and the seminal Birnbaum’s (2000a, 2000b) study of the rise and 
7 
 
fall of academic management fads at the institutional level.  However, these 
investigations do not allow for the conceptualization of state-level policy failure. 
It is imperative that researchers bridge these gaps in knowledge and 
understanding of higher education policy dynamics. 
In brief, although there is a modest literature on higher education policy 
enactment (Doyle, 2006; Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2005; Hearn, McLendon, & 
Mokher, 2008; McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; 
McLendon et al., 2006; Mokher & McLendon, 2007), the knowledge of why states adopt, 
terminate, and revive these policies remains limited.  Thus, the overarching research 
problem is rooted in the need to better understand the antecedents of policy changes, in 
general, and in higher education, in particular. 
Investigation of this problem has both theoretical and practical importance.  From 
the theoretical perspective, analysts need to examine and explain various intrastate and 
interstate influences that drive states to adopt, maintain, modify, discontinue, and readopt 
public policies.  From the practical perspective, a better understanding of these driving 
forces and actors could help policymakers design more effective and sustainable policies 
and make revisions to their planning and implementation.  Thus, policy relevance and 
topicality of this research stem from the following needs: to fill in the gaps in theory and 
knowledge, offer explanations of states’ policy behavior, predict trajectories of policy 
development under the given conditions, and design more efficient policies based on an 
understanding of policy dynamics and experiences of earlier policy adopters. 
To address the above problem, I study the determinants of adoption and failure of 
performance funding policy systems in public higher education.  The purpose of this 
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investigation is to understand the influences that shape the policy lifecycle of 
performance accountability policies.  The ultimate objective is to empirically test 
hypotheses aiming to identify factors that determine performance funding evolution.  The 
subject of inquiry is the process of policy evolution, including its emergence, 
development, and demise.  The specific research focus is on the antecedents of 
performance funding adoption and failure.  Specifically, this investigation intends to 
answer the following questions: Why do performance funding policies emerge and die at 
a specific time?  What factors account for their adoption and failure?  What theoretical 
frames are better suited to explaining policy cycles in higher education arena?  I believe 
that my theoretical frames, methods, findings, and conclusions can be useful in studying 
other higher education policies. 
The key challenges and limitations of the study include the following.  First, 
competing explanations for policy adoption and failure complicate identification of 
reasons for these changes.  Second, I need to identify and account for multiple types of 
policy adoption and failure.  Third, states spend different amounts of time in different 
conditions, that is, before they transition from one status relative to performance funding 
to another.  Fourth, policy adoption, failure, and readoption are chronologically 
dependent on each other: A state cannot reach the next “destination” until it has gone 
through the previous stage.  Next, the observation period is limited to 30 years due to data 
availability at the time of the analysis; as a result, some states are likely to have policy 
changes after its expiration.  Sixth, on many occasions, states adopt or terminate their 
policies in the same period, which complicates statistical analyses.  Finally, limitations to 
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the estimation capacity of employed models necessitate selecting predictors based on 
their conceptual and statistical significance. 
My modeling strategy, which aims to overcome these limitations, combines 
different approaches.  To operationalize the policy shifts of interest, I propose strict 
definitions of operational performance funding, policy adoption, and policy failure.  To 
test competing explanations for performance funding adoption and failure, I advance four 
theoretical frames, propose specific hypotheses in each frame, and identify variables for 
testing these hypotheses.  To examine the entire policy lifecycle of performance funding, 
I adopt a multiple-event perspective and employ a set of cumulative-risk models with 
repeated events. 
This strategy is based on three major assumptions.  The first one asserts that, as 
political and social processes, policy adoption and policy failure are alike in terms of 
their intrastate and interstate determinants.  In other words, the same types of processes 
and actors drive states to adopt, terminate, and readopt a policy.  The second assumption 
is that each event of interest (adoption, failure, and readoption) is a negation of the prior 
condition.  This assumption builds on Volden’s (2007) suggestion that policy adoption is, 
in effect, an abandonment of the “no policy” policy or termination of failed policies and 
on Bardach (1976) and Hogwood and Peters’s (1982) arguments that policy termination 
(or succession) is a special case of policy adoption.  Expanding on these ideas, I argue 
that if a state does not have a policy after its invention elsewhere, it has chosen not to 
have it; that is, it is not a mere inaction, it is an action that a state chose not to pursue.  
Thus, having no policy is treated as a specific type of policy.  Another critical assumption 
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is that the policy changes of interest can only occur in succession: Adoption always 
precedes failure and failure precedes readoption. 
My proposed theoretical approach is integrative in nature.  In contrast to previous 
research on performance funding, this study intends to examine drivers of policy 
adoption, failure, and readoption simultaneously.  As explained above, I treat 
performance funding enactment, termination, and revival as kindred political and social 
processes.  In other words, I view the proposed state and policy characteristics as factors 
affecting all relevant policy changes.  This assumption allows for an integrated 
examination of policy adoption and failure, and each proposed theoretical frame applies 
to all policy shifts of interest.  Integration is also evident in combining the four theoretical 
frames.  In addition to using them separately, I test hypotheses generated under these 
conceptual lenses simultaneously, within one final model.  Finally, some uncovered 
relationships may have alternative causal mechanisms.  This possibility may require 
convergence of the employed theoretical frameworks, with distinct frames offering 
different causal explanations for the relationships. 
The novelty of the proposed approach involves the following: (a) refining 
definitions of performance funding, policy adoption, and policy failure; (b) using an 
advanced survival analysis technique in a study of policy evolution; (c) testing different 
theoretical frames simultaneously within one model; and (d) making use of all relevant 
policy changes that are dispersed in space and time.  Application of a powerful statistical 
technique, event history analysis, allows me to identify the determinants of multiple 
policy shifts across states and over time.  This task requires a longitudinal dataset on 47 
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states, including non-adopters of performance funding and excluding three outliers, for 
30 years since the enactment of the first policy. 
The theoretical contributions of the study include insights into the inadequately 
understood phenomenon of policy development.  This research conceptualizes the policy 
cycle as a more complex phenomenon than has been done previously in quantitative 
studies of policy changes.  Employing four distinct theoretical traditions, it adds 
conceptual clarity to the discussion of antecedents of policy changes.  This study 
examines the entire policy lifecycle, simultaneously analyzing determinants of policy 
adoption, failure, and readoption.  It tests a new theoretical perspective for understanding 
policy adoption and failure and suggests refined definitions of these processes.  This 
investigation proposes four sets of theory-driven hypotheses explaining policy shifts, 
empirically tests assertions about performance funding evolution suggested in the 
literature and in this investigation, and examines significance of individual factors.  Due 
to these contributions, I hope that this research represents a step toward building an 
integral theory of policy development. 
The overall structure of the dissertation is as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature.  After a general overview, I consider and propose definitions of the 
key terms.  Next, I examine the general context of performance funding evolution with a 
special focus on the accountability movement in higher education.  I then identify 
precursors of performance funding in four distinct areas.  Next, I examine four theoretical 
frameworks used in this study—the electoral connection, political environment, policy 
diffusion, and principal-agent frames.  I conclude by reviewing the literature on 
budgetary constraints and policy failure. 
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Chapter 3 establishes the conceptual framework for the study.  It describes the 
general integrative approach to the investigation, reviews the four theoretical frames, and 
suggests the respective sets of hypotheses.  Next, the chapter considers other critical 
influences on the policy lifecycle.  It concludes by outlining the key relationships in the 
conceptual framework and the general model specification. 
Chapter 4 describes the data and the analytical method.  First, it describes the 
dataset compiled for the study, the operationalization of the dependent and independent 
variables, and the data on all variables.  Second, it presents the event history analysis as 
the primary method for the study, specifications of the model, and the model estimation.  
Finally, the chapter addresses the remaining issues of model estimation. 
Chapter 5 reviews my analytical approach and presents the study findings.  
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the results, outlines the contributions and 
limitations of the study, and suggests directions for future research.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Background and Overview 
Over the last three decades, public higher education has experienced mounting 
pressures to become accountable for institutional performance and results.  This period 
has witnessed greater engagement of the general public and external agencies with the 
issues of quality and performance in higher education and greater focus on improving 
educational outcomes and increasing government interference (Alexander, 2000; Bogue, 
1997; Zumeta, 2001).  As a result, the precarious balance between external accountability 
and institutional autonomy has gradually shifted toward justifying public support and 
demonstrating value for money.  Leading policy analysts concur that this change toward 
performance accountability is irreversible (Burke, 2005b; Burke & Modarresi, 2000; 
Ewell, 2003; Gaither, 1995).  Burke and Modarresi (2000) note, “Accountability is a 
challenge, not a choice, for state colleges and universities. The real question with 
accountability for public higher education is not whether, but for what and how” (p. 433). 
Two trends paradoxically characterize this accountability movement: While states 
have increased pressures for accountability, they have also been disinvesting in higher 
education.  States governments have wanted higher education institutions to become 
more accountable for fewer resources available to them (Alexander, 2004), proving that 
“taxpayer support and public demands are seldom in sync” (Burke, 2005b, p. 9).  The 
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need to balance external accountability with institutional improvement and state needs 
with academic goals has required new policy solutions (Burke & Associates, 2002). 
One policy tool used to resolve these dilemmas is linking institutional budgets to 
performance.  Performance funding policy has emerged to offer incentives for 
measureable achievements and tangible institutional improvements (Bogue & Hall, 
2003).  Many states have allocated a portion of appropriations based on institutional 
performance on state priorities.  However, performance funding has turned out a volatile 
policy: Most adopting states have continually revised, shrunk, defunded, terminated, and 
readopted their programs (Burke & Associates, 2002). 
This study intends to identify the driving factors behind the emergence and 
demise of performance funding policy systems in public higher education in the United 
States.  It investigates why states adopt and abandon performance funding policies at a 
certain time.  To explain the policy lifecycle dynamics, the study employs several 
theoretical frames.  Focusing on the antecedents of policy adoption and failure, it aims to 
further our understanding of higher education policy development.  This intention 
determines the approach to reviewing prior research and existing literature. 
The following questions guide the literature review: What key definitions are 
applicable to this study?  What has been the general context for performance funding 
emergence?  What factors have determined the accountability movement in higher 
education?  What are the key aspects and main precursors of performance funding?  What 
theoretical frameworks are appropriate for studying determinants of this policy adoption 
and failure?  What evidence regarding performance funding does the literature provide 
for these frames?  What are the main gaps in knowledge about this policy evolution?   
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Key Definitions 
This section defines the following critical concepts: accountability systems, 
performance accountability policies, state policy, performance funding policy, 
operational policy, policy adoption, and policy failure.  I also consider the notion of 
policy failure in the respective section of the dissertation. 
The general concept of accountability defies comprehensive definition; as a 
result, “[a]ccountability is the most advocated and least analyzed word in higher 
education” (Burke, 2005b, p. 1).  In the past, this term referred to the issues of centralized 
state regulation and governance arrangements, economy and resource inputs; however, it 
has gradually acquired a new meaning, shifting the focus to state priorities and the 
outcomes of institutional activities (Burke, 2005b; McLendon et al., 2006).  Important 
aspects of higher education accountability include specifying requirements and actions to 
meet them (Neal, 1995).  State governments are mostly interested in higher education 
quality and cost-effectiveness (Ewell, 1997).  Therefore, a working definition of 
accountability should consider all these aspects of the general concept. 
In this study, I focus specifically on accountability systems designed to ensure 
higher education responsiveness to state needs and answerability for the results achieved 
with public funds.  As a starting point, I rely on the following definition of accountability 
systems offered by Wellman (2001): “Accountability systems are state-level indicators of 
institutional performance, designed to reach public audiences, using quantitative and 
qualitative measures that allow comparisons among institutions.  These systems […] are 
geared to legislative and gubernatorial audiences rather than individual governing 
boards” (p. 48). 
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I define a state accountability system as an arrangement of funding and publicity 
incentives intended to alter institutional behavior in ways that are consistent with public 
needs and state priorities.  These incentives run the gamut from financial awards and 
regulatory sanctions to increased autonomy to changes in reputation and rankings.  The 
unifying feature of these systems is a structure of built-in impetuses and constraints that 
aim to align institutional responses with external expectations and goals. 
Performance accountability policies include three main types: performance 
reporting, performance funding, and performance budgeting (Burke & Minassians, 2002, 
2003; McLendon et al., 2006).  Performance reporting involves assessing statewide goals 
and reporting of institutional results on pre-determined indicators (Burke & Minassians, 
2003; Wellman, 2001).  This policy relies on information and publicity to encourage 
institutions to improve their performance.  As a result, performance reporting is the least 
controversial accountability policy (Burke & Minassians, 2002). 
Linking budget allocations to institutional performance takes two distinct forms: 
performance funding and performance budgeting.  Performance funding ties a portion of 
the budget to the degree to which institutions meet or exceed preestablished criteria 
(Bogue & Aper, 2000).  In other words, it links budget allocations to prescribed levels of 
college achievement on designated indicators.  This process of tying government funds to 
institutional performance is direct and formulaic.  Performance funding focuses on the 
process of budget distribution (Burke, 2001a; Burke, 2003; Burke & Modarresi, 2000; 
Burke & Serban, 1998; Schmidtlein, 1999; Zumeta, 2001). 
Performance budgeting considers institutional achievement as merely one factor 
in determining total institutional budgets.  Performance information is used as a general 
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context, but funds are not tied directly to it.  Thus, the link between performance and 
funding is indirect, loose, and discretionary.  Performance budgeting focuses on budget 
preparation but ignores distribution (Burke, 2001a; Burke, 2003; Burke & Serban, 1998). 
To focus on the antecedents of policy adoption and failure, I must know exactly 
when a policy comes into existence and when it fails.  It is thus critical to define a state 
policy and identify the markers of its operational status.  These markers are determined 
by the definitions of a policy and the respective policy shifts. 
Political scientists and policy analysts have struggled with definitions of public 
policy and state policy, without reaching a definitive consensus (Birkland, 2001; 
Cochran, Mayer, Carr, & Cayer, 1999; Cochran & Malone, 1995; Dougherty & Reid, 
2007; Dye, 1998; Kerr, 1976; Kraft & Furlong, 2007; Kroll, 1962; Peters, 1999; 
McLendon et al., 2006; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). 
Birkland (2001) derives the following features of a public policy: 
• The policy is made in the “public’s” name. 
• Policy is generally made or initiated by government. 
• Policy is interpreted and implemented by public and private actors. 
• Policy is what the government intends to do. 
• Policy is what the government chooses not to do (p. 20, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
There are two camps in defining a policy.  The first camp focuses on 
government’s intentions and actions.  Kraft and Furlong’s (2007) definition exemplifies 
this approach: “Public policy is what public officials within government, and by 
extension the citizens they represent, choose to do or not to do about public problems” (p. 
4).  Following this logic, a policy comes into existence when the government makes a 
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decision—through a legislative mandate, executive order, or agency initiative—to adopt 
it.  Likewise, policies are abandoned by the government’s decisions and actions. 
Acknowledging the government’s role, the second camp emphasizes the role of 
the agents in policy implementation (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  Kerr’s (1976) formal 
policy conditions and conditions for policy success are the epitome of this approach to 
defining a public policy.  Kerr underscores the need to distinguish between a policy and a 
promise, that is, a simple declaration of intention.  In the words of Birkland (2001): 
[P]olicies are not just contained in laws and regulations; once a law or rule is 
made, policies continue to be made as the people who implement policies—that is, 
those who put policies into effect—make decisions about who will benefit from 
policies and who will shoulder burdens as a result. (p. 20, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
From this camp’s perspective, it is not sufficient to enact a policy; this decision 
must be supported through policy implementation, and the agents must be aware of its 
operation.  This is the perspective that I choose for this study.  Extending the same logic, 
I argue that policies do not fully exist until the agents notice them and are poised to 
respond.  In this interpretation, policies with a legal mandate that are not implemented or 
funded are in effect policy failures. 
For the purposes of this study, I propose the notion of an operational policy.  I 
rely on Dougherty and Reid’s (2007) definition of a state policy as “an authoritative 
action by state government” (p. 2) but refine it with the addition of a critical condition.  
The advantage of the above definition is that it does not restrict policies to only 
legislative actions and is thus appropriate for performance funding, which may be 
initiated by governors, state higher education agencies, and individual institutional 
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systems.  However, it does not take into account whether the policy has an operational 
status, that is, whether performance funds are allocated to institutions. 
For performance funding to become operational, a policy authorization decision 
(declaration of intent) must be followed by an appropriation decision.  The latter makes it 
a “policy with teeth” (Burke & Associates, 2002), a powerful tool with real implications 
for the agents.  Performance funding aims to induce desired changes in institutional 
behavior through provision of financial incentives.  However, no declaration of intent can 
alter institutional behavior unless there are financial strings attached to it.  Institutions 
become aware of the policy and begin to respond only when funding is allocated. 
Combining the above definitions, I define performance funding policy as an 
authoritative action by the state government to provide funds to public higher education 
institutions based on multiple output-oriented indicators in exchange for desired changes 
in their behavior that is followed by actual funding. 
This definition is consistent with the refined conceptualization of policy failure as 
introduced later in this section and in the section The Concept of Policy Failure.  In brief, 
similar to removing the mandate or substituting a policy with a different program, policy 
failures also include various scenarios when funding is not provided.  The rationale for 
treating defunding as failure is that, in the absence of funding, institutions have no 
incentives to alter their behavior.  Therefore, the intent of the policy is not realized and it 
ceases to be an operational policy; the policy status changes from adoption to failure. 
Regarding performance funding, I equate policy enactment with adoption 
(operational status) just for the year in which it takes place.  To maintain the operational 
status in subsequent years, the policy must receive funding.  The rationale for exempting 
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the adoption year from the constraints of my definition is that policymakers need time to 
ensure financial support for the policy and funding generally does not begin the same 
year as policy authorization.  At the same time, institutions are made aware that the new 
policy requires altering their behavior.  If however, the policy is not funded after the 
initial year, it is considered a failure.  The unfunded policy maintains its nonoperational 
status until funding is provided. 
Three criteria define performance funding as an operational policy: (a) 
authorizing the policy (adoption), (b) providing financial incentives aimed at changing 
institutional behavior (appropriation), and (c) using multiple, output-oriented indicators 
(complexity).  The first action is not a strong enough incentive to trigger a response from 
institutions; however, coupled with the second component, it powerfully declares what 
the state values and what goals must be pursued.  The third criterion ensures policy 
complexity and distinguishes “true” performance funding policies from matching funding 
schemes and similar input-oriented programs, which often use a single indicator. 
As the centerpieces of its conceptual framework, this study uses two major terms, 
policy adoption and policy failure.  The notion of policy adoption is much better 
understood and conceptualized in the literature (Bardach, 1976; Berry & Berry, 1990, 
1992; Doyle, 2006; Gray, 1973; Hearn & Griswold, 1994; Hearn et al., 2008; McLendon 
et al, 2006; Mintrom, 1997; Walker, 1969).  Policy adoption is a lengthy political process 
that culminates in policy enactment by a state legislative mandate or an executive order.  
It is “essentially an effort by a nuclear group of proponents to assemble, out of a diverse 
array of social and political interests, a supporting coalition weighty enough to secure 
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authoritative approval of their proposal” (Bardach, 1976, p. 126).  The focus of this study 
is on the outcome of this process, that is, on the actual policy enactment. 
In this study, policy adoption is defined as the following actions of the state 
government or its agency that bring about an operational status of a policy: enacting a 
policy with a legislative act or an executive order, introducing a policy by a higher 
education board’s decision, or initiating it via an appropriation act or a budget proviso.  A 
special case of adoption, policy readoption, may take the following forms: reenactment 
after a prior termination or succession with another policy, provision of funding with 
more than a year’s delay after the original adoption, resumption of funding after a prior 
suspension, and upgrading the policy to meet the above criterion of sufficient complexity. 
For the purposes of this research, I define policy failure as the state government’s 
actions that make performance funding lose its operational status (achieve a latent status).  
These scenarios may include failing to fund an adopted policy (false start), withdrawing 
or not renewing the policy mandate (termination), suspending or removing funding 
(starving or defunding), substituting the policy with another policy (succession), and 
failing to meet the sufficient complexity criterion (inadequacy).  However, because of 
their inherent subjectivity and ambiguity, the following scenarios are not considered 
policy failures: failing to adopt a policy (proposal failure), failing to meet the policy 
objectives (policy ineffectiveness), and scaling down of the policy from its original scope 
(policy shrinking).  The general concept of policy failure is considered in the respective 
section at the end of Chapter 2, and Chapter 4 provides its detailed operationalization.       
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Historical Background of Performance Funding Evolution 
 
Changing Context of Higher Education 
Tennessee was the first state to adopt performance funding in 1979; it was 
followed by Ohio and Connecticut in 1985, although the latter two do not meet the above 
definition of a “true” performance funding policy with sufficient complexity.  The other 
24 adopting states enacted this policy for the first time in the period from 1990 to 2000.  
However, many of these initiatives turned out to be short-lived experiments and policy 
failures.  The second round of performance funding adoptions—dubbed Performance 
Funding 2.0 (Lederman, 2008)—started in the new millennium (Dougherty et al., 2012; 
Dougherty & Reddy, 2011).  These dynamics demonstrate that the antecedents of these 
policy changes should be identified in the past two decades.  
A number of environmental factors and events have shaped American higher 
education during this period.  These external forces have included economic, political, 
ideological, social, and attitudinal changes in the society.  These contextual factors 
operated both at the national and state levels.  Environmental pressures and new trends 
required relevant policy responses from state higher education systems. 
Economic, political, and ideological changes in the nation have had the greatest 
effect on higher education, especially on its relationships with state governments.  
According to Wellman (2001), “an external economic and political climate is forcing 
fundamental structural changes in the relationship between higher education and 
government” (p. 48).  A key change in these relationships concerned the need to justify 
continued public support and become accountable for results on the part of colleges. 
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During the period of interest (1979–2009), the national economy experienced 
three periods of growth and four major recessions—in the early 1980s, early 1990s, and 
early and late 2000s.  During recessions, competition for state resources between public 
sector priorities intensified, leading to calls for greater efficiency in resource allocation 
and, importantly, to diminishing budgets of public higher education. 
Similarly, this period witnessed significant political and ideological changes in 
the country.  A major political development with critical economic repercussions was the 
1970s voters’ tax revolt.  This movement was driven by people who did not trust 
legislatures and were concerned about government growth and increasing budget deficits.  
Its strategy involved imposing limits on state tax revenues and spending growth, 
downsizing government, and curtailing the social support system.  The tax revolt 
produced legislation that altered taxing and spending policies in many states, thereby 
reducing public financing for state-supported services and sectors, including public 
education (Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Baker, 2003; Merrifield, 1998). 
This period saw five presidential terms by a Republican president and three terms 
by a Democratic president.  In 1994, the Republicans became the majority party in both 
houses of the U.S. Congress for the first time in 40 years.  They controlled Congress until 
2007 and managed to create and partially implement the Contract with America, a 
conservative reform agenda.  The dominant ideology during that period was a complex of 
ideas that called, among other things, for a smaller and more performance-oriented 
government. 
Rich (2004) identifies two broad political developments in the 1970s.  First, three 
distinct groups became politically mobilized: the business and corporate world, neo-
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conservatives, and fundamentalist Christians.  Second, higher education institutions and 
major policy actors became more accepting of neoclassical economic theories.  In the late 
1970s and 1980s, the promarket ideology was largely out of favor in the US; however, it 
began to gain popularity in the 1990s.  Over the last three decades, neoliberalism came to 
dominate the modern ideological field and became the “defining political economic 
paradigm of our time” (McChesney, 1999, p. 7).  The consequence of this change was the 
ascendancy of the corporate and market cultures in all aspects of life in the USA, 
including education (Giroux, 2002). 
In the early 1990s, the public’s attitude toward government institutions began to 
change and voters started to express concerns about costs, efficiency, and results.  
Policymakers responded to these concerns by adopting corporate management practices 
(Ruppert, 1995).  A major change in public management was due to the emergence of the 
Reinventing Government movement at the federal level (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; 
Thompson & Riccucci, 1998).  This initiative shifted public management from a 
regulatory controls paradigm to a results paradigm (Burke & Serban, 1997).  Using 
benchmarks to measure performance and implement changes, it aimed at achieving 
greater results with fewer resources.  Due to this reform, the notions of accountability, 
performance, and results began to permeate governmental agencies (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992).  Aiming to enhance government performance and increase accountability of public 
agencies regarding quality, efficiency, and effectiveness, state governments introduced 
management for results and performance-based funding schemes (Ingraham & 
Moynihan, 2001; Klein, 2005; Willoughby & Melkers, 2001). 
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These developments at the national level have brought about changes in state 
contexts.  The state-level factors are crucial because public higher education is the 
managerial and financial responsibility of the states.  States provide the bulk of funds for 
public institutions through appropriations and an appreciable portion of student aid, 
payable directly to students (Heller, 2001a). 
Regarding demographic trends, demand for higher education has been on the rise.  
Enrollment kept growing throughout the 1990s, despite constantly rising tuition fees 
(Heller, 1999).  The number of nontraditional and historically underrepresented students 
has rapidly increased, changing the demographic landscape of higher education.  
Accommodating increasing numbers of students, the physical and fiscal capacity of 
higher education institutions has been put to the test. 
The demographic pressures were aggravated by an unstable fiscal context.  In 
accord with fluctuations in the national economy, financial support of higher education 
has had its ups and downs, with important consequences for the structure of higher 
education finance.  State financial support for higher education is crucial because “[e]ven 
today, with budgets emerging from crisis, the states provide over four dollars of support 
for higher education expenses for every dollar of federal subsidy” (Archibald & Feldman, 
2006, p. 618) and all economic downturns in state economies have affected higher 
education.  The 1989-90 state fiscal crisis produced especially long-lasting consequences. 
Findings of various studies suggest two opposite trends: State support has recently 
declined and, alternatively, state support has recently increased.  To illustrate, Archibald 
and Feldman (2006) contend that since the late 1970s, the aggregate state effort has 
dropped by 30 percent; Mortenson (2004) finds that state appropriations for higher 
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education have dropped by 40 percent since 1978.  In contrast, Ruppert (1995) asserts 
that the 1980s were a time of abundance, with annual increases in appropriations often 
exceeding 10 percent; it was “a period of slowed enrollment growth and an expanding 
resource base” (p. 16).  After a recession in the early 1990s, there was a temporary 
decline in state support; however, later in the decade, there were increases in state 
appropriations due to the recovery of the national economy. 
The Grapevine database, an annual compilation of state tax support of higher 
education, shows that the overall fiscal support has significantly increased.  State 
investment in the enterprise grew, incrementally, from about $7 billion in 1970 to about 
$77.5 billion in 2008.  However, starting with FY02 and FY03, state support for higher 
education began to decline for the first time and annual increases in appropriations 
significantly slowed down (Grapevine, n.d.).  Toutkoushian (2006) resolves these 
conflicting findings by suggesting that the often-cited decline in state support is relative 
to the growth in other state government priorities and it does not reflect the direct level of 
state funding. 
To explain these conflicting findings, Trostel and Ronca (2007) propose a unified 
measure of state support for higher education.  They find that state support for higher 
education was almost constant between 1980 and 1984, grew rapidly between 1984 and 
1987, grew slowly between 1987 and 1995 (with a drop in FY 1992), was constant from 
1995 through 2002, and started to decline significantly from 2002 through 2005.  The 
critical change began with the slowdown of the national economy in the early 2000s. 
The above-mentioned tax revolt also led to a retreat of public support for higher 
education.  This development was exacerbated by rising costs—a combination which 
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presented severe financial problems for public higher education (Archibald & Feldman, 
2006).  Competition for scarce state resources began to intensify in the early 1990s due to 
an economic recession (Serban, 1998).  As a discretionary item on state budgets, in direct 
competition with K-12 education, corrections, health care, and public assistance, higher 
education has begun to lose its share of the total state budget (Ruppert, 1995; 
Toutkoushian (2006). 
The consequences of declining state financial support (in relative and absolute 
terms) involved rising tuition, reducing financial aid, increasing attrition, changing 
enrollment patterns, and decreasing faculty salaries (Ehrenberg, 2006).  To compensate 
for declining state appropriations, institutions had to rely more heavily on tuition and fees 
for revenue.  As a result, tuition and fees began to rise rapidly (College Board, 2004).  In 
the 1990s, tuition paid by students started to surpass state appropriations for the first time, 
bringing about a fundamental structural change in higher education finance (Breneman & 
Finney, 1997).  This shift of responsibility for higher education costs from governments 
to consumers is referred to as cost-sharing (Johnstone & Preeti, 2000). 
Finally, the above political and ideological changes, in combination with the 
fiscal pressures, led to changes in the ideological context of higher education.  Some 
policy analysts argue that the increasingly powerful ideology of market capitalism 
(neoliberalism) pushed for marketization, privatization, and corporatization of higher 
education (Ayers, 2005; Baez, 2007; Giroux, 2002; Jones, 2009; Olssen & Peters, 2005; 
Saunders, 2010; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  Due to this influence and in response to 
declining state support, higher education institutions have adopted nontraditional, 
28 
 
entrepreneurial practices to ensure their survival and to gain an edge over competition 
(Hearn, 2003; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
However, despite frequent references to the creeping influence of neoliberalism, 
little systematic evidence supports this assertion.  Such conclusions are often made on the 
basis of discourse analysis of texts relating to higher education (Baez, 2007; Jones, 2009) 
or anecdotal evidence (Giroux, 2002; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  However, it is possible 
that other ideological stories could explain the same data differently.  According to 
Saunders (2010), “most literature on colleges and universities still fails to connect 
changes in the dominant socio-economic policy to changes within colleges and 
universities” (pp. 66-67).  Thus, the argument that market capitalism has affected higher 
education remains to be empirically tested. 
In public education, there emerged a common political and policy agenda, 
focusing on accountability, efficiency, productivity, and improvement (Wellman, 2001).  
Several factors shaped this new agenda for higher education.  Globally, the World Bank-
promoted reform agenda, which is based on the principles of neoliberal economics, puts a 
high premium on higher education privatization, marketization, and deregulation 
(Johnstone, Arora, & Experton, 1998).  Also, although higher education is deemed 
indispensable for serving state needs and ensuring social mobility, it is increasingly 
becoming less accessible due to rapidly increasing tuition fees (Ruppert, 1995).  Finally, 
due to tuition spikes and perceived inefficiency of higher education, public and 
legislative discontent with higher education has been on the rise and these concerns have 
required urgent policy responses (Serban, 1998).        
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Accountability Movement in Higher Education 
Accountability is not a new thing in higher education, and in various forms it can 
be traced back almost to colonial times (Bogue & Aper, 2000).  However, the era of 
intense governmental and public scrutiny of higher education started in the past several 
decades (Burke, 2001a, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Burke & Minassians, 2002).  
Accountability became an extensively discussed topic in the 1970s, and the movement 
gained momentum in the early 1990s (Burke, 2005a).  Based on the main concerns of 
each period, Burke (2005b) identifies four phases in the accountability movement: (a) 
1970s: focus on economy and centralized state regulations; (b) 1980s: concern with 
quality outcomes in student learning, campus processes, and institutional improvement; 
(c) 1990s: focus on state priorities, performance production, and results; and (d) 2000s: 
greater reliance on private market forces with less emphasis on public priorities. 
Over the past decades, states’ priorities have shifted from ensuring access to 
higher education to demanding greater accountability (Burke, 2005b; Levine, 1997).  
Because of this shift, “[g]overnmental authorities are no longer as receptive to the 
traditional self-regulatory processes that have dominated university development for 
centuries” (Alexander, 2000, p. 411).  The stakeholders have focused attention on higher 
education productivity and efficiency and demanded “value for money,” that is, better 
outcomes of using public resources.  As a result, public higher education often found 
itself in a position when it had to demonstrate that “colleges and universities are neither 
privileged havens of waste nor institutions so out of touch with reality that they are on the 
verge of losing their relevance” (Massy & Zemsky, 1994, p. 1). 
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The paradigm shift in accountability occurred in the 1990s when its goals changed 
from accounting for expenditures and complying with rules to accounting for outcomes 
and producing results (Burke, 2005c).  This change was driven by a growing perception 
that traditional measures of performance, peer review and market choice, no longer were 
adequate indicators of value (Alexander, 2000).  The concept of accountability began to 
denote demonstrating return on state investment in higher education (Alexander, 2000; 
Ewell, 1994).  This new focus on performance produced a variety of performance 
accountability policies (McLendon et al., 2006; Ruppert, 1995).  During that time, budget 
allocations began to be linked to performance on accountability measures (Zumeta, 
2001).  By 2003, nearly three-quarters of the states had adopted programs relating 
performance to budgeting (Burke, 2003). 
The above change in the nature of accountability was caused by several factors.  
Most important, “[p]ublic higher education had become too important and too costly to 
states to ignore campus results” (Burke, 2001a p. 2).  On the one hand, higher education 
is increasingly viewed as investment in human development and as a means of raising 
economic competitiveness of states and nations (Alexander, 2000; Blondal, Field, & 
Girouard, 2002).  Governments now expect higher education to play a key role in 
creating highly performing economies.  As a result, the economic motivation of states has 
grown stronger, and governments started to demand greater efficiency in using public 
resources from institutions (Alexander, 2000). 
On the other hand, growing financial pressures on state governments led to 
limitations of public expenditures.  A squeeze on public spending has intensified 
competition for public resources and deprioritized higher education on the governments’ 
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agendas; this situation was aggravated by a massive expansion of higher education 
(McLendon et al., 2006; Zumeta, 2001).  Many policymakers believed that the reduction 
of institutional funding would cause higher education to become more efficient in the use 
of public resources and accountable to state demands (Alexander, 2000).  Some policy 
analysts argue that the hope to cut higher education expenditures was the real motive for 
the increased push for accountability (Burke & Associates, 2002). 
Mounting public criticism of higher education has been fueled by two major 
factors: concerns about access to, and affordability of, higher education and perception 
that higher education as a necessary source for individual and state success (Burke, 
2005a; Heller, 2001b).  It has led to growing public pressures for greater productivity and 
efficiency of institutions.  Facing limited funding while trying to maintain quality, higher 
education institutions had to charge students more for their services.  As a result, “[i]n 
return for growing fiscal reliance on student user fees, governments are demanding more 
stringent and informative accountability requirements” (Alexander, 2000, p. 419).  A 
greater reliance on user fees has contributed to public insistence on accountability. 
The executive and legislative branches of state governments have been critical of 
higher education; the main objects of criticism are skyrocketing institutional costs, 
unresponsiveness of higher education to societal and economic demands, and inadequate 
self-regulation on the part on institutions (Alexander, 2000).  The legislative and 
executive mistrust in higher education has been a major driving force behind the 
assessment and accountability movements in higher education (Astin, 1990; Burke & 
Associates, 2002). 
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The business community has played an active role in the emergence of 
accountability policies in higher education.  In the words of Zumeta (2001), “business 
leaders have applied pressures to universities, directly and through the political process, 
to ‘streamline their production processes’ as they themselves have done” (p. 157).  The 
business community called for greater efficiency and quality of the enterprise, lower 
costs, and better workforce preparation; it has often advocated or supported specific 
accountability policies (Burke & Associates, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2011).  Recent 
structural changes in the national economy have intensified this pressure (McLendon et 
al., 2006).  Experiences of individual states demonstrate that business community could 
greatly affect policy evolution (Natow & Dougherty, 2008; Dougherty et al., 2011). 
Recent reforms in K-12 education have contributed to increasing accountability 
pressure across the entire public education system (McLendon et al., 2006).  Wellman 
(2001) argues that accountability systems in higher education are rooted in the standards 
movement in secondary education.  Some specific techniques, for instance, the report 
card format, were directly borrowed from the K-12 accountability reform (Serban, 1998). 
Public institutions have been generally unwilling to focus on results; this campus 
opposition has produced increased criticism from state governments, the business 
community, and the public (Burke, 2001a).  Astin (1990) maintains that colleges were not 
ready to answer questions about quality, student assessment, and resource use; “the 
institutions themselves have played perhaps the biggest part in laying the groundwork for 
state-sponsored assessment initiatives” (p. 35).  Alexander (2000) comments that 
“[e]arlier attempts by states to measure institutional efficiency and performance have 
generally been met with passive resistance or benign neglect in academic circles” (p. 
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411).  Thus, passivity of institutions has also been a key factor in the growth of 
government interference in the higher education arena. 
Performance funding has been an offspring of the general accountability 
movement.  It emerged as part of “the contemporary movement to hold public higher 
education to rigorous accountability standards devised by state policymakers and 
increasingly tied to budget allocations” (Zumeta, 2001, p. 188).  This policy intended to 
balance external accountability with institutional improvement and state priorities with 
academic goals.  Also, it has been a policy response to external pressures to demonstrate 
the effective use of public funds (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Modarresi, 2000).  
However, in its first reincarnation, performance funding has often proved controversial in 
nature, difficult in implementation, and weak in effects on institutional performance.  As 
a result, many programs adopted by states in different years ended up as policy failures. 
 
Aspects and Precursors of Performance Funding 
The concept and implementation of performance funding have departed from 
traditional higher education practices in the following areas: outcomes assessment and 
accountability, institutional improvement and quality enhancement, resource allocation 
and budgeting, and state and market relationships in higher education reform.  Thus, four 
perspectives are useful for understanding this policy holistically: performance funding as 
(a) an accountability tool, (b) a means of institutional improvement and quality 
enhancement, (c) a budgetary and resource allocation tool, and (d) an expression of 
higher education privatization and corporatization.  In each of these areas, performance 
funding had specific precursors, which it came to supplant or supplement.     
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Precursors of Performance Funding as an Accountability Tool 
The accountability movement has progressed through three main stages: 
outcomes assessment, performance reporting, and performance funding (Burke & 
Modarresi, 2000).  Thus, performance funding had two precursors in the area of higher 
education accountability: outcomes assessment and performance reporting.  These 
policies were the most popular state accountability systems in the 1980s.  Neither 
outcomes assessment nor performance reporting has gone completely away with the 
advent of performance funding: Many states have implemented these policies 
concomitantly.  In some periods, performance reporting has been more popular than 
performance funding and performance budgeting (Burke & Minassians, 2002, 2003). 
Outcomes assessment.  A growing popularity of the concept of higher education 
accountability was the key factor behind the assessment movement (Astin, 1990).  In the 
1980s, the issues of quality and accountability dominated the public discussions 
(Freeman, 2000).  State legislatures were concerned with assessment of educational 
performance, development of accountability measures, improvement of productivity, and 
reallocation of resources (Bogue, Creech, & Folger, 1993).  Such pervasive push for 
accountability led to development of performance and outcomes measures aimed at 
evaluating institutional effectiveness.  As a result, in the last half of the 1980s, outcomes 
assessment began to dominate accountability (Ewell, 1996; Layzell, 2001). 
Although statewide assessment systems spread swiftly across the country, their 
overall impact on institutions was insignificant and mostly disappointing to policymakers 
(Burke, 2001a).  Outcome assessments did not provide credible and comparable evidence 
of institutional performance that officials desired (Ewell, 1996).  Serban (1998) suggests 
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that outcomes assessment was abandoned due to its inability to meet the accountability 
demands of state policymakers and because of the 1989-1990 state fiscal crisis.  
According to Burke (2001a), “[t]he failure of assessment to achieve accountability led 
states to adopt performance policies with teeth” (p. 4).  Thus, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, many states turned to performance reporting (Ruppert, 1994). 
Performance reporting.  In the 1990s, the thrust of the accountability movement 
switched to performance indicators (Bogue & Hall, 2003).  “[O]utcomes indicators have 
emerged as an instrumental economic rationality devised to improve institutional 
efficiency and effectiveness” (Alexander, 2000, p. 419).  During that time, the major 
emphasis was placed on information, that is, reporting data on institutional performance 
and results to state legislatures, state agencies, and the public (Zumeta, 2000).  
Performance reporting focused on undergraduate education and pursued the 
following goals: demonstrating accountability; improving institutional performance; 
meeting state needs, especially ones pertaining to economic development; and increasing 
state funding for institutions, which was the tacit goal of campus leaders (Burke, 2001a).  
In contrast to institution-based and internally focused assessment, performance reporting 
used comparable metrics among institutions. 
By 2000, 30 states introduced performance reporting (Burke, 2001a).  However, 
despite this widespread policy adoption, the extent to which policymakers used its results 
and its effects on campuses were unclear.  Performance reporting was information-driven 
but it did not offer any financial incentives.  “The lack of fiscal consequences helps to 
explain the neglect of the performance reports by state and campus policy makers.  
Policies not connected to budgets get little attention in state capitals or on college 
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campuses” (Burke, 2001a, p. 7).  Policymakers started to doubt that performance 
reporting can hold institutions fully accountable and attempted to link funding to 
measured performance on specific indicators (Zumeta, 2001).  Thus, moving from 
performance reporting to performance funding seemed a logical step to state officials 
(Burke & Modarresi, 2000). 
This paradigm shift in accountability took place in the 1990s: The focus switched 
from assessment to linking funding and performance (Burke & Serban, 1998a).  
“Budgeting has shifted from what states should do for their campuses to what campuses 
should do for their states” (Burke & Serban, 1997, p. 1).  Unlike mostly voluntary 
systems of the 1980s, new accountability policies became mandatory for institutions 
(Layzell, 1999).  Performance funding drew on the experiences of assessment and 
performance reporting; however, it had similar shortcomings (Burke & Modarresi, 2000). 
 
Precursors of Performance Funding as a Quality Enhancement Tool 
Performance funding has departed from traditional methods of quality assurance 
in higher education, such as accreditation, academic program review and audit, licensure 
and certification, follow-up studies of client satisfaction, outcomes assessment, and 
college rankings and ratings (Bogue & Hall, 2003).  It has also been different from 
quality enhancement methods imported from the for-profit sector.  Performance funding 
has not been intended to replace the traditional quality assurance methods; on the 
contrary, it aimed to strengthen all institutional efforts to enhance educational quality. 
Accreditation.  Accreditation is defined as “a process by which an institution of 
postsecondary education evaluates its educational activities, in whole or in part, and seeks 
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an independent judgment to confirm that it is substantially achieving its objectives and is 
generally equal in quality to comparable institutions of postsecondary education” 
(Young, Chambers, Kells, & Associates, 1983, p. xi).  This evaluative method conducted 
by regional agencies has been traditionally used to ensure higher education quality.  The 
most fundamental purposes of accreditation, which make it kindred to performance 
accountability policies, are ensuring quality and aiding in institutional and programmatic 
improvement (Bogue & Hall, 2003).  At the same time, its key difference from 
performance accountability systems is that accreditation focuses on individual 
institutional reports and avoids interinstitutional comparison (Wellman, 2001). 
Total Quality Management (TQM).  TQM originated in the for-profit sector and 
made its way into higher education as part of quality enhancement initiatives (Seymour, 
1992, 1995; Bogue & Hall, 2003).  Thus, quality management cannot be considered a 
traditional approach to quality assurance in higher education. 
According to TQM, the primary purpose of an organization is to stay in business 
and it should do by meeting customer needs through continuous quality improvement, 
process analysis, and performance measurement (Deming, 1986; Hackman & Wageman, 
1995; Ishikawa, 1985; Juran, 1974; Marchese, 1993; Oakland, 2003; Ross, 1993; 
Seymour, 1992).  As Hackman and Wageman (1995) put it, “A fundamental premise of 
TQM is that the costs of poor quality […] are far greater than the costs of developing 
processes that produce high-quality products and services” (p. 310).  Thus, organizational 
survival directly depends on producing quality products and services (Deming, 1993). 
These concepts are important to performance funding, too; however, analysts 
diverge on the role of TQM in ensuring quality in higher education.  Some observers 
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argue that TQM has been another “management fad”: It arrived with a great promise, had 
only a modest impact—mostly on the administrative side, and quietly departed from 
campuses due to implementation difficulties and a lack of a consensus regarding higher 
education quality (Birnbaum, 2000; Bogue & Hall, 2003; Marchese, 1996).  However, 
others assert that strategic quality management is still a better way to manage higher 
education in the era of consumerism (Seymour, 1992, 1995).  As Owlia and Aspinwall 
(1997) note, “The problems that exist with TQM in higher education, however, should 
not overshadow the necessity for change in this area” (p. 540) and “there appears to be no 
apparent reason for rejecting the applicability of TQM as a ‘general philosophy’” (p. 
541). 
Outcomes assessment.  Student Outcomes Assessment of the 1980s was also a 
tool of institutional improvement.  Assessment was mostly campus-based: Institutions 
were held responsible for designing and implementing internal programs of institutional 
assessment (Ruppert, 1995).  According to Neal (1995), “assessment strategies were 
internally focused, institutionally developed, and largely voluntary in nature” (p. 6).  
Thus, the major focus of the movement was on institutional improvement, and 
accountability was more of a “by-product when institutions provided qualitative evidence 
of assessment activities” (Ruppert, 1995, p. 16).  The major contribution of assessment 
was that it “promoted a new notion of institutional quality based on results not resources, 
on performance not prestige” (Burke, 2001a, p. 4); this notion was later borrowed by 
performance reporting and performance funding.     
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Precursors of Performance Funding as a Budgetary Tool 
Linking fiscal resources to demonstrable results represents a departure from 
traditional budgeting approaches—formula, incremental, and initiative budgeting—which 
focus on inputs and processes and do not consider performance in resource allocation 
(Burke & Associates, 2002).  Performance funding was rooted in popular budgetary 
reforms of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Anders, 2001; Burke & Serban, 1998a; Hager, 
Hobson, & Wilson, 2001); and it came to supplement, and not to replace, the traditional 
resource allocation practices.  Prior to performance funding, annual performance 
reporting and resource allocation indicators had been used in the following budgetary 
approaches: Program Budgeting (PB), Program Planning Budgeting Systems (PPBS), and 
Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) (Pyhrr, 1977; Schick, 1977, 1979).  As a concept, 
Performance-Based Budgeting (PBB) preceded these approaches, but it was not widely 
adopted until later. 
Program Budgeting and Program Planning Budgeting Systems.  PB and 
PPBS, which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, were the first approaches that considered 
performance in the budgeting process (Schick, 1966).  These budgeting methods 
emphasized a link to program objectives and planning, related quantifiable objectives to 
activities, and assigned costs and benefits to programs and not to units.  The underlying 
idea was directly related to performance: Output categories should be considered in 
budgetary decisions together with input categories and performance should be improved 
through allocating funds to the most effective means for attaining program goals (Anders, 
2001; Downs & Larkey, 1986; Pilegge, 1992).  Also, “[a]n advantage of program 
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budgeting is that the grouping of similar alternatives into a program may encourage 
competition among them to meet the program’s objectives” (Hager et al., 2001, p. 8). 
Zero-Base Budgeting.  ZBB “was implemented by some governments in the 
1970s as a way to prioritize among different programs and to increase accountability” 
(Hager et al., 2001, p. 9).  ZBB gained popularity in the 1970s: It was adopted by the 
federal government and by roughly half the states by end of the decade (Schick, 1979).  
However, it was never widely used because of its cumbersomeness (Hager et al., 2001). 
This budgeting method requires evaluating all programs and activities and 
appraising performance and costs (Anders, 2001, p. 19).  This method identifies 
measurable objectives and rank-orders “decision packages” of programs and activities, 
based on their current, reduced, and increased levels of funding.  In other words, 
budgeting units propose what they would be able to accomplish at different funding 
levels, and decision makers select the most effective package from a group of possible 
choices (Hager et al., 2001; Pyhrr, 1977; Schick, 1979).  Thus, ZBB prioritizes all 
programs and activities and examines each budgeting unit starting from zero in each 
budgeting period (Hager et al., 2001).  ZBB uses the following performance-based 
component: Each program and activity has to justify its existence and continued support.  
Also, “officials are accountable for the performance of their entire program, not just for 
proposed changes” (Hager et al., 2001, p. 9).  
Performance-Based Budgeting.  PBB, or simply, performance budgeting, holds 
public agencies accountable for achieved results and links state appropriations to 
outcomes of individual programs; its focus on the outcomes is more pronounced than in 
any prior budgetary method (Hager et al., 2001).  As a concept, performance budgeting 
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originated in the 1950s due to the Hoover Commission’s work and was later used by the 
federal and state governments with varying success (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999).  The 
interest in PBB was renewed by the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act and 
the passage of performance budgeting state legislation in the early 1990s.  Eventually, 
higher education borrowed performance budgeting from other government-supported 
services.  Burke and Minassians (2003) report that there were 16 states with performance 
budgeting in the higher education sector in 1997, 28 states in 2000, and 21 states in 2003.  
The focus of performance budgeting on outcomes, accountability, and efficiency 
increased the visibility of performance accountability policies and encouraged 
consideration of all approaches by state policymakers. 
The above methods and approaches were attempts to rationalize budgeting.  
However, in higher education, these budgeting methods were limited to the institutional 
level and turned out to be short-lived.  Higher education generally adopted these 
management and budgetary practices at a time when the government and corporate 
worlds were already giving up on them and eventually abandoned them as well 
(Birnbaum, 2000; Bogue & Hall, 2003).  According to Serban (1998): 
[T]hese budgetary reforms created the basis for the reforms of the 1990s through 
the attempts made to use performance indicators in the state budgetary process for 
public higher education and, in several instances, linking part of the funding for 
public colleges and universities to performance indicators. (p. 18) 
 
Reinventing government.  A political development, the Reinventing 
Government movement, was instrumental in dissemination of performance-based 
budgeting and similar approaches.  It aimed to make governments more responsive to 
citizens by using the corporate customer service model and focusing on results and 
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competition (Hollings, 1996; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  “[I]n government, the most 
important lever—the system that drives behavior most powerfully—is the budget” 
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 161); therefore, resource allocation was deemed to be a 
way to alter agencies’ behavior.  Such ideas were not particularly new: “Budgeting based 
on results got a big push from the popularity of Osborne and Gaebler’s 1992 book 
Reinventing Government, but the logic behind performance budgeting was already well 
known” (Hager et al., 2001, p. 10).  Nevertheless, this movement contributed to the 
emergence and spread of performance-based resource allocation methods. 
The most recent budgetary reform effort in the higher education arena, 
performance funding, has shifted the focus from institutional needs to results in policy 
areas important to the states (Serban, 1998).  At the same time, performance funding was 
intended not to replace the core funding methods but to supplement them. 
 
Precursors of Performance Funding as a Corporatization and Privatization Tool 
An often-cited driving force behind performance accountability is raising 
institutional productivity and efficiency through redefining the relationships between 
higher education and state government, between higher education and the corporate 
world, and among institutions.  From this perspective, performance funding introduction 
is an effort to bring market forces into higher education and make higher education more 
businesslike.  These goals are consistent with neoliberal ideology and practices and with 
ideas of higher education corporatization (Barrow, 1990; Green, 2003; Johnstone et al., 
1998; Saunders, 2010). 
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Performance funding introduces “quasi-markets,” which create competition 
among institutions and encourage them to adopt practices and norms typical of the 
private business sector.  Aiming to steer institutions in the desired direction, this policy 
provides financial incentives and creates “a ‘market’ interaction between the regulator 
and the regulated” (Soo, 2003, p. 2).  Institutions have to justify public support and, in 
some cases, compete for additional money or a portion of the base funding.  This 
marketlike competition is intended to improve institutional performance. 
Adoption of business practices can be an indicator of the drift toward higher 
education corporatization.  Using performance benchmarks and linking results to 
financial incentives have clear corporate origins, and the higher education community 
was often loath to go in that direction.  Frequent campus opposition to the advent of 
performance funding has stemmed from the clash between corporate and academic values 
(Birnbaum, 2000; Burke & Associates, 2002; Natow & Dougherty, 2008). 
The precursors of performance funding in this area are various approaches, which 
are aimed at “creating more market-driven college and university decision systems and 
services” (Gose, 2002).  These practices include two main groups: (a) Incentive funding 
methods—namely, initiative funding, categorical funding, and block grants—which 
provide grants in advance to encourage desired activities (Serban, 1998); and (b) 
Efficiency enhancement methods: Management by Objectives (identifying units’ 
objectives according to the organizational goals and measuring progress toward them), 
the use of benchmarks (performance indicators) and institutional audits (Birnbaum, 2000; 
Wellman, 2001).  The first group of initiatives creates quasi-markets, meant to stimulate 
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compliance with state agendas and instigate adoption of the private sector operational 
norms; the second group introduces performance assessment systems. 
The 1993 book Reengineering the Corporation (Hammer & Champy, 1993) 
inspired a discussion about applying Business Process Reengineering to higher education 
in order to transform institutions into effective sets of business processes and practices 
(Birnbaum, 2000; Green, 2003).  These developments took place around the same time as 
performance funding and, thus, cannot be considered its precursors.  Nevertheless, the 
Reengineering Movement was rather instrumental in states’ consideration and adoption 
of performance funding and other accountability systems (Burke & Associates, 2002). 
To conclude this section, performance funding has emerged as a result of the 
convergence of multiple forces and factors that coexisted in different areas and at 
different levels.  It became a policy response to a variety of influences, stimuli, concerns, 
and issues.  As a result, it has evolved into a multifaceted policy with a checkered history 
of implementation, which requires a comprehensive analysis from multiple perspectives.  
 
Conceptual Frameworks for Policy Adoption and Failure 
This study focuses on two key events in the performance funding policy lifecycle: 
adoption and failure.  I am interested in how long states maintain a specific status 
regarding the policy—preoperational, operational, or nonoperational status—before they 
make the respective policy changes (adoption, failure, or readoption).  Of primary interest 
are (a) the factors that determine the occurrence of events, or transition into a new status, 
and (b) the length of time in a particular condition.  In this study, I propose the following 
theoretical lenses for explaining the emergence and demise of performance funding 
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policy systems: the electoral connection frame, the political environment frame, the 
policy diffusion frame, and the principal-agent frame.  In the subsequent sections, I apply 
these theoretical frames to the analysis of performance funding adoption and failure.  I 
also consider each conceptual lens at length in Chapter 3. 
 
Prior Research on Performance Funding Adoption 
Before discussing the proposed frames, I examine the contribution of a study that 
is of special importance to this research.  This importance stems from a partial similarity 
in research questions and methods and the significance of this study’s findings.  To date, 
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) have conducted the only analysis that 
quantitatively examined the antecedents of performance accountability policies across the 
states and over time.  Their findings, frequently referred to in this dissertation, are critical 
to the understanding of performance funding evolution and my hypotheses. 
McLendon et al. (2006) examined state-level factors that determined adoption of 
three accountability policies: performance funding, performance budgeting, and 
performance reporting.  To this end, the researchers employed a policy innovation and 
diffusion framework (Berry & Berry, 1990, 1992) and the analytical technique of event 
history analysis.  By testing ten hypotheses regarding adoption of performance 
accountability policies, they examined the role of the states’ internal characteristics and 
interstate policy diffusion.  Their predictors included states’ educational attainment, 
change in gross state product, legislative professionalism, percentage of Republicans in 
the legislature, gubernatorial power, Republican gubernatorial control, change in tuition 
at state flagship universities, change in public higher education enrollment, the presence 
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of consolidated governing boards, and the percent of bordering states with similar 
policies (pp. 8-9).  The findings relating to performance funding are discussed in the 
respective sections; these findings supported the researchers’ hypotheses only in part. 
There are some similarities between this research and McLendon et al.’s (2006) 
study: Both investigations address the determinants of performance funding adoption 
(although the latter also examines adoption of two other policies) and both use event 
history analysis as the primary analytical method.  However, this study is different from 
McLendon et al.’s (2006) research in several respects.  First, while focusing on just 
performance funding, I study the entire policy lifecycle.  In other words, I simultaneously 
analyze the determinants of policy adoption, failure, and readoption.  This approach 
allows me to model performance funding evolution more precisely and in greater detail.  
It also requires using a more sophisticated form of event history analysis than has been 
used previously in the policy adoption and diffusion literature. 
Second, I propose a different interpretation of an operational state policy.  I steep 
it in the discussion of institutions’ reaction to performance funding and directly relate 
policy existence to the government’s decision to fund it.  This approach marks a sharp 
distinction from McLendon et al. (2006), who employed the initial government’s decision 
to adopt a policy as the single criterion for its existence.  This discrepancy in the policy 
conceptualization provides for different findings and their interpretations. 
Finally, McLendon et al. (2006) used the policy innovation and diffusion frame 
(Berry & Berry, 1990, 1992), while I employ four distinct theoretical frames—each with 
its own set of hypotheses—to investigate the factors influencing performance funding 
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evolution.  This approach ensures greater conceptual clarity of policy development and 
allows using more predictors. 
 
The Electoral Connection Frame: Introduction 
The fundamental idea of the electoral connection theory is straightforward.  It 
postulates that when considering a policy shift, politicians reckon with voters’ opinions 
and wishes.  However, this simple idea has consequential theoretical ramifications, which 
may rapidly become involved.  This section considers key developments of the electoral 
connection theory. 
The basic assumptions of this frame are as follows: Voters and policymakers are 
rational actors trying to maximize their own utility and anticipating each other’s 
preferences.  Constituents vote based on their preferences and are aware of the 
incumbents’ policy positions.  Rational voters decide which party will benefit them most 
and whether it has any chances of winning.  The public evaluates candidates for office 
based on how their platforms align with its ideological preferences, votes for politicians 
whose policy positions are closest to its preferences, and withdraws support of politicians 
who do not align with its preferences.  Constituents expect incumbents to adopt policies 
in response to their concerns, crises, or inadequate state performance.  In turn, rational 
policymakers are driven by their desire to be elected and adopt or abandon policies based 
on voter preferences.  Responsiveness to voter preferences makes parties in power 
converge around the preferences of the median voter and enact policies that are aligned 
with these preferences (Ahmed & Green, 2000; Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; 
Borcherding & Deacon, 1972; Bowen, 1943; Craw, 2008; Downs, 1957; Erikson, Wright, 
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McIver, 1989; Farnham, 1987; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 2002, 2004; Robers, 1977; Romer 
& Rosenthal, 1984; Shafritz, Layne, & Borick, 2005; Stevens, 1993). 
One central assumption of this theory is the rationality of the actors’ behavior.  
Rationality assumes that the decision-making process aims to produce outcomes that 
maximize the values of decision makers (Birnbaum, 1988).  Allison and Zelikow (1999), 
note, “to choose rationally is to select the most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative 
that maximizes output for a given input or minimizes input for a given output” (p. 17). 
This frame also assumes that voters are knowledgeable about incumbents’ policy 
positions and can influence policy development through their influence on elected 
officials via the voting mechanism.  In the situation when incumbents have more 
knowledge about policies than voters, elections become the main tool of citizens’ control 
over government and voting is the primary incentive to discipline politicians (Besley & 
Case, 1995; Rogoff, 1990; Weissberg, 1976). 
The above assumptions include key features of the following ramifications of the 
electoral connection theory: the median voter theorem, the political business cycle, the 
yardstick competition, and the issue attention cycle.  If one accepts the above 
assumptions, these developments of the electoral connection theory lend themselves to 
empirical testing. 
Median voter theorem.  The median voter theorem has been widely employed in 
economic and political research.  The works by Hotelling (1929), Bowen (1943), Downs 
(1957), Black (1958), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981) laid the 
foundation for this theory.  Some subsequent studies provided evidence supporting its 
assumptions (Husted & Kenny, 1997; Lindert, 1994, 1996; Mueller, 1989; Mueller & 
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Stratmann, 2003), while other studies refuted them or supported them only partially 
(Bernstein, 1989; Fiorina, 1974; Romer & Rosenthal, 1979; Rosen, 1988). 
The median voter is the enfranchised citizen situated in the middle of a 
distribution of single-peaked preferences along a single evaluative dimension.  In other 
words, there are equal numbers of voters below her, with preferences for less, and above 
her, with preferences for more (Black, 1958; Doyle, 2007b; Stevens, 1993).  The theory 
showed that the median voter is always the winner: Her vote becomes decisive and her 
utility is maximized.  However, for this to happen, the following conditions must be met: 
(a) preferences are single-peaked and there is one unifying dimension, (b) there is 
universal suffrage and majority rule and everyone votes, and (c) there is repeated voting 
(Black, 1958; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Roberts, 1977; Stevens, 1993). 
The first condition may seem unattainable in the real world.  However, Downs 
(1957) and later Romer and Rosenthal (1984) suggested ideology—that is, political 
preferences along the liberal-conservative continuum—as a single dimension in which 
voter preferences are single-peaked.  Such a unifying ideological dimension provides for 
greater stability in the political process (Romer & Rosenthal, 1984).  The median voter is 
thus situated in the middle of a distribution of political preferences.  On a liberal-
conservative spectrum and under universal franchise and majority rule, the median voter 
prevails (Downs, 1957; Romer & Rosenthal, 1984; Stevens, 1993). 
Alternatively, the median voter can be conceptualized as a voter with the median 
income; median income is often used as a proxy for the median voter in economic studies 
(Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; Inman, 1978; Kearns, 1994; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; 
Romer & Rosenthal, 1982).  In the words of Kearns (1994), “Since the median voter is 
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not definable, a convenient proxy has often been used—the voter with the median income 
level” (p. 345).  Certainly, in this conceptualization, the median voter is also the winner.  
Meltzer and Richard (1981) demonstrate that under universal franchise and majority rule, 
the voter with the median income is decisive in single-issue elections (pp. 920-923). 
In addition to the majority rule, the second condition requires that everyone vote, 
which also happens rarely.  Voting abstentions provide for the emergence of a new 
median voter, the pivotal voter, among those who participate in voting.  The pivotal voter 
is different from the true median voter, and this difference depends on the extent of non-
voting (Stevens, 1993).  According to the third condition, the median voter maximizes 
her utility only if a series of votes is taken.  In theory, the median voter can reach her 
position if there is voting without limit. 
To summarize, the median voter is decisive and prevails under majority rule, 
universal franchise, and repeated voting; in other words, her utility is maximized if all the 
above conditions are met (Meltzer & Richard, 1981).  Responding to voter preferences, 
incumbent politicians act cautiously so as not to be seen as taking positions.  As a result, 
parties in power converge on the preferences of the median voter and move to the center 
of the political spectrum (Downs, 1957; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1974, 2002; 2004).  As 
Mayhew (2002) notes, “To the extent that parties and candidates seek election victories 
above all else, they will tend to converge at the voter median and bring on close 
elections” (p. 148). 
Political business cycle.  The second theoretical offshoot of the electoral 
connection frame is the notion of the political business cycle or the “politically induced 
cycles” (Nordhaus, 1975, p. 181).  This concept places emphasis on the importance of the 
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electoral cycle and the electoral considerations of politicians.  It focuses on two major 
factors: proximity of elections and electoral competition.  This perspective states that the 
responsiveness of elected officials to voter preferences is cyclical and is moderated by the 
timing and intensity of elections.  To ensure electoral advantage, politicians use 
policymaking strategically and pragmatically in order to please constituents closer to the 
election time.  Thus, this concept—analogous to business cycles in the private sector—
focuses on the role that the electoral cycle plays in making policy shifts (Nordhaus, 1975; 
Rogoff, 1990; Tufte, 1978). 
The political business cycle is based on the following assumptions: Rational 
incumbents and voters anticipate elections to maximize their utility.  Policymakers and 
parties seek electoral advantage through manipulating policies in a systematic manner.  
Voters have a short (decaying) memory of past events; thus, recent performance of 
candidates for office has a great effect on voters’ expectations of their postelection 
performance.  If officials’ recent performance pleases voters and meets their preferences, 
constituents reward incumbents with votes.  In turn, politicians also anticipate voters to 
pay closer attention to their positions and performance as the election draws near.  To 
enhance their reelection prospects, incumbents seek to please constituents closer to the 
election time.  Thus, policymakers are more likely to adopt popular policies with high 
immediate visibility closer to elections.  Electoral timing and electoral competitiveness 
affect various policy outcomes (Besley & Case, 1995, 2002; Lindbeck, 1976; Nelson, 
2000; Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff, 1990; Tufte, 1978). 
Two key factors constitute the functioning of the political business cycle: (a) 
rational anticipation of voter myopia (decay of voter memories) on the part of incumbents 
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and (b) strategic manipulation of government policies by policymakers aimed at 
obtaining electoral advantage.  As Rogoff (1990) puts it, “[a]ny incumbent politician, 
regardless of his ideological stripes, wants to convince voters that he is doing an efficient 
job running the government” (p. 21).  Politicians take advantage of the supposition that 
“[o]n election day, the memory of recent events is probably more poignant than that of 
ancient ills” (Nordhaus, 1975, p. 182).  Parties act strategically to pursue the goals of 
reelection and policy enactment (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002).  Therefore, the 
pursuit of this optimal partisan policy produces a political business cycle, which is 
characterized by a predictable policy pattern (Nordhaus, 1975).  This pattern involves 
adopting more austere policies early in the term and more voter-pleasing policies closer 
to elections.  Adopting voter-pleasing policies in the election year increases the 
incumbents’ chances of reelection.  In contrast, the least popular policies are more likely 
to be enacted immediately after the elections: Officials would like to adopt them early in 
the term in the hope that voters’ attention will be drawn to other things by the time of the 
next election (Nelson, 2000; Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff, 1990). 
The concept of the political business cycle may be deemed as antithetical to the 
Downs’s model in that “[r]ather than converging at the median, parties and candidates 
engage in a variety of activities designed to win votes” (Barrilleaux et al., 2002, p. 419); 
in other words, parties strategically adapt their policymaking to electoral circumstances.  
The original formulation of the political business cycle by Nordhaus (1975) has 
been criticized on theoretical grounds (Alesina, Cohen, & Roubini, 1992; Nelson, 2000).  
However, the subsequent studies also showed the importance of accounting for electoral 
circumstances and politicians’ responses to them (Barrilleaux, 1997; Barrilleaux et al., 
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2002; Besley & Case, 2002; Doyle et al., 2010).  Thus, the role of electoral timing and 
electoral competitiveness in making public policy shifts deserve more analytical attention 
and empirical testing. 
Yardstick competition.  Another theoretical development of the electoral 
connection frame is the concept of yardstick competition.  Its basic idea that the 
performance of others is used as a benchmark for evaluation was adapted by Besley and 
Case (1995) from the studies of firms (Shleifer, 1985).  This perspective suggests that 
voters appraise relative performance of incumbents (i.e., against the performance of their 
counterparts in neighboring states) and base their voting decisions upon such evaluations.  
“From the media or other sources, voters can gain access to information about what other 
incumbents are doing, which serves as a benchmark for their own jurisdiction” (Besley & 
Case, 1995, p. 30).  As a result, reelection results depend both on the internal policy 
features and policy characteristics of nearby states.  Consequently, yardstick competition 
is an influential factor in the political business cycle, and voters’ comparative evaluation 
of incumbent performance becomes a major driving force for policy competition between 
governments at different levels (Besley & Case, 1995; Rincke, 2004). 
Besley and Case (1995) offer an illustration of states’ tax-setting behavior: 
In a world in which voters make comparisons between states, incumbents may 
look to other states’ taxing behavior before changing taxes at home.  This would 
give rise to a kind of (yardstick) competition between jurisdictions, each caring 
about what the other is doing. (p. 25) 
 
The key assumptions of this perspective include the following.  There is 
information asymmetry between rational and utility-maximizing politicians and their 
constituents; the former are better informed about the policy process and its prospects, 
54 
 
thus, the latter have to rely on comparative performance evaluation.  To evaluate 
performance of their elected officials, voters look to neighboring states for information 
and use them as benchmarks for assessing performance of their own state.  The public 
expects policymakers to make a policy change if they believe that their state is not 
keeping up with its neighbors.  Responding to voter preferences, incumbents enact 
policies similar to the ones in the nearby states.  Thus, policy shifts may occur if 
constituents perceive that their state is behind its neighbors in some respects.  Because 
voters do not want to be too different from what they observe in other states, states 
attempt to get in line with each other.  Thus, relative evaluation of incumbents’ 
performance by voters may lead to strategic interaction between governments in adoption 
of policy innovations (Besley & Case, 1995; Rincke, 2003, 2004; Rork, 2009). 
Examining political consequences of tax increases, Besley and Case (1995) find 
support for the idea of yardstick competition: “The results […] suggest that voters are 
sensitive to the tax changes they face, relative to those observed in neighboring states, 
and that this sensitivity translates into votes against an incumbent whose tax changes are 
high by regional standards” (p. 36). 
Several follow-up studies investigated and discovered various effects of yardstick 
competition among states and local districts both in this country and abroad (Allers & 
Elhorst, 2005; Brueckner, 2003; Edmark & Agren, 2008; Rincke, 2003, 2004; 2009; 
Rork, 2009).  However, it is important to test the role of yardstick competition in 
adoption and failure of other state public policies, including higher education policies. 
Issue attention cycle.  Another major outgrowth of the electoral connection 
theory is the concept of the issue attention cycle; this notion is based on the cyclical view 
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of policy shifts in agenda-setting (Downs, 1972).  According to this perspective, public 
perception of existing problems “reflects the operation of a systematic cycle of 
heightening public interest and then increasing boredom with major issues” (p. 39).  In 
other words, the public attention to an issue is piqued initially; however, at later stages of 
policy evolution, it gradually declines.  Importantly, the objective status of the issue may 
be unrelated to the rise and decline of the popular interest and is determined more by the 
dynamics of the issue-attention cycle itself. 
The cycle includes five stages: the pre-problem stage, alarmed discovery and 
euphoric enthusiasm, realizing the cost of significant progress, gradual decline of intense 
public interest, and the post-problem stage, or moving of the issue into “prolonged 
limbo” (Downs, 1972).  This perspective is important because it offers rationale for the 
emergence and abandonment of public policies in various policy domains.  When public 
attention to the issue is piqued, politicians are more likely to adopt respective policies; 
when it declines, policymakers are more likely to discontinue policies that are too costly 
or difficult to implement.  Thus, the first two stages explain the rise of the issue on the 
policy agenda, while the dynamics of the last three stages could provide for a policy 
failure, especially if the policy faces significant implementation problems.  The specific 
operation of the cycle and duration of each stage depend on the issue and respective 
policies (Cram, 2001; Downs, 1972; Hall, 2002; Peters & Hogwood, 1985; Wrobel & 
Connelly, 2002, 2004).  To be sure, the natural evolution of the median voter’s 
preferences and respective policy shifts may also lead to the policy’s demise. 
The above ramifications of the electoral connection theory have been empirically 
tested in various contexts and demonstrated that electoral politics is of utmost 
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importance.  First, studies of federal and state legislators showed that reelection concerns 
underlie all actions of elected officials, who seek to increase their voters’ trust and 
support and ensure electoral advantage (Fenno, 1978; King, 2001; Mayhew, 1974, 2004).  
Also, responsiveness of political parties to state public opinion was found to determine 
their electoral advantage and success, and electoral circumstances were found to affect 
government strength of political parties (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Erikson et al., 1989). 
Second, the functioning of the political business cycle was tested in multiple 
studies with mixed empirical support for this concept (Alesina, 1988; Barrilleaux et al., 
2002; Besley & Case, 1995; Bizer & Durlaf, 1990; Mikesell, 1978; Nelson, 2000). 
Third, the median voter models were mostly used in the studies of government 
spending and state budgets (Ahmed & Greene, 2000; Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; 
Craw, 2008; Husted & Kenny, 1997; Inman, 1978; Kearns, 1994; Lindert, 1994, 1996; 
Mueller & Stratmann, 2003; Romer & Rosenthal, 1982) and electoral competition 
(Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Fiorina, 1974). 
Finally, several studies tested the concept of the issue attention cycle (Downs, 
1972) in various policy domains and national contexts and found it applicable to 
particular policy issues (Cram, 2001; Hall, 2002; Henry & Gordon, 2001; Peters & 
Hogwood, 1985; Wrobel & Connelly, 2002, 2004; 2006). 
To summarize, when considering a policy change, incumbents keep voter 
preferences in mind.  At the same time, voters are unlikely to control the agenda because 
they lack incentives to do so and are generally politically inactive (Stevens, 1993).  
Unlike policymakers who have incentives to form coalitions, voters yield agenda control 
to state legislatures and government agencies.  Stevens (1993) explains this point: 
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A voter who has intense preferences [...] might agree with other voters that they 
should support a particular course of action, but ironically, the secrecy of the 
voting booth may cause the costs of monitoring each other’s actions to be 
infinitely high.  [...].  This difference in incentives suggests that legislators will be 
politically active but that voters will be politically inactive. (p. 293) 
 
For the purposes of this study, the electoral connection frame emphasizes the role 
of voters in performance funding policy changes and is based on the notion of rational, 
utility-maximizing behavior on the part of both voters and elected officials.  
 
Performance Funding Through the Electoral Connection Lens 
From the electoral connection perspective, elected officials are responsive to voter 
preferences because they are driven by the desire to get reelected into office (Fenno, 
1978; Mayhew, 1973, 2004).  This research examines whether such motivation of 
legislators, coupled with their assumed rationality in making decisions and changes in 
voter preferences, can affect performance funding policy shifts.  If one assumes that 
accountability policies, including performance funding, enjoy public support, then one 
could expect elected officials to adopt these policies rationally and strategically in order 
to please their constituencies and respond to their concerns regarding higher education. 
There have been significant changes in voter preferences and legislative concerns 
over time.  In the era of higher education expansion, the policy focus was on access and 
equity; both the public and legislators were concerned with ensuring access to higher 
education for growing student populations and with equitable resource distribution 
among sectors and institutions.  However, since the advent of the accountability 
movement, the focus has shifted to making colleges responsible for the effective use of 
public support and the production of the desired outcomes (Burke & Associates, 2002). 
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Through elected officials, taxpayers control one of the two main revenue sources 
for higher education—general fund state appropriations (Deaton, 2006).  “Linking 
performance to appropriations gives policy makers and customers a clearer sense of how 
the public’s investment in education is being used” (Carnevale, Johnson, & Edwards, 
1998, p. B7).  In the present context, accountability has acquired a distinct financial 
character: There is a “growing demand that colleges do a better job of accounting for how 
they spend tax dollars” (Carnevale et al., p. B6). 
Due to the emergence of the results paradigm (Burke & Serban, 1997), both the 
public and politicians have become interested in getting “more bang for the buck,” 
demanding greater output for the public resources provided.  It has become unacceptable 
to taxpayers and elected officials to fund resource inputs but ignore performance results 
(Burke, 2002c).  “Taxpayers are not likely to accept the concept that results count in 
every endeavor except government budgeting” (Burke & Serban, 1997, p. 5).  This shift 
in legislative and voter preferences led to adoption of performance-based policy reforms, 
which are results-focused, market-oriented, and information-driven.  From this position, 
the accountability reforms have been implemented in response to increasing public call 
for accountability (Burke, 2005a; Carnevale et al., 1998; Ewell, 2003). 
This general explanation, commonly offered in the literature, identifies key 
factors that could have caused the emergence of the accountability movement and 
adoption of performance accountability policies.  However, it does not explain why, in 
their pursuit of higher education accountability, certain states opted for performance 
funding out of several available alternatives.  If one assumes that voter preferences had 
been the primary driver of performance funding emergence, this assumption begs the 
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question, Why would voters push for performance funding, given the buffet of other 
policy options, some of which may already exist in the state?  Within the electoral 
connection framework, it remains largely unclear whether state officials respond to voter 
pressure for a specific policy or they exercise discretion in responding to general and 
vague public calls for higher education accountability and efficiency. 
A partial answer to this question is offered by the above idea of yardstick 
competition (Besley & Case, 1995).  According to this perspective, voters pressure 
officials to adopt policies similar to the ones that they perceive as effective and 
advantageous in neighboring states.  Thus, in certain contexts, performance funding could 
have been adopted as a result of yardstick competition among states, that is due to voter 
pressure to enact this policy because of its visibility and perceived effectiveness in 
contiguous states.  The chronology of performance funding adoption across states 
demonstrates distinct regional patterns in the policy spread: States generally seem to have 
borrowed this policy from its neighbors.  Thus, it would seem that yardstick competition 
is a valid explanation of performance funding migration among states.  However, a 
different causal mechanism—diffusion of policy innovation among states due to mutual 
social learning (Walker, 1969; Berry & Berry, 1999)—may have created the same 
chronology and policy spread.  I consider the concept of policy diffusion later in this 
chapter and in Chapter 3. 
The electoral connection frame explains the policy demise by changes in voter 
preferences, dynamics of the political business cycle, negative examples of other states, 
and policy evolution through the issue attention cycle.  However, these models cannot 
fully explain differences in performance funding longevity, offer little understanding of 
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differences in policy failure determinants among states, and do not account for various 
types of policy failure. 
McLendon et al.’s (2006) study was the first comprehensive empirical 
investigation of the factors affecting adoption of performance accountability policies.  
Some of their hypotheses are relevant to the electoral connection frame.  For example, 
they hypothesized that (a) “pressures on public higher education to demonstrate its 
performance will be greatest in those states where levels of educational attainment are 
lowest” (p. 5); (b) “states with poorer economic climates will have heightened incentives 
for ensuring that public agencies are making wise use of limited public resources” (p. 5); 
and (c) states experiencing rapid growth in undergraduate tuition levels will be more 
likely to adopt performance policies.  The researchers relate the last factor to the role of 
state officials, which is more in line with the political environment frame.  However, it is 
possible to reconceptualize this factor in terms of voter pressure to hold institutions 
accountable in the times of escalating higher education costs.  It is important that 
McLendon et al.’s (2006) find no empirical support for these hypotheses. 
I conclude that the electoral connection frame can explain some factors and 
dynamics of the accountability movement and performance funding policy shifts.  
However, it fails to explain why states choose performance funding out of several 
alternatives and what other factors—besides changing voter preferences, electoral timing, 
and waning public interest in the issue—may contribute to policy failure.  Another 
shortcoming of this frame is that it disregards the independent role of state policymakers 
in affecting policy adoption and failure.  The electoral connection frame also fails to 
consider the influence of various interest groups, for instance, organized business 
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interests, that influence policy outcomes.  Most important, this frame does not fully 
explain the mechanisms by which general voter preferences are translated into specific 
policies through the political process of policymaking.    
 
The Political Environment Frame: Introduction 
The political environment frame embraces partisan and ideological forces that 
affect the policy lifecycle.  Unlike the electoral connection theory, this perspective argues 
that policymakers do not merely follow voters; on the contrary, state officials exercise 
much discretion, initiate and propose their own policy solutions, and attempt to get voters 
to accept these ideas.  This frame presumes the leadership role of political parties in 
promoting policy agendas.  To convince the public about the right way to run the country, 
political parties promote and advocate different policy scenarios and make these 
arguments both to themselves and to voters.  Parties and politicians exercise leadership, 
set the policy agenda, and engage in strategies to get the public to go along with them.  
When in power, they adopt policies with specific ideological positions; in other words, 
ideologies determine the proposed policy solutions.  From the policy development 
perspective, it is important that party representation in government and party views have 
a cyclical pattern.  Therefore, their effects on policy evolution vary with time.  In brief, 
partisan and ideological factors are critical to all stages of policy development—agenda 
setting, policy adoption, and policy failure (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; 
Klingman & Lammers, 1984; Wright, Erikson, & McIver, 1987). 
Examining partisan and ideological factors of policy evolution, the political 
environment frame focuses on key state policymakers, legislators and governors.  These 
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elected officials play an important role in policy development, including higher education 
policies.  According to Wellman (2001), “[s]tate legislatures and governors have long 
played a critical role in higher education policy, through the power of the budget and 
their influence on the agendas and membership of public governing boards” (p. 49).  
Therefore, both party membership and the ideological positions of state policymakers are 
critical determinants of all policy changes. 
Partisanship.  The literature shows that partisan strength influences policy 
outcomes at the state level (Alt & Lowry, 2000; Berry & Berry, 1990).  In the words of 
McLendon et al. (2006), “party control of government institutions may help explain the 
policy behaviors of states” (p. 6).  If one party has unified control over the state 
legislature, it has fewer obstacles in enacting desired legislation (Squire & Hamm, 2005). 
Partisanship matters because it has come to be aligned—together with ideological 
positions—with specific policy objectives (Doyle, 2007a).  Members of the Republican 
party are deemed to be more oriented toward accountability, choice, efficiency, and the 
promotion of business interests in government programs and to be more suspicious of 
public bureaucracy.  In contrast, Democrats are more concerned with issues of equity and 
strengthening of financial support for welfare and education programs (Alt & Lowry, 
2000; Doyle, 2007a; McLendon et al., 2006). 
In public higher education, Republicans tend to emphasize efficiency and choice 
through the education market; Democrats focus more on the opportunity to participate in 
higher education (Doyle, 2007a; Lyall & Sell, 2005; McLendon et al., 2005).  Also, 
“Republicans seem to be much more concerned about holding institutions accountable for 
their use of resources.  Democrats seem to be much more concerned about the effect of 
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tuition increases on the opportunity of different groups to attend higher education” 
(Doyle, 2007a, p. 370).  Partisan differences also greatly determine legislative responses 
to higher education funding needs and requests.  On the majority of issues at the national 
level, congressional Democrats generally have been more responsive and sympathetic to 
such requests than Republicans (Cook, 1998).  At the state level, Democratic officials 
also tend to allocate more resources to public higher education than Republicans 
(Archibald & Feldman, 2006; McLendon et al., 2007; Okunade, 2004). 
At the same time, Doyle (2007a) finds that Democrats and Republicans in 
Congress do not differ significantly on the issue of efficiency.  One can assume that this 
finding holds true for the parties’ representatives in the state legislatures.  The current 
financial crisis in higher education, and bleak prospects for the future of public support, 
can partially explain this lack of difference in the parties’ views regarding higher 
education efficiency.  Wellman (2001) explains this point: 
[I]t is a widely held belief that state funds for higher education will not grow 
enough to accommodate future demand if resources are used in the same way as 
they have been thus far. […] As a result, state decision-makers are keenly 
interested in promoting efficiency and productivity in higher education. (p. 49) 
 
Ideology.  Ideology was generally defined as “a verbal image of the good society 
and of the chief means of constructing such a society” (Downs, 1957, p. 96).  The 
prevailing ideology of state citizens and political leaders is a crucial determining factor in 
state-level policymaking and is quite distinct from partisanship (Berry et al., 1998; Doyle, 
2004, 2006; Erikson, McIver, & Wright, 1987).  Researchers found that state political 
ideology affects the content of policy, the avowed ideological positions of state parties, 
the actions of state policymakers, and the process of policy adoption, diffusion, and 
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termination (Berry et al., 1998; Erikson et al., 1989; Grogan, 1994; Grossback, 
Nicholson-Crotty, & Peterson, 2004; Hearn et al., 2008; Klingman & Lammers, 1984; 
Volden, 2007; Wright et al., 1987). 
Grossback et al. (2004) and Volden (2007) demonstrate that ideological 
preferences of state governments that have made a particular policy shift affect the 
probability of ideologically proximate states following suit.  Thus, ideological similarity 
among states may become a crucial determinant of policy adoption or failure.  From the 
research perspective, ideological proximity of policy lending and policy borrowing states 
may shed more light on the process whereby states learn from each other’s experiences. 
Partisanship overlaps with ideology only partially.  In the words of Doyle (2006), 
“[w]hereas many liberals are Democrats and conservatives are Republicans, the concepts 
of ideology and partisanship are not identical. […]  [p]artisan identification may be quite 
different than ideological position” (p. 267).  Besides, in many respects, parties behave in 
a like manner; this means that, in some contexts, partisanship-driven behavior of elected 
officials may run contrary to the avowed ideological positions. 
Bardach (1976) provides the following illustration: 
The American political system, like most others, rewards novelty and innovation. 
Even Republicans prefer to talk of cutting back government in generalities only. 
When it comes to specifics, Republicans resemble Democrats in drawing the 
electorate’s attention to “positive” contributions, that is, new programs and policy 
initiatives. (p. 129) 
 
Therefore, to analyze the determinants of policy emergence and demise, one must 
take into consideration state-specific partisan and ideological factors and their changes 
over time.      
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Performance Funding Through the Political Environment Lens 
As a theoretical concept and public policy, performance funding is rooted in a 
particular ideology and has a specific partisan bias. 
In broad-brush terms, liberal ideology supports active government interventions to 
ensure equity, while conservative ideology promotes a limited government role and 
market-based approaches using incentives to steer public institutions in a desired 
direction (Doyle, 2006; Klingman & Lammers, 1984).  Therefore, performance funding, 
which introduces rewards for enhanced institutional performance and elements of 
marketlike competition, gravitates toward the conservative ideology and departs from the 
liberal end of the ideological scale.  By adopting these policy systems, state policymakers 
send the following message to higher education: “Public higher education is essential to 
state interests but it should become more efficient and more effective in meeting student 
and state needs” (Burke & Serban, 1998b, p. 1). 
Generally, performance funding pursues the following goals: (a) holding 
institutions accountable for results and performance; (b) enhancing institutional quality 
and efficiency; and (c) meeting state needs, especially economic needs.  These goals 
reflect some of the most pressing issues in public higher education—accountability, 
quality, productivity, and responsiveness.  Therefore, partisan differences associated with 
the exigency of these issues are expected to exert influence on this policy evolution.  At 
the same time, some authors express skepticism about the actual effect of partisan 
differences on adoption of performance accountability systems (Burke & Associates, 
2002). 
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The finding that congressional Republicans and Democrats do not differ 
significantly on the issue of efficiency (Doyle, 2007) may aid in understanding why 
performance funding has frequently survived drastic changes in state political leadership.   
The same objectives pursued by legislators of different partisan and ideological 
identification—enhancing higher education accountability, searching for effective 
methods of resource allocation, and, occasionally, cutting budgets (Shin & Milton, 
2004)—undergirded the trend of performance funding adoption in the 1990s. 
McLendon et al. (2006) examine the antecedents of performance accountability 
policies.  This study provides an empirical proof of the importance of legislative party 
strength for performance funding adoption.  The researchers find that a larger Republican 
presence in state legislatures is significantly related to performance funding adoption 
whereas a smaller percentage of Republican legislators is associated with adoption of a 
rival program, performance budgeting.  The authors offer two possible explanations for 
their findings.  The first one resorts to ideological differences between the parties 
regarding government accountability: “Republicans may favor performance-funding 
policies because these initiatives offer elected officials the strongest leverage for 
ratcheting up accountability pressures within the large public bureaucracy of higher 
education” (p. 18).  The second explanation focuses on changes in partisan oversight of 
higher education bureaucracy; when Republicans win over legislatures, as they did in the 
1990s, they start to oversee the bureaucracy put in place by their Democratic 
predecessors.  Also, McLendon et al. (2006) fail to find support for the hypotheses that 
legislative professionalism, gubernatorial strength, or gubernatorial partisanship 
determine performance funding adoption. 
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Ideological factors have also contributed to the advent of performance funding.  
Most states adopted their first performance funding policies in the 1990s, with the trend 
being most salient in the mid-nineties.  After the Republican takeover of Congress in 
1994, they proposed and partly implemented the Contract with America, the conservative 
agenda for national renewal.  During that decade, there emerged an idea of a smaller, 
performance-oriented government, which is interested in outcomes-based funding.  
Therefore, the advent of performance funding could be a symptom of the times when 
conservative ideology was becoming predominant in the United States.  The new 
programs of performance-based accountability followed the overall trend of deregulation 
and decentralization in state governments, in line with the Reinventing Government 
movement (Burke & Serban, 1998b; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). 
However, the role of ideological factors in performance funding policy shifts 
remains largely undisclosed and warrants special attention in this and future research. 
Focusing on changes in political leadership, prevailing ideology, and state 
priorities, the political environment frame, however, slights other critical reasons for 
performance funding policy changes.  For instance, despite the above findings and 
insights, this frame fails to offer adequate and full explanations of performance funding 
failures.  As state vignettes demonstrate, policy abandonment is usually due to a 
combination of political and implementation issues and changes in the budgetary 
priorities (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Serban, 1998c; Natow & Dougherty, 
2008; Dougherty et al., 2011; Serban & Burke, 1998); thus, these issues include, but are 
not limited to, partisan and ideological changes in state leadership.  The upcoming 
discussion of the rational bureaucratic frame delves into the issue of implementation.      
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Electoral Connection vis-à-vis Political Environment 
The first two theoretical frameworks represent two opposite approaches to 
analyzing the relationships between the main actors in the political process.  Both frames 
are necessary for understanding the dynamics of political decision-making and the 
formation of policymakers’ positions.  Doyle (2007) explains the applicability of these 
conceptual lenses to examining policy positions of elected officials: 
A pure Downsian model of political decision-making would suggest that positions 
should only reflect the policy preferences of a majority of voters (Downs, 1957).  
A purely ideological model would posit that policy positions reflect only the ideal 
policy favored by an individual policymaker.  Real policies are formed in between 
these two extremes.  While it is true that politicians do indeed take into account 
the desires of their constituents when forming policy positions, it is also the case 
that they have their own preferences over policy positions. (p. 386) 
 
Therefore, the electoral connection and the political environment frames converge 
when researchers dissect the entire political decision-making process.  Also, research and 
practice demonstrate that partisan and ideological distinctions are often blurred by the 
political parties’ dependence on state public opinion and voter pressures.  Thus, 
according to Erikson et al. (1989), these theoretical frames converge in the following: 
At the state level, the Democratic and Republican parties offer an ideological 
choice but also respond to state opinion. How well they respond helps to 
determine their electoral success at the legislative level and also the content of 
state policy. State politics […] does matter. (p. 743) 
 
These two frames fall within the internal determinants model, according to which 
internal political, economic, and social characteristics of the state are the key factors of 
policy innovation.  An alternative approach relies on the diffusion models that assert that 
states emulate earlier policy adoptions by other states (Berry, 1994).       
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The Policy Diffusion Frame: Introduction 
In contrast to the electoral connection and political environment explanations of 
policy change, the policy diffusion frame shifts attention from the internal, intrastate, 
determinants of policy changes to the interstate influences that may facilitate policy 
migration.  The basic idea of this theory is that states learn from each other’s experiences; 
state policymakers emulate effective policies and supposedly avoid failed programs or 
hard-to-implement innovations.  In other words, states are deemed to engage in the 
process of social learning: Officials learn what policies work and do not work in other 
states and emulate the former.  Therefore, to modify a policy to fit their needs better, 
states can learn from earlier adoptions and, by extension, from prior failures (Balla, 2001; 
Berry & Berry, 1990, 1992, 1999; Boehmke & Witmer, 2004; Karch, 2007; Mintrom, 
1997; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998).  According to Berry and Berry (1999), the “diffusion 
models are inherently intergovernmental; they view state adoptions of policies as 
emulations of previous adoptions by other states” (p. 170, emphasis in the original).  An 
observed policy shift in one state may cause a “ripple effect” (Natow & Dougherty, 2008) 
in another state.  This effect can refer to both policy adoption and policy failure. 
The policy diffusion frame postulates that policy innovations diffuse across states 
in a systematic manner (Balla, 2001).  Berry and Berry (1999) identify three major 
reasons for borrowing policies: (a) social learning, i.e., adopting policy innovations that 
proved successful and effective elsewhere; (b) interstate economic competition, i.e., 
gaining an edge over competitor states and avoiding being disadvantaged; and (c) public 
pressure on elected officials.  The researchers comment on the last point: “[P]ublic 
officials can experience public pressure from their own citizens to adopt policies initiated 
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in other states” (Berry & Berry, 1999, p. 172).  Thus, the policy diffusion frame and the 
electoral connection frame, in its yardstick competition interpretation (Besley & Case, 
1995), converge in the last potential reason for policy migration. 
Traditional policy diffusion studies focused on geographic proximity of lending 
and borrowing states, assuming that diffusion factors are regional in nature (Berry & 
Berry, 1990, 1992; Doyle et al., 2010; McLendon et al., 2006; Mintrom, 1997, 2000; 
Mooney & Lee, 1995).  However, more recent studies have found that diffusion of policy 
innovations and policy failures could also happen based on political, demographic, and 
budgetary similarities among states rather than on regional proximity (Grossback et al., 
2004; Karch, 2007; Soule & Earl, 2001; Volden, 2006, 2007).  Policies may diffuse 
through such channels as professional associations, national mass media, electronic 
communication networks, and networks of policy innovators and entrepreneurs (Karch, 
2007; Mintrom, 1997, 2000).  For example, McNeal et al. (2003) found some evidence of 
a positive effect of participation in state professional networks on state innovation in e-
government. 
Policy diffusion must be distinguished from an independent adoption by a given 
state.  Policy adoption can occur through independent actions of state government; in 
other words, it may be driven by the state’s own experiences and be unrelated to what 
other states were doing (Volden et al., 2006).  One should also distinguish between policy 
innovations and policy inventions.  Innovations are policies that are new to adopting 
states, regardless of how many states adopted it previously; innovations may be adopted 
independently or borrowed.  In contrast, inventions mean new solutions, that is, adoption 
of a policy that did not exist anywhere else (Walker, 1969).  To illustrate, performance 
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funding adoption by Tennessee in 1979 was policy invention because it was the first 
policy of this kind in the nation and in the world.  Subsequent first-time policies in other 
states were innovations to these states; their adoption may have happened through either 
policy diffusion or independent actions by these states. 
 
Performance Funding Through the Policy Diffusion Lens 
The evidence supporting or refuting the idea of policy diffusion in the higher 
education arena exists today in two major forms.  The first line of research includes 
attitudinal surveys and individual and comparative case studies of states’ experiences.  
These investigations show that certain regional and national factors may provide for 
policy borrowing and, when considering a policy change, policymakers look at other 
states’ experiences (Marcus, 1997; Martinez & Nilson, 2006; Ruppert, 2001).  Ruppert 
(2001) reports, “In the course of conducting this and previous higher education issue 
surveys, legislators often expressed an abiding interest in knowing what other states are 
doing as they try to work through similar issues” (p. xiii).  At the same time, Martinez 
and Nilson (2006) concede that elected officials often introduce innovations in higher 
education governance or financial policies with little evidence of their successful 
implementation elsewhere. 
A common theme across these studies is that long-standing and effective 
performance funding programs have been models for the nation and influenced policy 
adoptions and policy characteristics in other states (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & 
Minassians, 2003; Burke & Modarresi, 2000; Gaither, 1995; Natow & Dougherty, 2008).  
However, as a rule, these claims are not substantiated by data.  The role of successful 
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performance funding implementation in policy diffusion warrants a special attention in 
this and future research. 
The second group of studies uses quantitative methods to examine diffusion 
influences.  To date, several studies have examined policy diffusion in higher education 
(Doyle, 2006; Doyle et al., 2010; Deaton, 2006; Hearn et al., 2007; McLendon et al., 
2005; McLendon et al., 2006; McLendon et al., 2007; Mokher, 2008; Mokher & 
McLendon, 2007).  Only two studies have found some evidence of a positive diffusion 
effect.  McLendon et al. (2005) find that regional diffusion is a strong predictor of 
financing innovations adoption and a much weaker predictor of accountability innovation 
in higher education.  Doyle et al.’s (2010) finding that the number of neighboring states 
with savings plans affects the likelihood of this policy adoption is statistically significant 
only at a 90% confidence interval and has a small substantive effect.  In the other studies, 
diffusion influences were either statistically insignificant or negative, that is, contrary to 
the hypothesized relationships.  The finding of a negative diffusion effect calls for an 
alternative explanation of social learning by states; it could be that states may learn from 
policy failures and implementation difficulties in other states. 
McLendon et al. (2006) tested two regional diffusion hypotheses for three main 
performance accountability policies, including performance funding.  They hypothesized 
that states whose neighbors have adopted a respective policy would be more likely to 
follow suit.  The authors tested two diffusion models: diffusion from the immediate 
neighbors and diffusion within four regional higher education consortia.  They failed to 
find a significant diffusion effect in either model. 
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The above findings, observations, and opinions support two key reasons for 
policy diffusion: social learning driven by successful policy innovations elsewhere and 
public pressure from voters (Berry & Berry, 1999).  However, the role of interstate 
competition in higher education policy diffusion remains largely undisclosed and calls for 
researchers’ attention.  This research intends to partially fill this gap. 
 
The Principal-Agent Frame: Introduction 
The principal-agent frame examines the hierarchical and contractual relationships 
between entities and the motivations behind their actions (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Moe, 
1984).  This conceptual lens is rooted in the principal-agent theory (also known as the 
economic theory of agency and positivist agency theory) and the public bureaucracy 
literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; McLendon, 2003; Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992).  In brief, this theory develops hierarchical relationships, in which 
principals delegate work to agents for implementation.  In the words of Moe (1984): 
The principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the agency relationship, in 
which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement 
with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose 
actions that produce outcomes desired by the principal. (p. 756) 
 
The principal may wish to enlist the services of the agents for the following 
reasons: (a) the lack of knowledge, ability, expertise, time, or energy and (b) the big size 
and complexity of the task.  The agents, in turn, have the knowledge and expertise 
necessary to perform the task and are trusted to make decisions and take actions in the 
best interest of the principal; however, the agents may have their own interests at heart 
(Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Moe, 1984; Petersen, 1995).  Petersen (1995) describes a 
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principal-agent relationship: It “arises when a principal contracts with an agent to 
perform some tasks on behalf of the principal.  In executing the tasks, the agent chooses 
an action.  The action in turn has […] an outcome, and the outcome affects the welfare of 
both the principal and the agent” (p. 188). 
The key concepts of the principal-agent theory are the notions of hierarchy, 
contract, information asymmetry, and conflict of interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Moe, 1984).  These concepts lie at the heart of inherent problems of the principal-agents 
relationships. 
There are three main problems in these relationships: the adverse selection 
problem, the moral hazard problem, and increasing costs of delegation and management 
(Canbäck, 2002; McLendon, 2003; Moe, 1984; Petersen, 1995; Ross, 1973).  The adverse 
selection problem consists in the principal having to select the agents under the 
conditions of uncertainty and unequally shared risks.  Agents differ by type, that is, their 
capacity to perform the task; however, when enlisting their services, the principle selects 
the agents without knowing their type (Petersen, 1995). 
The moral hazard problem arises due to conditions of incomplete and asymmetric 
information.  Information asymmetry stems from the difference in proximity to the task 
implementation.  The agents observe their type, their actions, and, occasionally, random 
factors affecting the outcome; the principal generally observes just the outcome and 
sometimes the agents’ actions (Petersen, 1995).  Thus, the principal has less information 
than agents about implementation and makes decisions with incomplete information, 
while the agents may be unclear about the principal’s goals.  These factors lead to 
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information asymmetry and increasing costs of delegation (McLendon, 2003; Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1990, 1992). 
Information asymmetry favors the agent, and the conflict of interests provides an 
incentive for the agents to shirk (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Petersen, 1995).  Shirking means 
pursuing one’s own goals instead of the goals of the principal or slacking at one’s work 
(Fiorina, 1982).  Shirking is possible because the principal and the agents’ interests are 
not perfectly aligned.  Thus, the problem stems from the need to have the agents choose 
and implement the right type of action; its solution requires monitoring the agents’ 
behavior and incentivizing them to ensure compliance with the principal’s goals (Fiorina, 
1982; Moe, 1984; Petersen, 1995).  Lane and Kivisto (2008) note: 
This tension is one of the classic dilemmas at the heart of the principal-agent 
framework: how does one empower an agent to fulfill the needs of the principal, 
while at the same time constraining the agent from shirking on their 
responsibilities. (p. 142) 
 
The principal-agent theory solves the moral hazard, or shirking, problem through 
finding mechanisms that will motivate the agents to act in the best interests of the 
principal (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  The most common of such mechanisms are monitoring 
the agents and providing incentives to them to comply with the explicit or implicit 
contract (Petersen, 1995). 
The third problem arises from the increasing cost of delegation and management.  
The increased costs are due to the following reasons: increase in size, growth in 
hierarchical bureaucracy, the principal’s failure to monitor the agents satisfactorily, 
increasing inability to replicate high-powered incentives, and the agents’ motivation to 
provide false information beneficial to themselves (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990, 1992). 
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Although originally developed for individuals and later for private firms, the 
principal-agent theory has been modified to fit other organizational types, including 
public bureaucracies and political entities (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Miller, 2005; Moe, 
1984, 1985, 1989; Weingast, 1984; Wood & Waterman, 1991).  As a result, two distinct 
forms of the theory, economic and political principal-agent theory, have been developed.  
While sharing key assumptions, these perspectives diverge on important issues, such as 
the nature of the contract, the unit of analysis, the character of the principal-agent 
relationship, actors’ motivation, the mode of control, the output, and the source of 
shirking (Lane & Kivisto, 2008, pp. 150-154).  Both theories have been applied to the 
study of higher education governance and policy (Kivisto, 2005, 2007; Knot & Payne, 
2004; Lane, 2003, 2005, 2007; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Liefner, 2003; Lowry, 2001b; 
McLendon, 2003; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Toma, 1986, 1990). 
McLendon (2003) suggested that the principal-agent theory could be useful for 
examining interactions between state governments and higher education institutions.  
Since then, several studies have applied this frame to studying higher education policy 
making and governance, and government oversight over institutions (Kivisto, 2005, 
2007; Lane, 2003, 2005, 2007; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; McLendon et al., 2006; Nicholson-
Crotty & Meier, 2003; Payne, 2003).  These studies’ findings show the efficacy of this 
theoretical framework in organizational, political, and policy research in the higher 
education arena. 
The original principal-agent model “is based upon the rational assumption that an 
individual prefers to pursue self-interest before the interests of others” (Lane & Kivisto, 
2008, p. 145).  In contrast to the assumed rationality of individuals, this study assumes 
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rational behavior of bureaucratic organizations: public institutions and state boards.  As 
stated above, rationality refers to making value-maximizing choices and ordering 
preferences within specified constraints; it means selecting the best means for achieving 
the goals critical to the institution’s success (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Stone, 1988).  
In this interpretation, bureaucratic actors take on increased importance.  Leaders 
in the bureaucracy are key players in the choice and implementation stages of policy 
development because of the tenure privileges that they possess (Kingdon, 1995).  
Bureaucracies are deemed rational organizations: They make conscious attempts to link 
goals to activities and resources to objectives.  For its implementation, a policy depends 
on bureaucratic structures; these structures are needed to efficiently relate the programs to 
the achievement of specified goals (Birnbaum, 1988). 
According to Lane and Kivisto (2008), “as public bureaucracies, public colleges 
and universities are replete with principal-agent relationships, both internal and external 
to the institutions” (p. 144).  In the context of state higher education systems, the 
principals are elected officials, legislators and governors, who delegate authority to 
public institutions for the fulfillment of certain responsibilities and implementation of 
policies.  Similar to other public bureaucracies, higher education institutions operate 
under conditions of hierarchical control and information asymmetry, under various 
explicit and implicit contracts, and in an environment of multiple and collective 
principals (Lane, 2005; Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  Performance accountability policies 
represent mechanisms of legislative and executive oversight over public bureaucracy, 
including higher education bureaucracy (McLendon et al., 2006). 
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The roles of principals and agents in the higher education arena may change 
depending on the level of analysis.  “Aside from the ultimate principal and the ultimate 
agent, each actor in the hierarchy occupies a dual role in which he serves both as 
principal and as agent” (Moe, 1984).  Both state-level agencies for higher education and 
institutions perform dual functions, depending on the perspective and the context. 
State higher education boards are agents in relation to state policymakers and 
principals to their institutions.  As agents, state boards represent the interests of 
institutions and insulate them from the political reality of state policymaking.  As 
principals, these boards monitor institutional performance and offer various incentives for 
compliance with their policies.  State governance arrangements for higher education 
systems, and their powers and roles, differ by state and determine various policy 
outcomes (Doyle, 2004; Lowry, 2001a; McGuinness, 1997; McLendon & Ness, 2003; 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Weerts & Ronca, 2006, 2008).  In turn, institutions are 
agents in relation to state boards and elected officials; however, they also serve as 
principals to their academic and administrative units and students.  Therefore, inherent 
problems of the principal-agent relationships can play out virtually at any level. 
Therefore, the principal-agent framework is critical for understanding reasons for 
policy failures.  The biggest threat to policy implementation stems from the above 
assumption that the principal (policymakers) and agents (public institutions) are self-
interested rational actors aiming to maximize their own utility (Moe, 1984).  Because the 
agents do not perfectly align themselves with the principal’s objectives, implementation 
issues arise and can ultimately lead to policy abandonment. 
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Performance Funding Through the Principal-Agent Lens 
The principal-agent frame is critical to this study because it focuses both on the 
adoption and implementation aspects of the policy; the latter greatly determines policy 
success and longevity.  I start with the goals of state budgeting and the objectives of 
performance funding, which are pursued by the principals at the adoption stage. 
Economic perspective.  The primary objectives of state budgeting for higher 
education are merging intentions with practice, establishing a direction for higher 
education, and setting up an accountability device (Jones, 1984).  Thus, budgeting is a 
means of steering institutions through funding, an interactive process, and a mechanism 
of translating policies into activities and providing an accountability framework 
(Savenije, 1992).  By altering the terms on which financial resources are provided, state 
governments can influence behavior of higher education institutions (Williams, 1984). 
Once an agent has been chosen to perform a task, the next problem is to get her to 
perform, that is, to choose the right action, which usually is costly to the agent.  
This can be accomplished by tying the agent’s reward to the outcome of the action 
or by monitoring the action. (Petersen, 1995, p. 193) 
 
Performance funding employs both approaches: It establishes a system for 
monitoring institutional performance and offers financial rewards for complying with the 
policy objectives (Burke & Associates, 2002).  Both mechanisms serve to alter 
institutional behavior in ways that are consistent with the principals’ interests, that is, to 
alleviate part of the moral hazard problem.  The principal aims to solve the agency 
problem through designing an incentive structure that makes pursuing the principal’s 
objectives advantageous to the agents (Moe, 1984; Petersen, 1995). 
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Performance funding is deemed the most direct and effective approach to creating 
such an incentive structure (Shin & Milton, 2004).  In theory, this policy rewards high-
performing institutions with funding increases and punishes low-performing institutions 
with funding reductions (Nedwek, 1996).  Thus, it creates a steering capacity without 
altering the core of institutional budgets (Burke & Associates, 2002; Savenije, 1992). 
To align incentives and motivate the agents to pursue the principal’s goals, the 
latter may use the following means: persuasion, the prospect of rewards, and the threat of 
punishment (Massy, 2003).  Ideally, an incentive system should be based on the third 
principle of economic agency theory, high intensity of incentives.  However, in reality, 
performance funding relies more on the second principle, high level of monitoring, which 
is more costly and difficult to implement (Massy, 2003). 
Soo (2003) describes the conceptual bases of performance funding from the 
economic perspective: 
[W]e can assume that higher education institutions are rational agents that try to 
maximize their utility in a policy environment.  Performance based funding 
changes the incentives and is likely to bring changes in universities behavior.  
Universities will thus rearrange their resources in the way that is most “profitable” 
in the new environment.  Performance based funding will thus theoretically 
change universities’ production function and universities will respond to the 
policy in a way that is most suitable for them. (pp. 2-3) 
 
Through the adoption of “performance policies with teeth” (Burke, 2001), that is, 
programs with financial incentives or sanctions, incumbents introduce a mechanism of 
aligning institutions with the state’s goals and priorities.  The underlying premise is that 
“higher education institutions are motivated to improve their performance when 
performance is linked to budget allocation” (Shin & Milton, 2004, p. 27). 
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The resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) explains the 
conceptual bases of performance funding from the institutional position.  Institutional 
responses to changes in resource availability are driven by their dependency on public 
support and the need to adapt to changing environment in order to ensure organizational 
survival (Harnisch, 2011).  Harnisch summarizes this theory’s perspective on 
performance-based funding: “[B]ecause the leaders of public colleges and universities are 
significantly dependent on state appropriations, the theory postulates that they will take 
the measures necessary to retain or enhance their institutions’ funding” (p. 2). 
Apart from financial incentives, performance funding programs may publicize 
results of institutional assessment and institutional rankings.  If performance fund is 
small, public relations levers may be more powerful in changing institutional behavior 
than funding.  For example, Schmidt (2002) maintains that “the true power of 
performance-based financing systems may not lie in their impact on campus budgets.  
Instead, it is the threat of bad publicity and embarrassment associated with poor reviews 
that appears to motivate college presidents and other campus leaders” (p. 4). 
Another incentive for public higher education institution may include changes in 
institutional autonomy, for example, in tuition-setting authority (Harnisch, 2011).  
According to Burke and Modarresi (2000), performance accountability policies have 
often implied tacit agreements between state governments and institutions: “[S]tate 
granted increased autonomy to public colleges and universities in return for credible 
evidence of improved performance” (p. 433). 
Thus, by using three main levers—budgeting, publicity, and at times changes in 
autonomy—performance funding policy systems aim to achieve two key goals: 
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increasing external accountability and improving higher education performance (Burke & 
Associates, 2002).  However, in actual program implementation, these goals are often 
attained only partially or not at all.  Studies examining the impacts of performance 
funding policies on various outcomes have generally failed to find any statistically 
significant results (Belfield, 2012; Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Doyle & Noland, 2006; 
Ehlert, 1998; Fryar, 2011; Garrick, 1998; Huang, 2010; Polatajko, 2011; Rabovsky, 
2012; Sanford & Hunter, 2011; Shin, 2010; Shin & Milton, 2004; Strawn, 2003; 
Woodley, 2005; Yancey, 2002). 
Therefore, it is critical to identify forces that hinder the attainment of policy 
objectives and may lead to policy failure.  These forces stem from both conceptual issues 
and implementation difficulties (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke, 2003).  Despite the 
theoretical desirability of performance funding, its practical implementation faces many 
challenges (Burke, 2003; Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Serban, 1997). 
Conceptual and implementation issues.  As a concept, performance funding 
faces several key challenges, which make evaluating higher education performance 
highly problematic.  These conceptual problems stem from the complexity and diversity 
of higher education, ambiguity of its objectives, difficulty of defining and measuring 
quality, unwillingness of higher education to accept business management principles, and 
the lack of agreement on the outcomes of undergraduate education and the means of 
measuring student achievement (Albright, 1998; Burke & Associates, 2002; Lang, 2004; 
Serban, 1997b).  According to Burke (1998a), some critics find performance funding to 
be conceptually flawed because “it pursues what they perceive as incompatible goals, 
such as increasing productivity while improving performance and reducing costs while 
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raising quality” (p. 11).  These issues complicate the task of measuring performance and 
assessing quality in student learning and other meaningful results.  Burke (2003) asserts: 
But the fatal flaw for performance funding, as with outcomes assessment, is the 
reluctance of the academic community to identify and assess the knowledge and 
skills that college graduates should possess. […] Unfortunately, the academic 
community never determined or defined, with any precision, the objectives of 
undergraduate education nor developed systematic methods for assessing campus 
performance. (pp. 1-2) 
 
Performance funding programs also have to address the issue of timing in 
measuring outcomes and implementing assessment systems.  Many results in higher 
education are postponed and cannot be measured immediately.  According to Alexander 
(2004), graduates reach the peak of performance in 25 years after graduation; however, 
assessment systems generally require measuring outcomes at the time of graduation.  
Implementation of assessment systems also takes much time and cannot keep up with the 
political pressures of the moment.  Carnevale et al. (1998) comment, “Timing is also key: 
Elected officials may want immediate implementation and results, but colleges and 
universities need enough time to make the process work” (p. B7). 
The implementation issues of performance funding are well documented in the 
literature and run the gamut from changing state priorities and conflict of interest 
between policymakers and institutions to detrimental programmatic characteristics and 
perceived program ineffectiveness to higher education opposition and the principal-agent 
problems within and among institutions (Burke, 2001b, 2002a; Burke & Associates, 
2002; Burke & Minassians, 2003; Carnevale et al., 1998; Heller, 2001b; Klein, 2005; 
McLendon et al., 2006; Neal, 1995; Shin & Milton, 2004; Zumeta, 2001). 
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The last category is especially important and includes multiple implementation 
issues: creating a competitive environment among institutions, incurring implementation 
costs, adding to the bureaucratic complexity on campus, failing to motivate students to 
take assessment seriously, learning to “play the system” by establishing easily achievable 
criteria, having no impact on the internal distribution of funds, and lacking visibility at 
the level of individual departments and programs (Banta et al., 1996; Bogue, 2002; 
Burke, 2003; Burke & Minassians, 2003; Burke & Serban, 1997; Carnevale et al., 1998; 
Folger & Jones, 1993; Hoyt, 2001; Klein, 2005; Noland et al., 2004). 
Bogue and Hall (2003) comment on the last point: 
There is a notable lack of penetration to the department and program level in 
terms of using assessment data for program improvement decision for decisions 
related to student placement and progress.  This must be counted one of the more 
important disappointments in the impact of the policy.  Thus, for most campuses, 
energy and attention to the policy centers at the executive administrative levels 
and very little at the department chair and faculty level. (p. 210) 
 
Finally, there are many conceptual and technical issues with performance 
indicators, which are the centerpieces of most performance accountability systems 
(Burke, 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Burke & Associates, 2002; Ewell, 1996; Gaither, 1996; 
Gaither, Nedwek, & Neal, 1994; Rupper, 1995).  On the conceptual side, performance 
indicators cannot truly capture educational quality, reflect different educational 
objectives, or account for mission differentiation among campuses (Borden & Banta, 
1994; Burke, 1998a; Gaither et al., 1994).  On the technical side, Carnevale et al. (1998) 
argue that the attractiveness of performance indicators is “equal only to the difficulties of 
designing, implementing, and assessing them” (p. B6). 
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To conclude, the principal-agent frame helps explain the regularities of the 
performance funding policy lifecycle.  It sheds light on the original intentions behind 
policy adoption and explains how conceptual and implementation issues may cause 
policy failure.  However, its limitations include the following critical aspects: public 
pressures and expectations of higher education, political-ideological aspects of state 
policymaking processes, social learning on the part of state policymakers, and the role of 
competition for state resources among public sectors and interest groups. 
 
The Role of Budgetary Constraints 
The above theoretical frames disregard two conditions that are crucial to 
understanding the antecedents of policy change: budgetary stringency and the procyclical 
character of state funding.  Consideration of state budgetary issues is important to this 
research for the following reasons: Budget is the most direct and tangible tie between 
state government and public higher education institutions (Jones, 1984; Noland et al., 
2004), budget constraints affect both policy adoption and failure, and state appropriations 
to higher education are influenced by the business cycle conditions. 
In simple terms, budgeting is defined as a systematic way of resource allocation 
(Hager et al., 2001, p. 3).  Kettl in the foreword to Wildavsky and Gaiden (2004) defines 
budgeting as making the best use of scarce resources, which is tantamount to making the 
most of public tax funds.  In his view, budgeting “is in part about economics—how to 
extract the best return from public dollars.  In part, it is also about politics—how to make 
these decisions” (p. xi).  The authors themselves rely on Wildavsky’s definitions of 
budgets as “links between financial resources and human behavior to accomplish policy 
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objectives” and as “a mechanism for making choices among alternative expenditures” (p. 
2).  Jones (1984) views a budget as a device by which state government signals it 
priorities and implements its plans, and proposes the following key functions of a budget: 
linking intentions and actions, state-level planning, and providing a framework for 
accountability. 
The budget system characteristics determine various budgetary outcomes, such as 
revenue and spending patterns in a state.  For example, Nardinelli, Wallace, and Warner 
(1988) argue that structural and institutional differences in budgetary systems produce 
variations in price flexibility, which in turn cause differences in the business cycle.  
Kearns (1994) finds that the length of the budget period, budget periodicity, influences 
state spending: Contrary to a conventionally held view, states with biennial budgets 
spend more than states that budget annually.  She also reports that the GAO survey of 
1987 found a direct correlation between budget periodicity and state spending.  The 
budget process is also dependent on availability of relevant, accurate, and timely 
information (Hyatt, 1985). 
According to Lasher and Green (2001), higher education budgets are susceptible 
to both external and internal forces.  External forces include economic, political, and 
demographic factors, while internal forces include institutional history, mission, and 
other characteristics.  The combination of these influences creates budget constraints.  
Jones (1984) identifies three main shocks to a state budgetary system that may have a 
deleterious effect on state appropriations to higher education: declines in enrollment, 
inflation, and the general economic decline.  An additional factor is that, unlike K-12 
87 
 
education, higher education is a discretionary item on the state budget, which may be cut 
during fiscal stringency periods. 
State expenditures generally have a cyclical pattern; in other words, they are 
curtailed during economic downturns and expanded during economic recoveries.  These 
business cycles affect state budgets and appropriations through the transmission 
mechanism of tax revenues (Humphrey, 2000).  State governments resort to 
countercyclical fiscal policies in order to reduce expenditures and raise taxes during 
austere economic times and accumulate the “rainy day” funds in prosperous times (Kane, 
Orszag, & Gunter, 2003; Levinson, 1998).  In the words of Kane et al., (2003), 
“[t]ypically, states cut back programs during the downturns and then expand them during 
the subsequent recovery” (p. 14). 
Prior research has shown that business cycles affect two factors of importance to 
higher education: (a) tax revenue and, consequently, state spending and (b) college 
enrollment.  State appropriations to higher education are very sensitive to the business 
cycle dynamics; appropriations fall during economic downturns and rise during 
expansion periods.  At the same time, enrollment is countercyclical: It grows during bad 
economic times when government funding is cut, thus placing extreme financial pressure 
on higher education institutions.  A critical finding is that higher education is one of the 
most cyclical categories of state budgets, but its competitor, K-12 education, is not (Betts 
& McFarland, 1995; Humphrey, 2000; Kane et al., 2003; Leslie & Ramey, 1986). 
Humphrey (2000) finds that real appropriations fall more during recessions than 
they rise during expansion.  After the recession of the early 1990s, post-recession 
appropriations to higher education stopped exceeding the pre-recession levels.  
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According to Kane et al. (2003), “[a]s the economy entered a recession in the early 
1990s, real appropriations per students again declined.  But during the boom of the 
1990s, appropriations for higher education rose only slightly and never reached their pre-
recession levels” (p. 15).  The researchers explain this failure of higher education 
appropriations to recover largely by the rapid increase in the Medicaid costs. 
Most first-time performance funding policies were adopted in the 1990s after a 
particularly severe recession at the beginning of the decade; at that time, the decline in 
state support for higher education became especially pronounced.  Due to fiscal 
stringency, institutions raised prices, leading to calls for greater transparency and 
accountability.  During that decade, tuition and fees started to surpass state appropriations 
as institutions tried to compensate for the decline in state appropriations (Breneman & 
Finney, 1997; College Board, 2004).  Therefore, one may presume that budget constraints 
of that period played a large role in introduction of performance funding programs; 
however, this assumption requires empirical testing. 
Influenced by cyclical economic conditions, the fiscal capacity of states to support 
performance funding has greatly determined this policy evolution, creating conditions for 
both policy adoption and failure.  On the one hand, a common explanation for 
performance funding adoption is fiscal contingency and the intent to enhance institutional 
efficiency and productivity.  On the other hand, state case studies demonstrate that, as 
budgets get tight, states start abandoning performance funding.  Thus, economic 
recessions, and associated budget difficulties, have been key factor in frequent policy 
failures (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Minassians, 2003; Klein, 2005). 
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Based on the above, I conclude that, in addition to the primary theoretical frames, 
this study must also account for the procyclical nature of state funding for higher 
education and budgetary constraints of institutions. 
 
The Concept of Policy Failure 
Political scientists have extensively analyzed the concept of policy failure, or 
government failure, as opposed to market failure (Mitchell & Simmons, 1994).  Two 
primary reasons drive this interest: first, policy failures are ubiquitous and this situation 
raises many concerns (Ingram & Mann, 1980) and, second, the issue of policy success 
and failure lies at the heart of public policy analysis (Nagel, 1980).  Although the 
ubiquity of policy failure is acknowledged in various areas of research and practice, this 
concept remains under-theorized in political science research (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996; 
Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA), 2007; Howlett, 2007; Ingram & Mann, 
1980; Lane, 1990; Milne, 2001; Nagel, 1980; Wildavsky, 1979). 
Likewise, in higher education studies, policy failure is inadequately 
conceptualized and there is a lack of empirical research regarding specific policy failures.  
To the best of my knowledge, no one has systematically and comprehensively examined 
policy failures in the area of postsecondary education.  The only exceptions are isolated 
case studies of terminated and inactive policies, including performance funding, and, to 
some extent, annual surveys of performance accountability policies (Burke & Associates, 
2002; Burke & Minassians, 2001, 2002, 2003; Burke & Modarresi, 1999; Burke, Rosen, 
Minassians, & Lessard, 2000; Burke & Serban, 1997; Burke & Serban, 1998b; Dougherty 
& Natow, 2009; Dougherty et al., 2011; Dougherty et al., 2012).  Birnbaum (2000a, 
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2000b) has uncovered the evolutionary mechanism of academic management fads from 
birth to decline; however, these innovations are limited to the institutional level, as 
opposed to statewide policies. 
Although widely used, the term policy failure is more elusive than policy 
adoption or innovation.  Several factors contribute to this elusiveness: (a) the employed 
terms are often ambiguous and may be used interchangeably, although they overlap only 
partially; (b) the notion of policy failure is inseparably linked to the notions of policy 
adoption and success; (c) defining a policy failure is open to subjective interpretation and 
susceptible to political pressures; (d) public policies can fail in various ways, and (e) 
policy failures may be classified into different categories. 
First, the number of terms referring to, or interpreting, the concept of policy 
failure is large.  To illustrate, policy failure can be conceptualized as policy termination 
(abandonment), retreat on policy objectives or failure to realize the policy aims, policy 
fiasco or shrinking, policy succession or substitution, policy reformulation, a form of 
policy learning, prerequisite to a policy paradigm shift, substantive or procedural failure, 
and preadoption or postadoption failure (Bardach, 1976; Boven & ‘t Hart, 1996; Brewer 
& deLeon, 1983; Hall, 1993; Hogwood & Peters, 1982; Howlett, 2007; Ingram & Mann, 
1980; May, 1992; Nagel, 1980; Volden, 2007; Wildavsky, 1979). 
Second, the notions of policy adoption, success, and failure are inextricably linked 
(Bardach, 1976; Dutton et al., 1980; Hogwood & Peters, 1982; Nagel, 1980; Volden, 
2007).  Policy success is determined by posteriori evaluation of effects; however, failures 
can occur at any stage in the policy process (Dutton et al., 1980).  Nagel (1980) asserts 
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that policy failure can happen even at the preadoption stage: “Policies can thus be failures 
in the sense of never being adopted” (p. 7). 
The concepts of policy adoption and policy failure are also linked.  Each policy 
change is, in effect, a negation of the preexisting state of things.  Volden (2007) suggests 
that policy adoption is an abandonment of either failed policies or the “no policy” policy 
(i.e., the condition that preceded the adoption).  “[A]ny study of successful policy 
adoptions implicitly contains elements of a study of the abandonment of failed policies, 
for the new policy is replacing something that was no longer as attractive to 
policymakers” (Volden, 2007, p. 3).  He proposes treating the “no policy,” pre-adoption, 
condition as a separate type of policy, encompassing the choice to take no action. 
Expanding on Volden’s idea, one can argue that if a state does not have a policy 
after its invention elsewhere, it has chosen not to have it.  In other words, it is not merely 
inaction on the part of the state, it is an action that the state chooses not to take.  Thus, the 
condition of having no policy is treated as a specific type of policy; this condition is 
abandoned when the policy is adopted.  Following a similar logic, Bardach (1976) and 
Hogwood and Peters (1982) suggest that policy termination and policy succession be 
treated as special cases of policy adoption, when a new policy eliminates or supplants the 
preexisting policy. 
Third, the concept of policy failure is context-dependent, subjective in evaluation, 
political in nature, and may be interpreted in value-laden terms and promoted for political 
objectives (Anagnoson, 1980; Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996, 2011c; Dutton, Danziger, & 
Kraemer, 1980; Ingram & Mann, 1980).  In the words of Howlett (2007), 
“[c]onsiderations of policy success and failure are evaluative judgments” and serve as 
92 
 
“semantic tools themselves […] in order to seek political advantage” (p. 2).  Judgments 
about policy successes and failures are affected by the environmental conditions in which 
an evaluation takes place and the timeframe associated with the conditions.  The 
interrelations of various policies and the existence of institutional barriers may further 
complicate such judgments (Ingram & Mann, 1980).  Along the same line, May (1992) 
asserts that “the objective reality of policy failure is less important that a perception of 
policy failure” (p. 341). 
Next, policies can fail in numerous ways (Howlett, 2007), and it may be difficult 
to pinpoint the exact markers for failure.  Researchers diverge on how to identify a policy 
failure.  For example, one way of measuring policy failure is against original objectives 
(Ingram & Mann, 1980; Wildavsky, 1979); however, some analysts believe that policy 
goals may be too subjective and ambitious to serve as reliable measures of success or 
failure (Ingram & Mann, 1980).  The most obvious indicators of policy failure are policy 
termination, or abandonment of a policy (Bardach, 1976; Dery, 1984), and policy 
succession, or substitution with a new policy (Hogwood & Peters, 1982; Volden, 2007).  
However, there are other objectively and subjectively measured ways—apart from policy 
abandonment and falling short of predetermined objectives—in which policies can 
succeed and fail (Bovens et al., 2001; Howlett, 2007; Ingram & Mann, 1980; Kerr, 1976). 
Besides, not every failing policy is terminated.  Bardach (1976) explains why this 
is the case: Policy termination is a complicated process, which may produce conflicts; 
policies are generally designed to last almost indefinitely; policymakers are reluctant to 
admit their mistakes and may be unwilling to damage the existing program infrastructure; 
and political incentives for policy abandonment are in short supply.  According to 
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Hogwood and Peters (1982), the interest in policy termination is misplaced because most 
supposedly new policies, in fact, replace the old ones; therefore, the term policy 
succession is more appropriate.  “[M]ost policy making is actually policy succession: the 
replacement of an existing policy, program, or organization by another” (Hogwood and 
Peters, 1982, p. 226).  These researchers suggest using the term policy termination only 
in rare cases when policy abolishment is not followed by policy substitution. 
Finally, different classifications of failures are possible.  Common classifications 
use the following oppositions: quantitative versus qualitative failures and goals versus 
reality.  Criticizing these approaches, Nagel (1980) suggests three ways of measuring 
them: “in terms of the degree of noncompliance, the deviation between actual and 
optimum, and in terms of opportunity costs, rather than on a dichotomy of failure versus 
success” (p. 9).  Bovens et al. (2001c) argue that policy failures can happen in two related 
areas of evaluation: program performance (i.e., policy’s effectiveness, efficacy and 
resilience) and political performance (i.e., the ways in which policies are represented in 
the political arena) (p. 20).  Another approach to classifying policy failures is 
distinguishing between substantive and procedural failures (Howlett, 2007).  From the 
substantive perspective, a failing policy fails to deliver on its goals.  In procedural terms, 
a failing policy may be seen as illegitimate, unfair, or unjust.  In the latter case, a policy is 
considered “failure in normative justification” (Kerr, 1976, p. 361). 
The causes of policy failure may include the following: challenges of 
implementation, failure to translate goals into practice and fulfill the original purposes, 
inadequate governmental analytic capacity and policymakers’ competence, overly 
ambitious policy goals, attempts to address insurmountable problems, poor task 
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delegation, a lack of proper oversight over implementers, challenges of political nature, 
the cyclical nature of the policy life, insular character of policy implementation, 
proneness of some political systems to experience failures, and a lack of proper learning 
from past experiences (Anderson, 1996; Birnbaum, 2000a, 2000b; Bovens & ‘t Hart, 
1995, 1996; Downs, 1972; Dur, 2001; Fellegi, 1996; Howlett, 2007; Kerr, 1976; Lane, 
1990; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Lupia & McCubbins, 1994; May, 1992; Peters, 1996; 
Petersen, 1995; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Scharpf, 1986; Wildavsky, 1979). 
Policy failure offers opportunities for policy learning.  “[F]ailure serves as a 
trigger for considering policy redesign and as a potential occasion for policy learning” 
(May, 1992, p. 341).  As a result, through policy learning and creating uncertainty, policy 
failure and associated policy learning can act as catalysts for policy change (Skogstad, 
2007).  Policy learning may include two major forms: learning of policy inadequacies and 
learning of unsuccessful policies in the other states (May, 1992; McLendon et al., 2006; 
Mooney, 2001; Volden, 2007).  In the former case, policies are reformulated in response 
to widespread perception of failures (May, 1992).  In the latter case, “if scholars were to 
focus on policies that failed to spread, perhaps geographic neighbors should be less likely 
to adopt one another’s policies because those neighbors had a privileged, close-up view 
of just how bad that policy was” (Volden, 2007, p. 2, emphasis in the original). 
Volden (2007) found that policy termination in one state is closely related to 
policy failure in other, especially ideologically proximate, states and is facilitated by the 
presence of more professional legislatures.  This finding demonstrates the phenomenon of 
policy diffusion in abandonment of failed policies among the states and allows the 
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researcher to conclude that “at least part of the policy diffusion process is based on 
learning, and specifically on learning about what policies do not work elsewhere” (p. 25). 
At the same time, May (1992) cautions that although policy failure may present 
opportunities for policy learning, the latter may be constrained by confusion over how to 
improve policy outcomes, government leaders’ unwillingness to acknowledge policy 
failure, conflict between competing advocacy coalitions, and other factors.  Thus, “policy 
learning does not necessarily follow from policy failure” (p. 351).  Dur (2001) concurs 
that policymakers are not willing to repeal a failing policy and concede defeat because 
they are concerned with reelection and do not want to be associated with policy failures. 
Another positive aspect of policy failure is that it may be an evidence of a 
political system’s response to existing issues, with politicians trying to solve, rather than 
ignore, problems (Ingram & Mann, 1980).  Ingram and Mann (1980) believe that one 
should consider the political consequences of not taking any actions before passing a 
judgment on policy failures. 
 
Conclusion.  This study aims to identify key determinants of performance 
funding policy shifts.  The literature review has shown that the research community 
knows a great deal about the antecedents of policy changes.  However, regarding 
performance funding evolution, this knowledge is mostly fragmentary, highly contextual, 
and subject to various interpretations.  Much of the literature is descriptive, anecdotal, 
state-specific, subjective in nature, and politically or ideologically driven.  The more 
methodologically sound literature generally includes individual and comparative case 
studies and surveys of key political and organizational actors.  Several quantitative 
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studies have examined effects of performance funding on various outcomes; however, 
only McLendon et al. (2006) investigated the antecedents of policy adoption of three 
major performance accountability policies.  To the best of my knowledge, there has been 
no comprehensive quantitative analysis of the entire performance funding policy 
lifecycle.  There is no unifying theoretical framework explaining policy emergence and 
failure.  Also, researchers still have a limited understanding of common factors leading to 
policy failure in higher education.  This research intends to fill these gaps in knowledge 
and theory by using four distinct theoretical traditions to examine the entire performance 
funding policy lifecycle.  The investigation of the determinants of all possible policy 
shifts regarding performance funding represents the major contribution of this study. 
The following chapter examines the theoretical frameworks in greater detail and 
proposes a unified approach to the investigation of the performance funding lifecycle. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
General Approach of the Study 
Researchers use different theoretical traditions to explain evolution of public 
policies; however, these conceptual frameworks are mainly used in isolation.  This 
chapter discusses my general approach to studying the antecedents of policy changes, the 
proposed hypotheses within each theoretical frame, and the key relationships in the 
conceptual framework for the study. 
My approach integrates several distinct conceptual arenas.  In contrast to prior 
research, this investigation examines all policy shifts simultaneously and within the same 
model.  I build this study around the following assumptions.  The first assumption treats 
policy adoption and failure as political and social processes that are alike in terms of their 
intrastate and interstate determinants.  This means that the same external and internal 
processes and actors drive states to adopt, discontinue, and readopt performance funding.  
Thus, I assume that the identified state and policy characteristics affect all events of 
interest.  The second assumption holds that each policy change represents abandonment 
of the prior condition.  It is rooted in Volden (2007), Bardach (1976), and Hogwood and 
Peters’ (1982) arguments that policy adoption is, in effect, abandonment of a failed 
policy or termination of the “no policy” policy.  The final assumption is that the events of 
interest happen in succession: Adoption precedes failure and failure precedes readoption. 
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Another feature of my approach is examining policy changes through different 
conceptual lenses.  In addition to analyzing four theoretical frames individually, I use 
them simultaneously by testing all the respective hypotheses in the comprehensive 
model; this final model combines all frames, policy shifts, and independent variables.  I 
argue that, despite different assumptions underlying these theoretical frames, their 
analysis in a unified model is more telling and advantageous than examining each 
conceptual lens in isolation. 
Employing the policy diffusion framework, some studies take a similar approach; 
they include various political, economic, demographic, educational, organizational, and 
geographic variables as determinants of policy adoption.  These analyses follow Berry 
and Berry’s (1990) advice that “regional diffusion and internal determinants explanations 
of state innovation should not be analyzed in isolation; instead, unified models are 
needed” (p. 411).  This suggestion leads researchers to identify a diffusion effect, on the 
one hand, and all the other influences (internal determinants of policy innovation), on the 
other hand.  Thus, these analysts use different internal determinants without focusing too 
much on the underlying theoretical assumptions.  This study differs from the described 
approach in that the proposed theoretical frames allow me to outline the assumptions 
driving each group of hypotheses more clearly.  I see one contribution of this research in 
bringing more conceptual clarity to the issue of public policy changes through combined 
application of different theoretical traditions. 
The final conceptual arena allows for potential convergence of the theoretical 
frames.  I base this idea on the possibility that some uncovered relationships may have 
alternative causal mechanisms.  The convergence of the frames may occur at the level of 
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the hypothesized cause-and-effect relations, with conceptual lenses offering divergent 
explanations of the observed relationships.  Depending on the frame, there could be 
different reasons for the data to look a certain way and it may be impossible to 
differentiate between them.  Because I use multiple theoretical frames, rival hypotheses 
could explain the same data differently and without definitive support for either 
hypothesis.  Therefore, there is a chance that in some cases the employed model will not 
be able to differentiate clearly between different explanations of the observed data. 
Although my definition of an operational policy (section Key Definitions; Chapter 
4) presupposes the agents’ awareness of the policy, I model state policymakers’ behavior 
rather than institutional behavior.  I am interested in the decision points at which elected 
officials make respective decisions: to mandate a policy, allocate funds to the program, 
suspend or remove funding, succeed a policy with another one, terminate a policy, 
maintain a policy after its evaluation, readopt a policy after its termination, and others.  
These decision points constitute the essence of the events of interest and provide the basis 
for their classification.  At the end of this chapter, I discuss the key relationships in the 
conceptual framework and place these events in the context of the entire policy cycle. 
To conclude, I employ four conceptual lenses—the electoral connection, political 
environment, policy diffusion, and principal-agent frames—to identify the conditions 
under which states are more likely to adopt or discontinue performance funding.  Within 
each frame, I propose hypotheses that aim to model policymakers’ behavior with respect 
to the policy changes of interest.  My intent is to identify the drivers of performance 
funding policy shifts and offer theoretical explanations of their causal mechanism.       
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Electoral Connection Frame 
As discussed in the literature review, this conceptual lens focuses on the role of 
voters in policy shifts.  From this standpoint, the elected officials’ behavior is influenced 
by their desire to be reelected and thus by voter preferences (Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 
1973, 2004).  In other words, to be reelected, incumbents must comply with their 
constituents’ wishes.  Consequently, they structure their political behavior in ways that 
are consistent with their rational anticipation of voter preferences and demands.  Voters 
perceive the existence of problems and expect politicians to adopt policies to solve them.  
They rationally calculate which party is more likely to adopt respective policies and 
decide if it can win the elections.  Through a variety of channels, voters make their 
preferences known to state policymakers, and the latter adopt policies to meet their 
electorate’s preferences and demands (Ahmed & Greene, 2000; Bergstrom & Goodman, 
1973; Bowen, 1943; Craw, 2008; Downs, 1957; Erikson et al., 1989; Farnham, 1987; 
Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1974). 
Regarding performance funding, electoral connection may work in two ways: (a) 
through legislative response to voter demand for specific accountability policies; and (b) 
through legislators’ response to a general sense of voter preferences.  These two scenarios 
offer different explanations of policy changes. 
In the first type of response, policy emergence and failure are driven by the 
incumbents’ motivation to be reelected and depend on the assumed rationality of elected 
officials.  If performance accountability policies enjoy broad public support, one may 
expect rational state officials to adopt such policies in order to please their constituency.  
From this perspective, performance funding enactment could be an outcome of this 
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policy popularity among the electorate driving incumbents to adopt it.  If incumbents are 
sensitive to voter preferences, performance funding adoption could be a response to the 
rising demand for this particular type of accountability policies.  Thus, adoption of 
performance funding is seen as a bottom-top process, which starts with the grassroots’ 
demands for greater accountability, efficiency, and institutional improvement and ends 
with the policymakers’ vote to enact a policy aiming to meet these goals.  By the same 
token, policy failure could be explained by its decreasing popularity among voters and 
subsequent changes in the policymakers’ behavior reflecting this dynamic. 
However, in reality the first type of response is rare because public pressure is 
diffuse rather than specific.  Voters primarily care about two major issues in higher 
education: lower tuition and better access (Heller, 2001b; Immerwahr, 2002; Immerwahr 
& Johnson, 2010; National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education [NCPPHE], 
2002).  The public may also have concerns about quality, affirmative action, and 
accountability, but in general, higher education is not a top priority for voters.  With the 
exception of those whose children are going to college soon, voters do not care much 
about higher education.  For most, more pressing issues in other policy domains—
economy, jobs, taxes, healthcare, corrections, K-12 education, transportation, public 
utilities regulation, and welfare—divert attention from higher education and its policies 
(Gallup, 2010, 2013).  Reflecting this diffuse demand, legislators and governors seldom 
run on a strong higher education platform; at the same time, general educational issues 
are often present on political agendas (Berdahl, 2004; Florestano & Boyd, 1989; 
Fusarelli, 2002; Gittell & Kleiman, 2000). 
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I argue that the second type of response is more plausible and use it as a basis for 
my hypotheses in this frame.  In brief, legislators respond to a general sense of voter 
preferences.  People vote based on broad ideological convictions, and officials rationally 
anticipate general voters’ demands and act on them when creating legislation.  This 
interpretation means that voters seldom push for specific policies.  Instead they raise 
general concerns about broader issues, such as accountability and efficiency in higher 
education, and legislators arrive at solutions that aim to address these concerns. 
The economic, political, ideological, and social changes outlined in the literature 
review demonstrate a growing popular demand for greater accountability and efficiency 
of higher education.  However, these pressures are quite diffuse and, as a rule, are not 
aimed at promoting specific accountability policies.  Nevertheless, these changes in voter 
preferences have provided for policymakers’ propensity to advocate accountability 
policies as the means of meeting these demands.  Thus, performance funding emergence 
has partly been a function of the accountability pressures, to a large extent exerted by 
voters.  However, this popular demand cannot explain the selection of performance 
funding from a pool of available policy options. 
Under the electoral connection frame, legislators may propose performance 
funding policies as a way to address key voter concerns about public higher education.  
Due to their salience and pervasiveness, concerns about tuition hikes and access to higher 
education are key drivers for such pressures.  Facing challenges of access and 
affordability, voters want officials to mitigate these issues and have institutions account 
for their performance and results.  However, these wishes seldom take shape of demands 
for specific policies.  In turn, incumbents design policies aiming to both meet this popular 
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demand and ensure electoral advantage for their party.  This is how some state 
legislatures arrive at the concept of performance funding or any other accountability 
policy.  At the same time, the nature of these policies and details of specific programs are 
determined by state policymakers, and their agents, rather than the public. 
In contrast to the above passage, however, there is still a possibility that voters 
may specifically push for performance funding.  According to the yardstick competition 
theory discussed in Chapter 2, Besley and Case (1995) argue that the electorate may base 
their voting decisions on other states’ performance.  Thus, voters may look at the 
experiences of states with performance funding and wish to have the same policy to 
address a similar set of concerns and not to fall behind other states.  If meeting this 
demand is important, policymakers may borrow this policy from other states.  In this 
respect, the electoral connection frame partly converges with the policy diffusion frame, 
although its causal mechanism is based on voter preferences rather than on state officials’ 
own decisions. 
Considering adoption and termination of performance funding, proximity of 
elections becomes a major determining factor of both of these events (Nordhaus, 1975; 
Rogoff, 1990).  In the words of Barrilleaux et al. (2002): 
[E]lectoral competition shapes the behavior of parties in government, leading 
them to provide policies more consistent with the demands of their core 
constituents. […]. [Parties] behave pragmatically, allowing electoral 
considerations to influence their policy making. (p. 425) 
 
Politicians are believed to be more likely to adopt popular policies closer to 
elections to ensure more votes and thus the incumbent advantage.  They are also more 
likely to enact unpopular programs or terminate popular policies soon after the elections.  
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This strategy gives them more time before the next elections to distance themselves from 
unpopular decisions and subsequently to win the public’s approval and votes for the next 
election (Doyle et al., 2010; Nelson, 2000; Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff, 1990). 
As a policy that aims to ensure accountability and efficiency of higher education, 
performance funding is likely to enjoy broad ideological support from voters.  Therefore, 
it is more likely to be adopted closer to the election times.  This strategy could earn 
incumbents more votes, and presumably rational officials could adopt performance 
funding to gain an electoral advantage over competition. 
If however, the program is difficult to implement, faces strong opposition, or 
cannot be funded, state officials may want to discontinue it despite its assumed popularity 
with the voters.  Not wishing to lose electoral support, incumbents are thus unlikely to 
terminate performance funding close to elections.  Instead, they are more likely to 
discontinue the policy in the beginning of their term in order to let voters’ attention drift 
to other issues by the next election.  Following the same logic, performance funding 
adoption seems less likely at the beginning of the term because it will not offer 
incumbents any electoral advantage. 
Regarding performance funding failure, shifts in voter preferences can explain 
legislators’ decision to discontinue a program.  According to Downs (1972), the public 
quickly loses interest in a policy after its adoption, especially if its implementation is 
problematic.  Therefore, policymakers have some discretion in whether to continue 
investing in it.  The negative experience of other states with performance funding could 
also provide for waning voter pressure to sustain this policy.  Thus, a policy failure could 
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be a result of the decline in public interest, shift in voter preferences, progression through 
the political business cycle, or negative influence of other states’ examples. 
Based on the discussion of factors that could affect performance funding policy 
shifts under the electoral connection frame, I propose the following hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 1:   States with a more rapid growth in public-sector enrollment 
will be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
Access to higher education is one of the most critical public concerns.  Despite 
tuition hikes partly caused by the reduction in state funding for higher education (Heller, 
2001a), the demand for college access has grown significantly.  The combination of the 
enrollment surge, increasing tuition, and common enrollment caps (due to inability to 
accommodate all aspirants) has created conditions for frequent denial of college access 
and thus put this issue on the front burner.  The perceived severity of this issue has 
increased over time, given the constancy of enrollment growth and the rising concerns 
over institutional capacity to meet this demand for access (AASCU, 2010). 
Rapid growth in undergraduate enrollment in public higher education creates 
pressures on the sector to accommodate larger numbers of students and on the 
government to provide greater financial support to the enterprise.  Given these fiscal and 
capacity constraints, the usual responses by institutions and policymakers are tuition 
increases and enrollment caps (AASCU, 2010).  These responses translate into stronger 
public demand for college access and greater pressure on incumbents to meet this 
demand.  I argue that voters who perceive access to be an increasing challenge will be 
more likely to push elected officials to demand enhanced performance and accountability 
of higher education.  Therefore, heightened public concern over access to higher 
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education is expected to increase the likelihood of performance funding adoption and 
decrease the likelihood of its failure.  Thus, change in public enrollment is an adequate 
proxy measure for enrollment pressure on public institutions as perceived by the public. 
HYPOTHESIS 2:   As the net cost of college increases, states will be more likely 
to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
The second critical public concern is with the rising price of higher education.  
Citizens feel that college education has become less affordable, even given the scope and 
variety of financial aid available to students and families (Heller, 2001b).  Increasing 
tuition costs drive voters to demand policies ensuring greater accountability of higher 
education and more government regulation of the enterprise.  Thus, a growing concern 
over rising tuition costs creates pressure on legislators and governors to adopt policies 
that force higher education institutions to account for their use of public money and 
results achieved with increased costs.  At the same time, available financial aid lessens 
financial burden associated with obtaining a higher education and may moderate the 
effect of increasing tuition. 
To be sure, an argument can be made that the general public never really knows 
the actual net cost of college and does not have full information about, or understanding 
of, the factors that constitute it.  According to Hearn and Longanecker (1985), these and 
related limitations cast “serious doubts about the meaningfulness and importance of net 
price in college attendance” (p. 494), and “the twin specters of disorderly chronology and 
inadequate information interfere with the ‘real world’ applicability of the net price 
concept” (p. 495).  However, this research uses the net cost of college not as a factor of 
college attendance decision-making but as a proxy measure of vague, yet strong, voters’ 
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concern about affordability of higher education.  Even if unknown, fully unavailable, or 
exaggerated, changes in the net price of higher education are powerful drivers of voter 
behavior.  I argue that in this sense this metric is adequate and useful for capturing the 
effect of voters’ perception of college affordability on the likelihood of policy changes. 
Also, when accounting for voters’ affordability concerns, employing the net cost 
of college is preferable to using changes in tuition levels.  The net price concept allows 
focusing more on the voters’ motivation for a policy change as opposed to the 
policymakers’ concerns over tuition increases; the latter “may view escalating tuition 
costs as one indicator of the higher-education sector’s lack of accountability” (McLendon 
et al., 2006, p. 7).  Therefore, the concept of the net cost of college helps differentiate 
between explanations offered by different theoretical frames. 
I calculate the net cost of college attendance according to the following formula: 
Net cost of college = Average tuition at public four-year institutions – Average state-
provided financial aid. 
HYPOTHESES 3 and 4: States will be more likely to adopt performance funding 
and less likely to abandon it as legislative or gubernatorial elections draw closer. 
These hypotheses are steeped in the workings of the political business cycle and 
are based on the assumed popularity of accountability policies among the electorate.  The 
role of voter support and voters’ influence on state policies wax and wane depending on 
the respective stage of the cycle (Nordhaus, 1975).  Due to the concerns that citizens have 
about state higher education and empirical observations outlined in the literature review, 
these hypotheses assume that performance funding enjoys broad public support and this 
support determines incumbent behavior.  In the words of Rogoff (1990), “Any incumbent 
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politician, regardless of his ideological stripes, wants to convince voters that he is doing 
an efficient job running the government” (p. 21). 
Following the dynamics of the political business cycle, politicians are more 
willing to adopt innovative and popular policies, such as performance funding, during the 
election year.  This tendency is likely to be observed because voters pay attention to the 
incumbents’ recent performance and thus are more likely to reward the latter with votes.  
By the same logic, terminating an accountability policy with great political capital close 
to the election time would be detrimental to the reelection chances of incumbents.  
Abandoning a performance funding policy that has proven ineffective or difficult to 
implement will most likely occur soon after the election so that the voters’ attention will 
drift to other issues before the next election (Doyle et al., 2010).  This rationale applies 
both to state legislators and governors; all incumbents rationally use the timing-of-the-
election factor in creating electoral advantage over competition. 
HYPOTHESIS 5:  States with a higher proportion of bordering states with 
operational performance funding and higher net cost of college will be more likely to 
adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
According to Besley and Case (1995), voters use other states as yardsticks to 
assess performance of their own states.  They push legislators to adopt policies similar to 
the ones in neighboring states (or states in the same media markets) so as not to fall 
behind in critical areas.  From this perspective, voters may look at the experiences of 
other states with accountability policies and demand that policymakers follow their lead.  
Thus, a greater number of nearby states with performance funding is likely to amplify the 
effect of the net cost of college on the likelihood of performance funding adoption.  The 
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same effect on performance funding failure is expected to be reverse: The greater the 
number of nearby states with performance funding, the weaker is the expected impact of 
cost of college on the likelihood of terminating performance funding. 
Combining the effects of neighboring states with performance funding with the 
net cost of college allows me to draw a conceptual distinction between different 
mechanisms of policy spread.  If this interaction is statistically significant, I will be able 
to differentiate policy diffusion driven by voters’ behavior from policy diffusion due to 
behavior of state policymakers.  In other words, a significant result will demonstrate that 
diffusion of performance funding is driven by public pressure and not by state officials’ 
preference to borrow advantageous policies. 
 
Political Environment Frame 
This frame analyzes the internal political characteristics of states that affect 
policymaking and drive policy changes.  It asserts that policy positions are formed by 
policymakers’ preferences and focuses on partisan and ideological forces that shape the 
policy lifecycle.  In this frame, parties are seen as key actors that “organize government 
by fashioning coalition through compromises and bargaining, and winning elections” 
(Godwin & Ingram, 1980, p. 283) in order to promote their ideas and agendas while 
ensuring voter buy-in.  Through this process, parties determine the policy lifecycle.  
Ideology is understood as “values, beliefs, and issue-positions” (Gerring, 1998, p. 6).  
The ideological positions of legislators and governors affect the entire process of state 
policymaking and many policy decisions (Erikson et al., 1987). 
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In brief, partisan and ideological identifications of state officials are two critical 
determinants of state policymaking and are often found to have a statistically significant 
effect on the outcome of interest (Alt & Lowry, 2000; Berry & Berry, 1990; Erikson et 
al., 1987).  Although overlapping to some extent, these concepts are not identical. 
“Particularly on a state-by-state basis, partisan identification may be quite different than 
ideological position” (Doyle, 2006, p. 267).  Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1989, 1993) 
find that party strength is essentially unrelated to elite ideology. 
Defined as a set of ideas, values, and beliefs, ideology provides a broader 
motivation for political actors’ behavior.  In contrast, the motivation for acting in a 
partisan fashion is to accomplish goals on behalf of one’s party and, more specifically, to 
ensure the continued party control of the government.  Therefore, it is possible that 
policymakers may act in ways that are ideologically inconsistent with their partisan 
identification.  An example of this inconsistency is a party’s decision to gain advantage 
by supporting policies that are opposite to its ideological leaning (Doyle, 2006). 
The political environment lens is related to the electoral connection frame in that 
parties make rational assumptions about voter preferences, and ideologies may provide 
for different policy responses to voter demands.  However, the political environment 
frame presupposes a leadership role of parties in promoting policy agendas and not 
merely responding to voter preferences.  Parties, their agendas, and their interactions are 
important determinants of state policy making and its outcomes.  Barrilleaux et al. (2002) 
note, “Political parties are the most common institutional devices through which 
democratic competition is structured.  The nature of that competition affects what 
governments do, that is, the policies they produce” (p. 415). 
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The political environment frame focuses on the role of key state policymakers, 
namely, legislators and governors.  These two groups are the most critical actors in state 
policy making, including the higher education arena.  Specifically, “[s]tate legislatures 
and governors have long played a critical role in higher education policy, through the 
power of the budget and their influence on the agendas and membership of public 
governing boards” (Wellman, 2001, p. 49).  Ideological and partisan identification of key 
policymakers and their interaction create the political environment in the state and, thus, 
affect all policy changes.  Godwin and Ingram (1980) underscore the importance of the 
political environment: 
A policy succeeds or fails not only on the basis of the resources of its proponents 
or opponents, its level of funding, the skill and dedication of those who must 
implement it, and the receptivity of the target population, but also on the basis of 
the political system’s general capacity to act effectively. (p. 279) 
 
According to Godwin and Ingram (1980), the relative effectiveness of 
government institutions, which may account for policy successes and failures, has to do 
largely with partisan strength, partisan ideology, and influence of interest groups.  At the 
time of writing, these researchers observed both the nascent decline of parties (a trend 
also noted by Crotty and Jacobson, 1984) and the disintegration of partisan ideology in 
terms of liberal-conservative split, as well as the emergence of powerful “single issues” 
cutting across party lines due to “the failure of pluralist institutions to be representative 
and responsive” (Godwin & Ingram, 1980, p. 297).  Since that time, the trend of parties 
losing their strength and influence has reversed itself, and more recent literature suggests 
that parties are getting stronger (for example, Bibby, 1996; Sinclair, 2006).  Nonetheless, 
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both then and currently, parties and ideological positions of policymakers have continued 
to be important factors of state political environment. 
Regarding performance funding, I argue that it is a policy with clear partisan and 
ideological associations.  Performance funding pursues the goals of accountability, 
efficiency, institutional improvement and quality enhancement; introduces marketlike 
principles; and, as some believe, promotes business interests in higher education.  In this 
respect, this policy is aligned with the Republican agenda.  At the same time, the 
concepts of educational accountability and institutional efficiency may belong to the 
above-mentioned “single issues” (Godwin & Ingram, 1980) that cut across party lines. 
Therefore, one may expect that states with the Republican leadership will be more 
willing to introduce this rigid and demanding form of higher education accountability.  
For Republicans, performance funding adoption achieves critical objectives: It imposes 
an accountability and efficiency mechanism via incentives for institutions to change their 
behavior in the desired way without direct government interference and it advocates 
business interests through aligning institutional incentives with the employers’ needs. 
Ideological positions of state policymakers could also be a major determining 
factor for performance funding, which promotes value-laden mechanisms of steering 
public institutions toward greater competition through incentive-based and information-
driven improvement.  Performance funding introduces elements of market competition in 
the publicly supported sector via monetary rewards for enhanced institutional 
performance.  Therefore, this policy gravitates toward a neoconservative ideology and 
departs noticeably from liberal ideological values.  Such distinct ideological leaning 
could ensure support from certain groups that share the same ideology and preferences. 
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Viewing performance funding as a policy with clear partisan and ideological 
associations, I propose the following hypotheses under this frame. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: States with a larger Republican presence in state legislatures 
will be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
McLendon et al. (2006) find that Republican legislative strength is positively 
related to the probability of performance funding adoption.  Their explanation is that 
Republicans, more than Democrats, are oriented toward accountability, choice, and 
efficiency in higher education, are more suspicious of public bureaucracy, and tend to 
promote business interests in government programs.  In the Republicans’ view, 
performance funding may provide “the strongest leverage for ratcheting up accountability 
pressures within the large public bureaucracy of higher education” (p. 18).  Alternatively, 
the researchers also speculate that Republicans, whose presence in state legislatures grew 
significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, may have tended to conduct a more aggressive 
oversight of their opponents’ policies. 
In McLendon et al.’s (2006) words, “the finding seems to us sufficiently 
interesting to merit additional scholarship” (p. 18).  The same hypothesis in this study 
aims to test the above finding in a different model with a new set of covariates. 
HYPOTHESIS 7:  States with a Republican governor will be more likely to adopt 
performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
Partisan and ideological reasons behind this hypothesis are the same as for 
legislators.  Governors are powerful political players who can induce policy shifts 
through direct intervention and influencing the legislative agenda.  They are high-
powered policy entrepreneurs and may propose important policy changes for legislative 
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consideration at any stage of the policy cycle.  Possessing veto power and the ability to 
influence policymaking through membership in governing boards and participation in 
networks, governors can also be influential in policy failures.  Governors have been 
direct initiators of at least six performance funding policies and influenced the design of 
many policies that were initiated by legislatures.  Prior evidence suggests that a change in 
the governor’s party may lead to closing of their predecessors’ programs (Burke, 1998; 
Burke & Serban, 1998). 
HYPOTHESIS 8: States with a more conservative government will be more likely 
to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
Performance funding is in sync with the conservative leaning toward using 
market- and incentive-based mechanisms to regulate public institutions as opposed to 
direct government interference.  Thus, it could enjoy greater support of conservative 
politicians.  I expect more conservative governments to be more likely to promote these 
policies that are aimed at affecting behavior of public bureaucracies.  
 
Policy Diffusion Frame 
States can be viewed as policy laboratories that allow experimenting with policies 
under different conditions and timeframes (Volden, 2006).  The policy diffusion frame 
postulates that public policies migrate across state lines in a systematic manner (Balla, 
2001).  Policies diffuse due to the following reasons: emulating states with advantageous 
policies, creating conditions for economic competitiveness, and meeting public demand 
(Berry & Berry, 1999).  Thus, proliferation of policies could be a result of their diffusion 
across states; likewise, policy termination could be encouraged by its failures in other 
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states.  State policymakers are thought to engage in the process of social learning; they 
examine other states’ experiences and adopt successful policies.  This process may also 
happen in reverse: Learning of a policy failure may prompt state officials to decide 
against adopting a similar policy or terminate their own program.  Thus, states can learn 
from earlier adoptions and modify the policy to fit their needs better (Balla, 2001; Berry 
& Berry, 1990, 1992, 1999; Boehmke & Witmer, 2004; Karch, 2007; Mintrom, 1997; 
Mintrom & Vergari, 1998; Volden, 2006, 2008). 
As discussed in the literature review, chronology of performance funding 
adoptions seems to support both the idea of yardstick competition in the electoral 
connection frame and the policy diffusion frame.  One can easily see that the spread of 
performance funding policies, as well as their demise, has had clear regional patterns.  
Thus, it is possible to assume that this spread has occurred due to both voters and state 
policymakers’ sensitivity to what is happening in the other states. 
Another potential factor of performance funding diffusion is the salience of such 
long-standing and successful programs as the ones in Tennessee or Missouri (before its 
abandonment), or such ambitious endeavors as the original policy in South Carolina.  By 
the same logic, well-publicized failures of some of these experiments could have 
provided for policy termination in other states.  In the latter scenario, diffusion is deemed 
to have a national, as opposed to just regional, character. 
Focusing on the causal mechanisms of policy borrowing, Karch (2007) identifies 
the following reasons for diffusion: (a) imitation, which is driven by shared policy-
relevant characteristics of states with similar political environments; (b) emulation, which 
involves social learning from policy successes and failures in other states; and (c) 
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interstate competition, which pressures officials to adopt policies that create competitive 
advantage over other states. 
Traditional policy diffusion studies focus on geographic proximity, which is 
deemed to facilitate policy migration across adjacent or nearby state lines.  However, 
Karch (2007) criticizes the use of geographic proximity because in many cases it does not 
explain why diffusion occurs or fails to occur.  Also, due to technological advances, the 
impact of geography has decreased and diffusion of public policies, in his view, might be 
caused by the national-level forces as opposed to juxtaposition. 
The impact of geography may be due to close communication networks, 
overlapping media markets, the shared attributes of nearby states, or something 
else.  But the conventional proxies used to model the impact of geographic 
proximity cannot distinguish among these possibilities. (Karch, 2007, p. 58) 
 
Regarding performance funding, I believe that diffusion mechanisms play out in 
the following way.  First, according to researchers who consider geographic closeness, 
policymakers can draw lessons from policy responses in proximate states (Doyle et al., 
2010; McLendon et al., 2005).  From this perspective, contiguous states with 
performance funding may influence a given state’s decision to adopt this policy by virtue 
of being near and offering more and better information about the policy functioning.  
Likewise, their decisions to terminate performance funding may provide—again, mostly 
through offering heuristic shortcuts for decision making—for policy failure in the given 
state.  The key issue is distinguishing policy diffusion from independent adoption. 
Second, imitation is based on state officials’ perception that a borrowing state and 
a lending state share some policy-relevant characteristics and belief that the borrowing 
state should also enact this policy due to this similarity.  “[P]olicies spread because 
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lawmakers imitate their colleagues who operate in similar political environments” (Karch 
2007, p. 60).  In my view, the only policy-relevant characteristic that is both appropriate 
and offers sufficient data variation is state government ideology.  Because performance 
funding for public higher education is, to a large extent, a value-laden policy, ideological 
leanings of state policymakers should affect decisions about its adoption and termination.  
Governments with similar ideological leanings are expected to imitate each other more 
readily, meaning that they may adopt or terminate policies in a more or less coordinated 
fashion. 
Third, emulation works through policymakers’ desire to copy policies that have 
proven successful in other states.  In Karch’s (2007) words, “Emulation is a specific form 
of imitation, such that officials believe they should adopt a policy because it will allow 
them to achieve a substantive policy objective.  […].  Emulation is also driven by the 
perceived success of a policy” (p. 60).  To reverse Karch’s logic, state officials may also 
want to avoid adopting policies that have proven unsuccessful or difficult to implement in 
other states.  They may also be more likely to terminate their own policies if their 
prominent counterparts elsewhere ceased to exist.  From this position, states that adopt 
performance funding intend to imitate success of the early policy adopters.  Prominent, 
long-standing, and perceivably successful policies are deemed especially influential in 
this diffusion mechanism.  Such policies have proven that performance funding can be 
successful and help achieve valuable objectives and thus are more likely to be emulated.  
In contrast, policy failures can make policymakers uneasy about the efficacy of this 
approach and can either deter them from adopting their own program or expedite the 
demise of an existing policy.  In brief, policies that have survived through periodic 
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evaluations are deemed successful.  Therefore, policy longevity can serve as a proxy 
measure for policy success. 
Finally, “[a] public policy may also diffuse because officials believe that the 
failure to adopt it will put their state at a competitive disadvantage, making them feel 
pressure to keep up with their colleagues in other jurisdictions” (Karch, 2007, p. 62).  
Policymakers may adopt a policy that, in their view, affects their state’s relative 
attractiveness.  Performance funding may be perceived as offering some competitive 
advantages to adopting states and the policy diffuses due to other states’ desire to gain the 
same advantage.  Much of state competition happens in the economic arena, and thus 
states’ motivation to adopt innovative policies may be related to economic development. 
If state officials believe that performance funding enhances quality and 
performance, they may adopt it to increase relative attractiveness of their institutions.  A 
long-term outcome, in their view, will be increasing the number of students coming from 
the competing states to receive higher education (in-migration) and decreasing the 
number of students leaving for other states to get a college degree (out-migration).  A 
postponed benefit of the adopted policy could be an increased level of educational 
attainment and higher state taxes paid by higher education graduates. 
Based on the geographic proximity rationale and Karch’s (2007) classification of 
the policy diffusion mechanisms, I propose the following set of hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 9: States with a higher proportion of neighbors with performance 
funding will be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
This hypothesis tests the proposition that geographic proximity determines policy 
diffusion.  Engaged in the process of social learning, policymakers are believed to 
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monitor activities of nearby states and borrow successful policies while steering clear of 
the failed ones.  Although evidence for diffusion is mixed, it is possible that state officials 
look at neighboring states for examples of effective policies and solutions to common 
problems.  States may also learn from their neighbors’ policy failures.  Dissemination of 
information about failed policies could lessen the chances of policy adoption and increase 
chances of policy demise (Doyle et al., 2005). 
Performance funding is a rather confined and specific policy, which does not 
attract a lot of voter interest and, therefore, does not claim much of elected officials’ 
attention.  Because of information access and processing constraints (Byron, 2004; 
Kingdon, 1995; Mooney, 1991a, 1991b, 1993; Stewart, 1992), state officials look for 
available examples of policy responses to common issues.  States in the same geographic, 
media, or policy regions—which overlap to a considerable extent—are the obvious 
sources of such heuristic shortcuts.  Therefore, proximate states with operational 
performance funding policies may influence incumbents’ decision to adopt it.  In a 
similar fashion, abandoning performance funding in a bordering states may provide for 
termination of an existing policy or failure to adopt a new policy in a given state. 
HYPOTHESIS 10: States with a larger number of “ideological neighbors” that 
have made a performance funding policy shift will be more likely to follow suit. 
This hypothesis tests the imitation rationale for policy diffusion (Karch, 2007).  
From this stance, states borrow policies based on their economic, ideological, or 
demographic similarities with the lending state.  In contrast to the previous explanation 
for borrowing (which relies on policy diffusion across adjacent state lines), this 
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explanation focuses on policy migration among states sharing certain characteristics that 
facilitate diffusion. 
As demonstrated by Grossback et al. (2004), Volden (2006), and Volden et al. 
(2008), policy diffusion may happen between states with similar partisan and ideological 
leanings, and demographic or budgetary situations.  Considering the nature of 
performance funding, I focus on ideological proximity among borrowing and lending 
states, namely, on similarity in government ideology.  The Index of Political Ideology 
(Berry et al., 1998) allows identifying ideologically proximate states accurately while 
providing sufficient variation of indices to run statistical analysis.  
HYPOTHESIS 11: States with more contemporaneous examples of successful 
policies will be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
This hypothesis tests the emulation reason for policy diffusion (Karch, 2007).  
Emulation consists in adopting policies that are deemed successful in other states.  In this 
explanation of policy diffusion, state officials learn about an effective program elsewhere 
and introduce it in their states as something that has proven successful and effective.  In 
brief, policies that are deemed successful are more likely to be emulated.  However, if a 
successful program fails, it could increase the likelihood of other adopters terminating 
their own program—especially, if these policies have not yet reached their maturity. 
This study equates success with longevity and considers policies that have been in 
operation for five years or more to be successful.  I argue that policy longevity is an 
adequate—although by no means the best—indicator of success; policies that have 
survived a long time, undergone periodic evaluations, and persisted into the next 
implementation period can be considered reasonably successful.  The very fact of a 
121 
 
continued financial and other investment in the policy testifies to its perceived success 
and desired impacts.  A five-year period is proposed as a measure of policy success 
because most programs have had shorter implementation periods at the end of which they 
stand for reevaluation.  Five years is also sufficient time for the policy to gain salience as 
an efficient policy so that other states would be motivated to adopt it, too. 
HYPOTHESIS 12: States with a higher ratio of student out-migration to in-
migration will be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
This hypothesis tests the competition-driven explanation of policy diffusion 
(Karch, 2007).  In higher education, student brain drain is an obvious measure of 
interstate competition.  I distinguish between (a) brain drain of college graduates, that is, 
“the net emigration of college graduates (skilled personnel) from the state where they got 
their college degree to another state” (Ionescu & Polgreen, 2008, p. 4), and (b) brain 
drain of potential and current students, that is, emigration of high school graduates to 
other states to obtain higher education.  This study is concerned only with the latter type 
of brain drain; however, I acknowledge the inseparable relationships between both types. 
States compete for instate high school graduates remaining in their home state to 
obtain higher education but also for out-of-state students moving in to attend higher 
education institutions.  States engage in this competition by increasing attractiveness of 
institutions, mostly through enhanced investment in higher education (Ionescu & 
Polgreen, 2008).  States enter into rivalry for students because brain drain has direct 
economic repercussions: “[L]osing college graduates is a drain on the local economy” (p. 
2).  If graduates join labor force in the state where they attended college, they will pay 
taxes, contribute to creating a more educated labor force, and enhance the state’s general 
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educational attainment.  Thus, increasing graduates out-migration can lead to decreases in 
public support of higher education as policymakers may be dissatisfied with its 
performance (Justman & Thisse, 1997; Strathman, 1994; Wirtz, 2003). 
Certainly, incumbents pursue both of these goals: (a) increasing attractiveness of 
institutions in order to keep native students and attract migratory students, and (b) raising 
the level of educational attainment in the state and enlarging its tax base.  They may 
deem brain drain to be an indicator of floundering higher education that cannot attain 
these policy objectives.  In pursuit of these goals, policymakers may look at policies in 
other states that can create a competitive advantage.  Successful performance funding 
policies, which aim to enhance quality and performance, may seem an obvious response 
to the brain drain problem that creates significant competitive advantage.  Not wishing to 
fall behind the competition, policymakers may find it necessary to adopt performance 
funding.  In a similar vein, if state officials believe that performance funding helps 
alleviate the brain drain problem through its focus on better institutional performance and 
results, they will be less willing to terminate the program or remove its funding.  
 
Principal-Agent Frame 
This conceptual lens is rooted in the agency theory and the public bureaucracy 
literature.  Agency theory examines how principals delegate work to agents for 
implementation by analyzing contractual and hierarchical relationships between them and 
motivations for their actions.  Agency relationships arise when the principals engage the 
agents—due to the lack of their own expertise, skill, or time—to perform some tasks on 
their behalf (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Moe, 1984; Ross, 1973).  The principal-agent frame 
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is appropriate for examination of the relationships between state officials (principals) and 
higher education institutions and their state boards (agents). As Lane and Kivisto (2008) 
explain, “Similar to other public bureaucracies, public colleges and universities operate in 
an environment of hierarchical control and information asymmetry” (p. 143). 
The principal-agent relationships have the following inherent problems: the goals 
and interests of the principal and agents are not perfectly aligned, these actors are driven 
by different motivations, and they attempt to maximize their own utilities.  The principal 
does not know if the agents do their best to pursue the former’s interests.  As a solution, 
the principal may design an incentive structure that makes pursuing the principal’s 
objectives advantageous to the agents.  Thus, to ensure compliance with their 
preferences, the principals have to select the agents, monitor them, and use various 
incentives (Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Miller, 2005; Moe, 1984; Petersen, 1995). 
Performance funding exemplifies precisely this type of incentive and monitoring 
structure for public higher education institutions.  While state officials use performance 
funding to align higher education with the state’s priorities, institutions mostly view it as 
a sign of increasing government interference and diminishing institutional autonomy 
(Burke & Associates, 2002).  Thus, this policy contains inherent conflicts due to a 
divergence of interests, priorities, and motivations.  In this study, the principal-agent 
frame is useful for understanding how relationships between state policymakers and 
institutions affect policy changes. 
Reflecting the principals’ goals and preferences, performance funding generally 
aims to pursue statewide goals and priorities.  Incumbent politicians often initiate the 
program and select performance indicators that mostly reveal state economic and 
124 
 
accountability priorities.  Conversely, policies initiated by higher education systems 
usually aim to avoid the anticipated imposition of performance indicators by external 
actors (Burke & Associates, 2002).  Burke (2005d) concludes, “Performance Funding 
(PF) stresses state priorities, with little recognition of market forces and academic 
concerns” (p. 311). 
Among the main goals of performance funding—demonstrating external 
accountability, meeting state needs and priorities, and improving institutional quality and 
performance (Burke, 2003)—colleges are mostly interested in the last one.  
“[I]nstitutional administrators and faculty have always been more concerned about 
institutional improvement than accountability” (Shin & Milton, 2004, p. 3).  As a rule, 
their motivation is largely monetary: to secure financial resources through compliance 
with policymakers’ interests.  In performance funding programs, targeted state funding is 
offered as an incentive for institutional cooperation (Burke, 2001b; Shin & Milton, 2004).  
“Performance based funding changes the incentives and is likely to bring changes in 
universities behavior.  Universities will thus rearrange their resources in the way that is 
most ‘profitable’ in the new environment” (Soo, 2003, p. 2).  This motivation is far from 
ideal to ensure perfect alignment of institutional behavior with the state officials’ goals 
and provides for the emergence of the principal-agent problem. 
Because higher education institutions are closer to the level of actual policy 
implementation, they have more and better information than policymakers about the inner 
workings of a program; however, they have little incentive to inform the principals about 
all details.  On the contrary, as bureaucratic agents, institutions prefer to retain discretion 
in their interpretation of legislative authority (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  This information 
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asymmetry provides for deviation from the original intentions and preferences of state 
officials and thus has a large potential for policy failure. 
The principal-agent theory solves this moral hazard problem through finding 
mechanisms that will motivate the agents to act in the principal’s best interests (Lane & 
Kivisto, 2008).  In the higher education arena, the principal-agent issue is solved by using 
proxy indicators to monitor institutional performance and providing financial incentives 
to alter institutional behavior.  However, the following critical factors can substantially 
affect the actual application of these approaches: the character of bureaucratic structures 
that embody the relationships between state officials and higher education institutions 
and the nature of the policy. 
Policies are mandated and adopted by state legislatures.  Therefore, institutional 
characteristics of legislative bodies are important determinants of policy shifts.  The most 
critical characteristics of legislatures are eloquently expressed by the notion of legislative 
professionalism.  In brief, more professionalized legislatures to a greater extent resemble 
the U.S. Congress in such key attributes as session length, legislative pay, and available 
staff (McLendon et al., 2006; Squire, 1992, 2000, 2007).  Professionalism is important in 
two respects: first, more professionalized legislatures have greater resources, such as 
time, staff, and analytics; and second, these resources present a greater policy analytical 
capacity which provides the potential to design and adopt more successful and 
sustainable policies.  Howlett (2007) defines policy analytical capacity as: 
[T]he amount of basic research a government can conduct or access, its ability to 
apply statistical methods, applied research methods, and advanced modeling 
techniques to this data and employ analytical techniques […] in order to gauge 
broad public opinion and attitudes, as well as those of interest groups and other 
major policy players, and to anticipate future policy impacts. (p. 4) 
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As is clear from this definition, more professionalized legislatures have a greater 
ability to carry out such activities, and this feature is deemed to have a direct bearing on 
both policy adoption and failure. 
Under conditions of unequally distributed power, different priorities, and partially 
divergent interests and goals, the role of state boards for higher education becomes 
critical.  The state board serves as a “buffer” between state officials and higher education 
institutions (NCPPHE, 2003; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003) and may be seen—
depending on the type of board, nature of the policy, and one’s position—as either “a 
hand of the government” or, alternatively, a defender of higher education’s interests in all 
interactions with the state government.  As discussed in the literature review, the state 
board is an agent in relation to state policymakers but it can also act as the principal in 
relation to its subordinate institutions—mostly, in case of consolidated governing boards. 
The nature of the program is critical in establishing principal-agent interactions 
and determining the likelihood of policy adoption or failure (Burke & Associates, 2002; 
Burke & Modarresi, 2000, 2001).  Built-in programmatic features can facilitate or impede 
principal-agent relations, thereby creating conditions for policy success or failure.  
Characteristics of performance funding programs are important because they can better 
align interests and priorities of policymakers and institutions or, on the contrary, create 
counter-incentives for cooperation.  I propose the following hypotheses under the 
principal-agent frame. 
HYPOTHESIS 13: States with more professionalized legislatures will be more 
likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it. 
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The level of state legislative professionalism is determined by such key 
characteristics as salaries, session length, and staff size (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; 
Squire, 1992, 2000, 2007).  More professionalized legislatures have greater analytic, 
time, and staff resources, may attract better educated members, and may deal with higher 
education bureaucracy more effectively; therefore, they are deemed to be more disposed 
to design and adopt innovative policies (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; McLendon et al., 2006; 
Squire, 2002).  According to Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003), “[t]he greater resources 
that more professionalized legislatures have at their discretion allow them to overcome 
problems of information asymmetry” (p. 89).  Besides, the same resources ensure greater 
policy analytical capacity and may allow more professionalized state legislature to design 
more sustainable and successful policies that are less likely to fail. 
To be sure, performance funding may be also initiated by governors or higher 
education community, and in such cases, focusing on just legislative professionalism may 
seem inadequate.  However, I argue that legislative professionalism is a good 
representation of the general culture of governmental professionalism.  This broad 
culture, and not necessarily specific states’ characteristics, makes a difference and is 
deemed to determine transitions in the policy lifecycle. 
HYPOTHESES 14a, 14b, and 14c: States with consolidated governing boards will 
be less likely to adopt performance funding and more likely to abandon it; these 
expectations will be reverse for states with strong and weak coordinating boards. 
McLendon et al. (2006) found that consolidated governing boards were negatively 
related to performance funding enactment but positively associated with the adoption of 
more flexible performance budgeting.  The researchers explain this finding by protection 
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of higher education interests from externally imposed accountability.  In their view, 
consolidated governing boards are better poised to protect institutional interests due to the 
former’s political clout and lobbying power.  If performance funding is deemed to 
infringe on institutional autonomy appreciably, these boards may use their clout to 
founder its adoption or expedite its demise.  This hypothesis tests this supposition with a 
new model and new set of covariates.  Conversely, states with strong or weak 
coordinating boards are considered to be less equipped to stand up against policies of 
external accountability that infringe on institutional autonomy. 
HYPOTHESIS 15: States in which performance funding was initiated by state 
boards of higher education will be less likely to abandon the policy. 
Prior research has found that while stable performance funding policies exhibited 
an important input by state governing boards, unstable programs were often mandated 
and used prescribed indicators (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Modarresi, 2000, 
2001; Serban, 1997b).  This hypothesis tests whether self-initiated programs are actually 
less prone to failure.  The rationale is that policies that were developed with strong input 
from the higher education community and were not imposed by external actors will have 
less opposition to policy adoption and stronger support in its implementation. 
HYPOTHESIS 16: Performance funding that was initiated via an appropriation 
bill or budget proviso will be more likely to fail and less likely to be readopted. 
Dougherty and Natow (2009), Dougherty et al. (2011), and Dougherty et al. 
(2012) find that performance funding policies initiated through a budget proviso were 
more likely to be terminated.  Their explanation is that such policies are easier to abandon 
because termination does not require withdrawing the mandate; it merely requires not 
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including the policy in the next budget.  Because their analysis is limited to case studies 
of individual states, I intend to retest this finding across states and over time with a 
quantitative method.  
 
Other Influences on Policy Lifecycle 
Several other determinants of policy changes fall outside the proposed theoretical 
frames but definitely must be accounted for.  These influences include short-term 
economic conditions, resource allocation to higher education, and idiosyncratic regional 
factors.  The first two determinants represent the current economic climate in the state 
and associated budget constraints, and the last factor accounts for political-cultural and 
economic differences on a larger scale—among various regions of the country. 
Prior research has demonstrated that short-term economic conditions are critical 
determinants of the policy lifecycle—including the probability of policy adoption—and 
various educational outcomes (Berry & Berry, 1990, 1992; Betts & McFarland, 1995).  
These fluctuating economic climates are determined, to a large extent, by the respective 
stage of the business cycle and national economic situation. 
Regarding performance funding, difficult economic times may encourage 
incumbents to adopt policies that demand financial accountability and efficiency.  
“[M]any observers of the recent accountability movement in higher education have 
surmised that the new mandates may be driven in part by fluctuating economic conditions 
in the states” (McLendon et al., 2006, p. 5).  Thus, my model must account for the current 
economic climate by controlling for indicators of economic health such as the 
unemployment rate, total state per capita income, or poverty rate.  I expect the likelihood 
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of adopting performance funding to increase as the economic situation worsens and 
decrease as it improves; the expected effect on the probability of failure will be opposite. 
State appropriations to higher education greatly affect policy changes and 
evolution.  Emergence of performance funding was contemporaneous with a diminishing 
share of state support (Burke & Associates, 2002).  As the majority of these policies were 
adopted through the 1990s, state appropriations slipped considerably due to the national 
recession and increasing competition from other public services (Burke, 1998a).  These 
developments forced incumbents to reconsider their traditional funding approaches and 
introduce performance accountability policies.  As state appropriations decreased and 
tuitions rose, so too did calls for accountability on the part of the public and 
policymakers.  The intent behind performance funding was to ensure efficiency of public 
money spending and demand accountability in the times of rising college costs. 
At the same time, many policies were discontinued in financially difficult times.  
The rationale behind such decision is different.  To illustrate, if the program uses 
supplementary funds to reward institutional performance, budget difficulties may lead 
state officials to abandon the policy.  In other words, state policymakers could make a 
decision to economize at the expense of the bonus money of the policy.  According to 
Dougherty et al. (2011), institutions are also more willing to sacrifice performance 
funding in austere economic times in order to protect their core funding. 
As mentioned in the literature review, emergence and spread of performance 
funding demonstrated obvious regional patterns.  Therefore, this study needs to account 
for any economic, political, and cultural differences among regions of the country that 
may affect various policy shifts.  To illustrate one possible mechanism of this influence 
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in McLendon et al.’s (2006) words, “In higher education, region-based policy consortia 
[…] have long served as conduits for disseminating information about higher-education 
policies among states within different regions” (p. 20).  Therefore, I also take into 
consideration the existence and operation of higher education regional compacts, the 
membership in which may be instrumental in determining the policy evolution. 
 
Key Relations in the Conceptual Framework 
The basic interrelations of the elements of the conceptual framework for the study 
are graphically presented in Figure 1.  These relations serve as the foundation for 
formulating the above propositions about my research question.  
In the graphical form, the conceptual framework boils down to the questions: 
“What factors lead to the events of interest?” and “Which actors perform which actions?”  
Although simplified, this visual presentation of the conceptual framework allows 
uncovering causal mechanisms behind the events and specifying the sets of actors and 
actions.  To a first approximation, Figure 1 presents the chronology of the policy 
lifecycle, specifying its major stages and the main points at which the events of interest 
occur.  It also identifies the main environmental factors, key actors, sets of actions 
available to each group of actors, decision points at which policy shifts (events) can 
occur, and causes of policy failures.             
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework for the Study            
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The policy lifecycle is roughly represented by the four main stages in the center of 
the graph.  It starts with the preadoption stage, leads to adoption (comprising two steps: 
policy authorization and appropriation), proceeds to policy implementation and revision, 
and then branches out into four possible outcomes: policy maintenance, policy succession 
(substitution with another policy), funding removal, and policy termination (mandate 
withdrawal).  This process is cyclical in nature: (a) policy maintenance requires 
repeatedly going through the implementation-evaluation-revision stage, (b) funding 
removal may lead to new appropriations, and (c) policy termination provides for potential 
readoption of the policy.  These possibilities are indicated by the reverse arrows on the 
graph.  Because my research focuses on two specific points, policy adoption and failure 
(identified with double-framed boxes), the preadoption and implementation stages are 
“black boxes” for me, with the internal processes being important but remaining 
unspecified. 
With double dotted and double straight arrows, Figure 1 indicates the decision 
points at which various policy failures can occur.  These events can happen when (a) a 
policy proposal fails to be adopted, (b) the policy is not subsequently funded (policy 
development ends with authorization), (c) its funding is suspended, and (d) the policy is 
terminated through the mandate withdrawal, permanent funding removal, or substitution 
with a different policy.  Because funding suspension can happen multiple times, the 
arrow between the boxes for implementation and failure to maintain funding is double-
headed. 
Figure 1 also identifies major factors in the state policy environment and higher 
education system environment and the key actors that affect performance funding policy 
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lifecycle.  The wide dotted arrows converging on each stage of the policy process 
represent sets of actions that are available to each group of actors.  In contrast to this 
design, the influences converging on the Policy Termination box are the causes of policy 
termination.  It is important that any of these causes (the “Why”) can be matched up with 
any of the ultimate types of policy failure (the “How”).  Identifying causes for failure in 
this part of the graph allows me to propose hypotheses that focus on policy termination. 
In addition to reasons for policy failure at preliminary stages, the following 
factors could lead to policy termination at the end of the cycle: changes in the political 
environment, failure to meet the original goals, lacking resources to resume funding after 
its suspension, and monitoring and implementation challenges that could lead to campus 
opposition to the policy and other issues of the principal-agent relationships.   
Finally, Figure 1 acknowledges that the state policy and higher education 
environments, and their actors, are subject to exogenous and endogenous forces in the 
global environment.  These influences provide for changes that could be imposed on the 
respective actors or initiated by these actors on their own.  To illustrate, a short-term 
massive decline in state revenue gives an exogenous shift that affects both sets of actors, 
whereas internal reforms in higher education are self-initiated and are not a response to 
external forces.  The objective external factors (most important, budgetary constraints 
and the natural progression of the business and political cycles) work through the state 
policy environment, providing for policy shifts at any stage of the policy lifecycle. 
In brief, as the visual conceptual framework demonstrates, the performance 
funding policy lifecycle is an extremely complex phenomenon, which is subject to many 
exogenous and endogenous forces and involves numerous actors with multiple sets of 
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actions available to them.  Due to this complexity, the causes of policy changes are also 
complex and affected by various external and internal influences.  Graphic presentation 
of these interrelations and influences allows putting forth testable propositions under the 
proposed theoretical frames.  The conceptual framework serves as a foundation for 
operationalization of the variables that are examined in Chapter 4.  
 
General Model for the Study 
Based on the proposed hypotheses and other critical factors, I suggest the following 
equation to analyze the time to occurrence of performance funding policy shifts.  This 
general equation will be further elaborated in the section Model Specification (Chapter 4). 
TIME-TO-EVENTit   =   ∫ (ENROLit,  NETCOSTit,  ELECTIONit,  YARDSTICKit,  
REPUBit,  IDEOLOGYit,  DIFFUSIONit,  BRDRAINit,  LEGPROFit,  
BOARDit,  PROGRAMit, ECONSITit, APPROPit , REGIONit) 
where i = 1 ,…, 47 for the 47 states examined in the study, 
t = 1, …, 30 for the years between 1979 and 2009, 
TIME-TO-EVENT  =  time to occurrence of performance funding policy shifts, 
ENROL  =  an annual change in the public-sector enrolment, 
NETCOST  =  the net cost of college attendance, 
ELECTION  =  the proximity of legislative and gubernatorial elections, 
YARDSTICK  =  factors of yardstick competition, 
REPUB  =  Republican presence in the state legislature and the governor’s office, 
IDEOLOGY  =  ideological leaning of the state government, 
DIFFUSION  =  other states’ experience with performance funding, 
BRDRAIN  =  the extent of student brain drain, 
136 
 
LEGPROF  =  legislative professionalism, 
BOARD  =  the presence of a particular type of state higher education board, 
PROGRAM  =  idiosyncratic characteristics of performance funding programs, 
ECONSIT =  the current economic situation in the state, 
APPROP  =  the level of state appropriations to higher education, 
REGION  =  a regional identifier.     
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Description of the Dataset 
To investigate my research question and test the hypotheses, I compiled a 
longitudinal panel dataset, which includes critical economic, political, and education 
indicators of the states.  The dataset contains data for 47 states for the period 1979 
through 2009.  The year 1979 is determined by Tennessee’s adoption of the first 
performance funding program in the nation.  The year 2009 is the last year for which the 
data were available at the time of the analysis. 
The dataset is limited to include information on 47 states.  Three states were 
omitted from the analysis: Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska.  These states are often 
excluded from comparative studies of the states due to unique characteristics (Doyle, 
2006; McLendon et al. 2006; Mokher & McLendon, 2007).  Alaska and Hawaii were 
omitted because they differ from other states on important indicators, including 
geographic isolation (Berry & Berry, 1990; Mintrom, 1997).  Nebraska was omitted due 
to the unicameral structure of its legislature and nonpartisan elections, which would 
preclude analysis of important political variables (Doyle, 2006; McLendon et al., 2007). 
During the observation period, 27 states adopted performance funding at least 
once; 13 of them terminated the policy at least once.  In addition, many adopting states 
experienced other types of policy failure: failing to provide funding, suspending or 
removing funding, or failing to meet all requirements of an operational policy (Table 1).   
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Table 1. Policy Cycles of State Performance Funding Systems 
State Policy cycle 1 Policy cycle 2 Policy cycle 3 
 Operational Latent Operational Latent Operational Latent 
Arkansas 1995 
[Act 1029] 
1997 
[Act 241] 
1999 
[Act 1180] 
2001 
[Act 221] 
2007 
[Act 1592] 
2008 
[no funding] 
California 1998 
[SB 1564] 
1999 
[not true PF] 
– – – – 
Colorado 1994 
[SB 94-1110] 
1996 
[HB 96-1219] 
1999 
[SB 99-229] 
2004 
[SB 04-189] 
– – 
Connecticut 1985 
[leg.mandate] 
1986 
[not true PF] 
– – – – 
Florida 1994 
[Ch. 94-249] 
1995 
[no funding] 
1996 
[approp. bill] 
2008 
[no funding] 
– – 
Idaho 2000 
[Board’s vote] 
2005 
[no funding] 
– – – – 
Illinois 1998 
[Board’s vote] 
2002 
[no funding] 
– – – – 
Indiana 1997 
[Board’s vote]  
1998 
[no funding] 
2003 
[Board’s vote] 
2004 
[not true PF] 
2007 
[Board’s vote] 
2008 
[no funding] 
Kansas 1999 
[SB 345] 
2000 
[no funding] 
2002 
[SB 647] 
2003 
[no funding] 
2004 
[SB 647] 
– 
Kentucky 1994 
[HB 2] 
1997 
[HB 1 & 4] 
2008 
[SB 80] 
2009 
[no funding] 
– – 
(continued)  
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Table 1, continued 
State Policy cycle 1 Policy cycle 2 Policy cycle 3 
 Operational Latent Operational Latent Operational Latent 
Louisiana 1997 
[Act 18] 
2001 
[no funding] 
2008 
(HB 1) 
– – – 
Minnesota 1994 
[Chap. 532] 
1995 
[no funding] 
1996 
[Serban & 
Burke, 1998] 
1998 
[Burke et al., 
2002] 
– – 
Missouri 1993 
[approp. bill] 
2001 
[no funding] 
– – – – 
New Mexico 2003 
[HB 393] 
2004 
[no funding] 
2007 
[approp. bill] 
– – – 
New Jersey 1999 
[Chap. 138] 
2003 
[no funding] 
– – – – 
New York 1998 
[Board’s vote] 
1999 
[not true PF] 
2000 
[approp. bill] 
2007 
[no funding] 
– – 
North Carolina 1999 
[HB 168] 
2000 
[no funding] 
2001 
[HB 168: 99] 
– – – 
Ohio 1985 
[leg.mandate] 
1986 
[not true PF] 
1995 
[HB 117] 
2008 
[substitution] 
2009 
[HB 1: 09] 
– 
Oklahoma 1997 
[approp. bill] 
2000 
[no funding] 
2001 
[Board’s vote] 
– – – 
Oregon 1999 
[Board’s vote] 
2001 
[no funding] 
2007 
[approp. bill] 
– – – 
(continued)  
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Table 1, continued 
State Policy cycle 1 Policy cycle 2 Policy cycle 3 
 Operational Latent Operational Latent Operational Latent 
Pennsylvania 2000 
[Board’s vote] 
– – – – – 
South Carolina 1996 
[Act 359] 
2003 
[no funding] 
– – – – 
South Dakota 1997 
[Board’s vote] 
2002 
[no funding] 
2004 
[Board’s vote] 
– – – 
Tennessee 1979 
[Board’s vote] 
– – – – – 
Texas 1999 
[HB 1] 
2003 
[no funding] 
2007 
[HB 3828] 
2008 
[no funding] 
2009 
[SB 1] 
– 
Virginia 1999 
[Board’s vote] 
2000 
[no funding] 
2005 
[HB 2866] 
2006 
[no funding] 
2007 
[approp. bill] 
– 
Washington 1997 
[ESHB 2259] 
1999 
[no funding] 
2007 
[approp. bill] 
– – – 
 
Note.  Operational status of a policy is achieved by policy adoption and readoption, and 
beginning or resumption of funding.  The policy’s latent status is achieved by policy termination, 
temporary or permanent defunding, substitution with another policy, and failing to meet the 
criterion of sufficient complexity (section Key Definitions).  The remarks in brackets list 
indicators of respective policy events: legislative acts, including appropriation bills and budget 
provisos; state board’s actions regarding a policy; and explanation of why a policy is considered 
nonoperational in spite of existing mandates.  In some cases, these remarks include references to 
studies that provide data on particular events. 
Due to space limitations, 2009 readoptions in Arkansas and Indiana are omitted from the table but 
are used in model estimations. 
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I use two types of data: data from a variety of reliable secondary sources and 
unique data collected for this investigation.  The following narrative and Table 2 describe 
all variables and data sources for them. 
 
Dependent Variables 
In the Method section, I explain why, despite dealing with different policy 
changes, this study employs a single dependent variable, which stands for a generic 
performance funding policy shift.  However, for ease of interpretation in this section, I 
discuss the outcome variable as if it were two separate dependent variables: the first one 
representing policy adoption (and readoption) and the second one standing for policy 
failure.  Each of these outcomes is a binary event, which is defined as whether or not a 
state adopted or terminated the policy. 
I conceptualize the dependent variable as the hazard rate (probability or risk) for 
either policy adoption or policy failure.  The hazard rate is the instantaneous probability 
of a policy shift occurring in each period.  In other words, it is an instantaneous rate of 
change—transition from non-adoption to adoption to failure to readoption—given that a 
state has persisted until this time without experiencing the event.  The Method section 
defines the hazard rate in more detail.  The data used to estimate hazard rates include 
both binary variables for each event and duration for every condition, i.e., the length of 
time that it took a state to adopt, abandon, or readopt the policy.     
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Table 2. Variable Description and Sources 
Variable Description Source Total / 
Max 
Mean SD 
Policy shifts 
regarding PF 
Dummy variables for policy 
shifts 
Prior research 
Statutes & gov. doc. 
91 – – 
Perceived access to 
higher education 
Annual changes (%) in public-
sector enrollment 
SREB data library – 1.60 3.20 
Net cost of college 
[Re-centered] 
Net cost = Average tuition at 4 
yr. HEI – Average state fin. aid 
WSAC tuition data 
NASSGAP surveys 
– 0.00 1,715 
Proximity of 
legislative elections  
Number of years before the next 
election to the State House 
Computed from The 
Book of States 
4 0.60 0.65 
Proximity of 
gubernator. elections  
Number of years before the next 
election to the Governor’s office 
Computed from The 
Book of States 
4 1.47 1.11 
Yardstick 
competition effect 
Interaction: Net cost of college 
X percent of neighbors with PF 
Computed from other 
variables 
– 12,269 45,828 
Partisan control of 
the state legislature 
Percentage of Republican 
legislators in state legislatures 
Klarner’s dataset 
Book of the States 
– 44.02 16.81 
Governor’s partisan 
identification  
Dummy variable for the 
presence of a Republic governor 
Klarner’s dataset 
Book of the States 
– 0.48 0.50 
Government 
ideology 
Ideological leaning of state 
government 
Pol. Ideology Index 
(Berry et al., 2004) 
– 49.40 24.00 
Regional diffusion Percent of immediate neighbors 
with operational PF 
Prior research 
Statutes & gov. doc. 
– 14.3 19.95 
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Table 2, continued 
Variable Description Source Total / 
Max 
Mean SD 
Imitation-driven 
diffusion 
Number of ideological neighbors 
with respective policy shifts 
Computed from Berry 
et al.’s (1998) dataset 
8 0.54 1.25 
Emulation-driven 
diffusion 
(#  states with successful PF) * 
(inverse log of distance) 
Prior research 
Statutes & gov. doc. 
– 0.38 0.33 
Competition-driven 
diffusion 
Ratio of student out-migration to 
in-migration 
Digest of Education 
Statistics 
– 0.94 0.84 
Legislative 
professionalism 
LP Index: [Z-score(salary) + Z-
score(session)] / 2 
Computed from the 
Book of the States 
– 0 0.87 
State governance 
arrangement 
Dummy variables for the 
presence of higher ed. boards 
State Gov. Structures 
(ECS); Own data 
4 – – 
Self-initiated policy Dummy variable for board-
initiated PF 
Prior case studies 
– 0.17 0.37 
Adopted by 
appropriation 
Dummy var. for PF adopted via 
an approp. bill or budget proviso 
Prior research 
Appropriation bills 
– 0.12 0.32 
Unemployment rate Percent unemployed Bureau of Labor Stat. – 0.06 0.02 
State support to 
higher education 
State appropriations ($1,000s) 
per college-age individual 
Grapevine database 
Nat’l Cancer Institute 
– 2.44 1.24 
Regions / compacts Dummy variable for higher 
education regional compacts 
Compacts’ web-sites 
4 – – 
Note.  ECS = Education Commission of the States;  NASSGAP = National Association of State 
Student Grant & Aid Programs;  PF = performance funding;  SREB = Southern Regional 
Education Board;  WSAC = Washington Student Achievement Council (formerly, the Washington 
Higher Education Coordinating Board).       
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Description of Policy Adoption 
From the policy adoption perspective, the dependent variable is the hazard risk 
rate for adoption, given that a state has not adopted the policy until this time.  The event 
of performance funding adoption is represented by a binary variable for the year in which 
the state government, or a higher education state board, made a decision to enact this 
policy. 
In this section, I consider policy adoption and readoption to be similar events 
because they signify a transition from nonoperational to operational status of the policy; 
however, in estimations these events are treated as distinct.  In this general sense, I define 
policy adoption as actions taken by state government, or its agencies, to establish 
performance funding or revive it after a policy failure.  These actions generally include 
legislative mandates, executive orders, votes taken by higher education state boards, and 
appropriation acts and budget provisos.  The year in which the action took place serves as 
an indicator of policy adoption. 
Thus, I operationalize performance funding adoption as the year in which the 
policy was mandated by the state legislature or ordered by the governor, or when the 
policy was self-initiated by a higher education state board.  However, this 
operationalization requires an essential refinement.  Guided by my definition of an 
operational state policy (section Key Definitions), the policy is in the provisional status 
until funding is provided.  I consider performance funding fully adopted only when it is 
followed by a funding decision: an appropriation act or a budget proviso.  In other words, 
it becomes an operational policy when it provides public institutions with real financial 
incentives to alter their behavior. 
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Therefore, I consider the original authorization of performance funding to be 
policy adoption just for the year in which it takes place.  To maintain the adoption status 
in subsequent years, the policy must be funded.  My rationale for treating the first year of 
policy existence differently is that state policymakers need additional time to arrange 
financial support and they may not be able to provide funding in the adoption year.  At 
the same time, institutions receive a clear signal that they need to alter their behavior in 
light of the new policy.  If however, the policy is not funded the following year, it is 
considered a failure because it has not reached the operational status.  The policy 
continues to have failure (nonoperational) status until institutions get financial incentives 
to which they can respond. 
Performance funding readoption is operationalized as the year in which the policy 
regains its operational status after a prior failure or suspension.  To paraphrase, the policy 
is considered readopted when a new legislative mandate or executive order revives a 
previously terminated policy, when suspended funding is resumed, or when an existing 
policy starts to meet the definition of a “true” performance funding policy. 
 
Description of Policy Failure 
From the policy failure perspective, the dependent variable is the hazard risk rate 
of policy abandonment, given that a state has not experienced failure until this time.  The 
event of performance funding failure is represented by a binary variable for the year in 
which the state government made a decision to terminate or defund this policy. 
Policy abandonment scenarios include the following actions, or lack thereof, of 
the state government: failing to fund an adopted policy, terminating the policy by 
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withdrawing or not renewing the mandate, suspending funding, removing funding 
permanently, substituting performance funding with another policy, and failing to ensure 
sufficient complexity of the policy.  This wide variety of possible failures is consistent 
with a view that failure can occur at any stage in the policy process (Dutton et al., 1980). 
Thus, I conceptualize policy failure to be of two major types.  The first type 
(referred to as policy failure) denotes any policy that does not deliver on its intent and 
goals; it covers the entire spectrum of the above scenarios.  The second type (referred to 
as policy termination) embraces a more restricted concept of failure that could only 
happen at the final stage of the policy cycle.  In other words, policy termination is a 
specific type of policy failure.  Figure 2 presents all possible types of performance 
funding policy failure. 
 
 
Figure 2. Types of Performance Funding Policy Failure 
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Based on the above distinction, I operationalize policy failure as the year in which 
one of the following takes place: an authorized policy is not provided resources in 
subsequent years (policy false start), funding for the policy is suspended (policy 
starving), the policy is officially abandoned by withdrawing or not renewing the 
legislative mandate or executive order (policy termination), funding is permanently 
removed (policy defunding), the policy is succeeded by another performance 
accountability policy (policy succession), or the policy is not upgraded to meet the 
criterion of sufficient complexity (policy inadequacy).  These policy changes represent 
the most typical types of performance funding failure as defined in this study. 
To paraphrase, I do not equate policy failure with just policy termination and 
broaden the concept to incorporate all of the above scenarios.  However, in this study, I 
ignore three types of failure that are presented in Figure 2: failure to adopt a policy 
(proposal failure), failure to meet the objectives (policy ineffectiveness), and scaling 
down of the policy from its original scope (policy shrinking).  The first type is excluded 
from consideration because it is impossible to model using the employed approach.  The 
last two types are excluded because both are amenable to subjective interpretations and 
do not lend themselves to objective measurement. 
The data for the dependent variable are drawn from several sources, which were 
cross-checked against each other for consistency.  As a starting point, I use Burke and 
colleagues’ surveys of performance accountability policies (Burke & Minassians, 2001, 
2002, 2003).  However, due to changing definitions of policy adoption and reliance on 
self-reported data, these surveys show discrepancies with other sources.  Furthermore, as 
the surveys pay inadequate attention to policy failures, they have to be supplemented with 
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additional data.  The most important sources include annual collections of state statutes, 
executive acts in states where the policy was initiated by the governor, materials made 
public by the respective state boards for higher education, and relevant Internet sites.  The 
additional sources of data are case studies of individual programs including dissertations, 
research by Burke and associates (2002), and investigations by Dougherty and colleagues 
(Dougherty & Hong, 2005, 2006; Dougherty & Natow, 2009, 2010; Dougherty et al., 
2011; Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Dougherty et al., 2012; Natow & Dougherty, 2008).  
 
Independent Variables 
The key independent variables used in this analysis reflect the hypotheses 
presented in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3.  The other covariates include three 
control variables and the first-order terms of interactions of the main predictors. 
 
Variables for the Electoral Connection Hypotheses 
To test the hypotheses of the electoral connection frame, I use five independent 
variables.  Hypothesis 1 addresses perceived challenges of access to higher education and 
their possible effects on the likelihood of policy changes.  To represent accessibility 
issues, I employ the notion of access pressure, or enrollment pressure on institutions.  In 
general terms, enrollment pressure can be thought of as the number of potential students 
per available publicly supported seat.  By using this concept, I aim to capture perceived 
problems of access to higher education and acuteness of access pressures. 
To operationalize access pressure, I use the annual percentage change in public 
enrollment.  I argue that this metric serves as an adequate proxy measure for perceived 
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access pressure: Annual enrollment changes capture the current conditions that determine 
the ease of access to higher education and the public’s attitude toward college 
accessibility.  Public enrollment denotes full-time equivalent enrollment in public four- 
and two-year institutions.  The data for this variable are drawn from the data library of 
the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB, n.d.). 
Hypothesis 2 tests the idea that perceived affordability of higher education affects 
the likelihood of policy shifts.  The cost of college is directly related to another higher 
education issue that voters are concerned about, higher education affordability (Heller, 
2001b).  Thus, the perceived price of college attendance is a crucial determinant of 
electoral pressures that could lead to policy adoption or failure.  The more the public 
thinks that tuition is becoming prohibitively expensive, the more it will pressure 
incumbents to adopt policies demanding accountability and ideally curbing the costs. 
To capture the notion of the perceived price of college, I employ the net cost of 
college attendance.  I estimate this variable as follows: Net cost = Average tuition at 
public four-year institutions – Average state-provided financial aid.  Thus, this metric is 
a computed outcome of two separate measures and requires data collection for each state 
and the entire period of interest (1979-2009).  The tuition data are collected from the 
annual surveys of tuition and fees of the Washington Student Achievement Council 
(WSAC, n.d.), formerly, the Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board.  The 
financial aid data are compiled from the surveys by the National Association of State 
Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP, n.d.).  The data on public enrollment, 
which are needed to estimate the average state aid, come from SREB’s data library 
(SREB, n.d.). 
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The variable for the net cost of college is also used in an interaction to test 
Hypothesis 5, explained below.  By itself, it denotes the effect of the net cost of college 
on the likelihood of policy shifts in states with no immediate neighbors that have 
operational performance funding.  To allow for a meaningful interpretation of the other 
component of the interaction, I have recentered the variable for the cost of college by 
subtracting its mean value from each observation.  Recentering the variable at its mean 
makes zero the new mean.  Due to this change, the other component of the interaction 
(percent of neighbors with performance funding) is interpreted at this variable’s mean. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 address the electoral timing issue.  I employ two distinct 
variables to test the effect of the election proximity on the likelihood of policy shifts.  
From this perspective, as the election draws closer, incumbents adopt policies with high 
and immediate visibility that appeal to voters.  In contrast, early in their terms, they seek 
to adopt possibly unpopular policies and terminate popular ones so as to have a “buffer 
time” before the next election (Doyle et al., 2010; Nordhaus, 1975). 
To operationalize the electoral timing factors, I use the number of years until the 
next legislative or gubernatorial elections.  For ease of interpretation, I multiply 
respective numbers by minus one so that the value grows as the election draws closer.  In 
line with Doyle et al.’s (2010) analysis, I expect that the closer the election date, the more 
likely a state would be to adopt presumably popular performance funding.  In contrast, 
states would be more likely to terminate this policy soon after the election.  The annual 
Book of the States series is the source of data for these variables (Council of State 
Governments [CSG], 1982-2009). 
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Hypothesis 5 tests whether the presence of neighboring states with performance 
funding modifies the effect of the cost of college on the likelihood of policy shifts due to 
yardstick competition (Besley & Case, 1995).  The employed variable is an interaction of 
the net cost of college with the percent of contiguous states with performance funding. 
 
Variables for the Political Environment Hypotheses 
To test the hypotheses under the political environment frame, I use three variables 
that help me capture the following concepts: partisan control of the state legislature 
(Hypothesis 6), party identification of the governor (Hypothesis 7), and government 
ideology (Hypothesis 8). 
Partisan control of the state government is a critical determinant of public policy 
shifts due to divergent views of the Republican and Democratic policymakers on the 
issues relating to government strength and size and efficiency of the public sector 
bureaucracy.  The importance of this factor has been convincingly shown in the literature 
on determinants of state policy outcomes, including adoption of performance 
accountability policies (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Berry & Berry, 1990; McLendon et al., 
2006).  Building on the finding of McLendon et al. (2006), I argue that stronger 
Republican control of state government provides for greater likelihood of performance 
funding adoption and lesser likelihood of its abandonment. 
To account for partisan composition of the state government, I use two measures 
of party dominance: percentage of Republican legislators in the state legislature and the 
presence of an incumbent Republican governor.  I estimate the percent of Republican 
legislators across both houses of the state legislature.  The variable for Republican 
152 
 
governor is a dummy variable for the presence of an incumbent governor who is a 
member of the Republican party.  The data sources for these variables include the Books 
of the States, which have been updated in Klarner’s dataset, Measurement of Partisan 
Balance of State Government (CSG, 1982-2009; Klarner, 2003; 2009). 
Policymakers’ ideology affects the entire policymaking process and many policy 
decisions (Erikson et al., 1987) and is one of the key determinants of the policy cycle.  
Being consistent with the conservative political views, performance funding is expected 
to be more actively advocated and supported by the conservatively-leaning policymakers.  
Therefore, I argue that more conservative state governments will be more likely to adopt 
performance funding and less likely to abandon it, holding all other influences constant. 
To capture this concept, I use the Political Ideology Index (Berry et al., 1998; 
2007), which places governments on the liberal-conservative continuum, with higher 
scores indicating greater liberalism.  It is calculated based on the roll-call voting behavior 
of congressmen and the parties’ proportional representation in all branches of the state 
government.  The Political Ideology Index through 2006 is made available by the authors 
(Berry et al., 2007).  In my dataset, I use the carry-last-value-forward approach for years 
2007, 2008, and 2009. 
 
Variables for the Policy Diffusion Hypotheses 
To test mechanisms of the policy spread, I employ Karch’s (2007) classification, 
which identifies three key reasons for policy diffusion.  However, I broaden this 
classification to account for interstate influences on policy failures and also test the effect 
of geographic proximity on the likelihood of policy shifts.  I propose the following 
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variables for testing causes of policy migration: diffusion prompted by regional factors 
(Hypothesis 9), imitation-driven diffusion (Hypothesis 10), emulation-driven diffusion 
(Hypothesis 11), and diffusion driven by interstate competition (Hypothesis 12). 
From the geographic proximity stance, “the existence of a public policy in nearby 
states provides a model upon which state officials can draw and, perhaps more 
problematically, that this model makes the enactment of the policy more likely” (Karch, 
2007, p. 57).  Although the role of this factor in the policy diffusion research could be 
overrated and the empirical evidence for its effect is weak, geographic proximity is still 
the most popular measure of policy diffusion in the existing literature. 
Acknowledging the theoretical ambiguity of this concept, I operationalize 
proximity-driven policy diffusion as the proportion of bordering states with operational 
performance funding policies.  Using the percent, rather than the number, of immediate 
neighbors allows me to lessen the proclivity to find a positive diffusion effect caused 
merely by the given number of bordering states.  The data for this variable are taken from 
prior published research, relevant archival sources, and my interviews of state officials. 
The imitation hypothesis claims that states borrow policies based on their 
ideological similarities with the lending state.  Specifically, ideological proximity of state 
governments is deemed a key factor in facilitating policy diffusion. 
To capture the notion of imitation-driven diffusion, I use the number of states 
with similar ideological leanings that have adopted or abandoned performance funding.  I 
compute this measure from two sources: (1) Berry et al.’s (1998, 2007) Index of Political 
Ideology for state governments, which allows me to identify ideologically proximate 
states, and (2) the data on the policy evolution that I have collected.  This measure allows 
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me to test whether diffusion of similar policy shifts occurs among states with proximate 
government ideology.  The states are considered ideological neighbors if their scores on 
the Index of Political Ideology fall within half of a standard deviation from each other. 
The emulation hypothesis focuses on a different mechanism of policy diffusion.  
It claims that policies are borrowed because they are deemed successful and 
advantageous for the adopting states.  By employing it, I test whether state policymakers 
take perceived policy success and effectiveness into consideration in making decisions 
about policy adoption or abandonment. 
To test the rationale for policy emulation, I use a proxy measure for policy 
success that is based on program longevity.  Specifically, I employ an interaction of a 
dummy variable for policies that have persisted for at least five years with a reverse log 
of distances between state capitals.  The first element of this interaction is based on the 
assumption that such policies have undergone at least one evaluation and are considered 
successful and worthy of further investment; thus, it is a good proxy for policy success.  
The second element, which also adds the element of geographic proximity, provides the 
requisite variation in the variable for different units of analysis.  The performance 
funding dataset collected for this research contains all the necessary information for 
constructing this variable. 
Finally, the interstate-competition hypothesis claims that incumbents may borrow 
performance funding to create competitive advantage for their state.  I use student brain 
drain as an education indicator of interstate competition that has clear and direct 
economic repercussions.  Policymakers may adopt performance funding if they believe 
that it helps address the brain drain issue.  The rationale here could be that performance 
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funding aims to enhance institutional performance and quality, raising institutional 
prestige and attractiveness in the eyes of instate and out-of-state students and families. 
I operationalize the competition for students as the ratio of student out-migration 
to student in-migration.  Values above one indicate positive brain drain (more students 
depart than arrive in the state); values below one indicate negative brain drain (more 
students migrate to the state to enroll in higher education than leave for other states).  The 
data for this variable are drawn from the Digest of Education Statistics (National Center 
for Education Statistics [NCES], n.d.).  I use the carry-last-value-forward approach for 
years in which these data were not collected. 
To be sure, this variable does not allow me to distinguish between policies that 
were borrowed through policy diffusion and policies that were enacted independently.  
However, given the time, resource, analytical, informational, political, institutional, and 
cognitive constraints on decision-making of policymakers (Byron, 2004; Entin, 1973; 
Kingdon, 1995; March & Simon, 1958; Menzel, 1978; Mooney, 1991a, 1991b, 1993; 
Simon, 1955; Stewart, 1992; Walker, 1969), it is reasonable to assume that incumbents 
rely on heuristic shortcuts rather than design policies from scratch.  Policies that are 
deemed to create competitive advantage for other states are likely to serve as available 
heuristic shortcuts in this resource-constrained environment.  As Walker (1969) notes, it 
may well be that “state officials make most of their decisions by analogy” (p. 889).    
 
Variables for the Principal-Agent Hypotheses 
I use six independent variables to test the hypotheses under the principal-agent 
frame.  Hypothesis 13 examines the effect of legislative professionalism on the hazard for 
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policy shifts.  More professionalized legislatures may be more disposed to adopt 
innovative policies due to greater resources, better-educated members, and capacity to 
effectively influence bureaucracy (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; McLendon et al., 2006; 
Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Squire, 1992, 2000, 2007).  Greater analytical capacity 
of such legislatures may also help prevent policy failures (Howett, 2007). 
Although the most popular measure of legislative professionalism is the Squire 
Index (1992, 2000, 2007), it is not available for all years of my study.  Thus, I computed 
my own index, which is estimated as the average of the standardized scores of legislative 
pay and session length.  Legislative pay includes salaries plus all related payments: per 
diem multiplied by the number of days in sessions, overtime pay, and benefits.  The data 
for this variable are drawn from the Book of the States (CSG, 1982-2009). 
Hypotheses 14a, 14b, and 14c test the role of higher education governance 
structures in determining performance funding evolution.  I operationalize governance 
arrangement as dummy variables for the presence of three main types of agencies: 
consolidated governing boards, coordinating boards without budgetary authority, and 
coordinating boards with budgetary authority.  The weakest types of boards, advisory 
boards and planning agencies, serve as the reference category.  The data on these 
variables are drawn from editions of McGuiness’s State Postsecondary Education 
Structures Sourcebook (1985, 1988, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2003), with the current version 
available through the Education Commission of the States (ECS, n.d.). 
The final two hypotheses test the effect of the programmatic characteristics on the 
hazard rates for policy shifts.  The nature of the policy is critical for principal-agent 
relations and can affect the likelihood of policy changes (Burke & Modarresi, 2000, 
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2001; Burke & Associates, 2002).  I use two variables to account for programmatic 
characteristics that are identified in the literature as critical for the policy evolution.  The 
first covariate, used in Hypothesis 15, is a dummy variable for performance funding 
policies that were initiated by higher education boards as opposed to external actors.  The 
second predictor, employed in Hypothesis 16, is a dummy variable for policies that were 
enacted via an appropriation bill or budget proviso.  The data for these variables are 
drawn from published research, archives, and my interviews of state officials.  
 
Control Variables 
This study employs three control variables to account for the following critical 
determinants of the policy lifecycle: short-term economic conditions, state support to 
higher education, and idiosyncratic regional peculiarities. 
To account for the business cycle dynamics, I control for unemployment rate.  
The data for this variable come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, n.d.).  To 
control for fluctuation in state support, I use the amount of appropriation per college-age 
individual; this variable is computed with the data from the Grapevine database (n.d.) and 
the National Cancer Institute (NCI, n.d.).  I use state membership in higher education 
regional compacts as a regional identifier.  This variable accounts for two distinct factors: 
(a) economic, political, and cultural differences among regions and (b) governing and 
information dissemination role of the higher education compacts.  The data for this 
variable come from the sites of the following regional higher education compacts: 
Midwestern Higher Education Compact (MHEC, n.d.), New England Board of Higher 
Education (NEBHE, 2010), Southern Regional Education Board (SREB, n.d.), and 
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Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education (WICHE, n.d.).  By virtue of 
geography, the non-affiliated states of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey are 
treated as part of the NEBHE regional compact.  North Dakota and South Dakota, which 
belong both to WICHE and MHEC, are treated as MHEC member states.  
 
Concept Operationalization in the Conceptual Framework 
The preceding discussion of operationalization of key concepts necessitates 
revisiting the major relationships in the conceptual framework for the study.  To reiterate, 
the visual conceptual framework (Figure 1, Chapter 3) presents the main stages of the 
performance funding policy lifecycle, key events of interest, principal actors and their 
actions, causes of policy failure, and environmental factors of policy development.  
Importantly, the conceptual framework identifies the decision points at which the events 
of interest (policy adoption, failure, and readoption) can occur.  My task consists in 
operationalizing these decision points and key determinants of policy change. 
The independent variables representing my hypotheses under the proposed 
theoretical frames aim to capture the external and internal forces that affect the 
probability of policy shifts.  The approach of this study is that the same sets of political 
and socioeconomic processes and actors drive states to make all relevant policy changes.  
Therefore, the factors of policy development, represented by the independent and control 
variables, exert their influence on all policy-relevant decision points at all stages of the 
policy cycle.  The only exception to this statement are variables for policy characteristics, 
which are deemed to affect only the likelihood of policy failure and readoption.  The 
wide dotted lines converging on the boxes for various stages of policy development in 
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Figure 1 represent either sets of actions available to involved actors or causes of policy 
failure, as discussed in the Conceptual Framework.  At the same time, these lines may 
also represent all influences captured by the employed independent variables.  In sum, 
operationalization of the concepts represented by the independent variables is implicit in 
the depicted forces acting on the policy lifecycle. 
In contrast, operationalization of the policy change concept is explicit in the 
decision points depicted in Figure 1.  These decision points indicate policy shifts of 
interest and are identified with double-framed boxes, double dotted and double straight 
arrows for policy failures, and reverse dotted arrows for policy readoption.  As mentioned 
above, the pre-adoption failure, the leftmost double-framed box, falls outside the 
analysis.  The next box, Performance Funding Policy Adoption (Readoption), indicates 
both adoption and readoption policy shifts with two requisite components (distinct 
decision points) of operational performance funding: authorization and appropriation.  
The reverse arrows leading to this box indicate two other decision points: readoption of a 
previously terminated policy and resumption of funding after its prior removal.  The other 
double-framed shaded boxes identify various policy failure scenarios at different stages 
of the policy lifecycle.  The adoption, failure, and readoption decision points identified in 
the visual conceptual frame (Figure 1) correspond to the operationalization of policy 
shifts as discussed above in the sections Description of Policy Adoption and Description 
of Policy Failure.  I revisit these relationships in my discussion of the study findings.   
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Method 
 
Modeling Strategy 
This investigation examines the determinants of performance funding policy 
shifts across states and over time.  The research question of this study poses several 
problems.  First, competing explanations for policy shifts complicate identification of 
drivers of specific changes.  Second, there are different types of policy adoption and 
failure, as described at the beginning of this chapter.  Third, these events happen at 
different times, which means that states spend various amounts of time in different 
conditions.  Fourth, policy adoption, failure, and re-adoption precede each other in time, 
and subsequent events cannot happen until a state has experienced the previous ones.  
Next, the observation period is limited to 30 years; as a result, some states have not 
experienced certain events by the end of the observation period but are likely to do so 
after its expiration.  Finally, there are multiple cases when different states made similar 
policy changes in the same period; in such situations, the exact order of events is 
unknown, which greatly complicates analysis.  All these issues have determined the 
choice of the research method for the study. 
My modeling strategy combines two approaches.  To test competing explanations 
for policy shifts and related hypotheses, I advance four theoretical frames (described in 
Chapter 3) and propose specific variables.  In addition, I adopt a multiple-event 
perspective and employ a set of cumulative-risk models with repeated events.  This 
strategy is based on the following key assumptions: (a) the same political and social 
processes and actors drive states to adopt or terminate a policy; (b) each event is a 
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negation (abandonment) of the prior condition; and (c) these events can happen only in 
succession: Adoption always precedes failure and failure precedes readoption. 
To address the above issues, I employ a quantitative method known as survival 
analysis, event history modeling, reliability analysis, or event history analysis.  This 
methodology is now widely used across disciplines to study change processes with 
temporal data.  The following sections explain why this analytic technique is best suited 
for investigating my research question.  
 
Event History Analysis: An Overview 
Event history analysis (EHA) originated in biostatistics and biomedical sciences, 
in studies of illness recidivism and patient mortality.  Later, this method was borrowed by 
social scientists and eventually migrated into the comparative state research (Berry & 
Berry, 1990; DesJardins, 2003; Doyle, 2006; Jones & Branton, 2005; Volden, 2006). 
Berry and Berry’s (1990, 1992) studies of state adoption of lottery programs and 
tax innovations were the first to apply EHA to an exploration of public policy adoption.  
Since these seminal works, the number of EHA studies of policy adoption has 
mushroomed, covering such diverse topics as living-will laws, morality policies, 
legislative term limits, gay rights, abortion regulation, death penalty, anti-smoking 
measures, motor voter reform, and health-reform policies among others (Balla, 2001; 
Buckley & Westerland, 2004; Colvin, 2005, 2006; Emmert & Traut, 2003; Grossback et 
al., 2004; Hays & Glick, 1997; Jones & Branton, 2005; Meseguer, 2006; Mooney, 2001; 
Mooney & Lee, 1995, 2000; Pierce & Miller, 1999; Scott & Bell, 1999; Shipan & 
Volden, 2006; Shoji, 2005; Soule & Earl, 2001; Volden, 2006). 
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Several studies examined policy innovations in education (Mintrom, 1997, 2000; 
Mintrom & Vergari, 1998; Renzulli & Roscigno, 2005; Rincke, 2004; Warren & Kulick, 
2007).  In higher education, EHA was first used to study determinants of student 
departure (DesJardins, 2003).  Vanderbilt-based education policy researchers applied this 
methodology to investigation of education policy adoption and diffusion both in the K-12 
and higher education arenas (Deaton, 2006; Doyle, 2006; Doyle et al., 2005; Hearn et al., 
2008; McLendon et al., 2006; McLendon et al., 2007; Mokher, 2008; Mokher & 
McLendon, 2007; Wong & Langevin, 2005; Wong & Shen, 2002). 
To the best of my knowledge, only one study used EHA to examine policy 
failures.  Volden (2007) employed a special type of event history analysis—dyad-based 
EHA, which relied on ideological similarities among the states—to study the 
abandonment of welfare policies under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
program.  He argues: “Because any new policy adoption is by implication an 
abandonment of the old policy, a theory of policy abandonment must contain the same 
elements as a theory of policy adoption” (p. 4).  Volden illustrates this idea by referring 
to Berry and Berry’s (1990) examination of lottery programs adoption: He asserts that, in 
effect, this policy enactment is equivalent to the abandonment of the “no lottery” policy 
that had existed prior to lottery adoption. 
In this investigation, I build on Volden’s idea in conceptualization and modeling 
of the events of interest.  His study is also important to my research because it relied on a 
repeated-events duration model—a special type of EHA modeling that I employ in my 
investigation as well (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 
2002; Therneau & Grambsch, 2000). 
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Event history analysis has a number of advantages over the traditional regression 
methods (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  This method allows accounting for both 
occurrence and timing of events and investigating issues that could not be adequately 
addressed with other analytic techniques, such as logistic regression or time-series 
methods.  The other key advantage of EHA is its ability to handle the critical issues of 
censoring and time-varying independent variables (Allison, 1984; Bennett, 1999).  Using 
standard multiple regressions in such cases would lead to a loss of information and biased 
estimations (Allison, 1984; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  In contrast, EHA utilizes 
information provided by censored cases to produce unbiased estimates; it also allows for 
time-related changes in values of independent variables.  In addition, EHA works well in 
cases in which there is little variation in the dependent variable (Berry & Berry, 2007). 
 
Key Concepts of Event History Analysis in This Study 
Event history analysis is ideal for studying temporal changes (events or 
transitions), such as policy shifts.  An event is defined as a qualitative change that occurs 
at some specific time.  This technique is motivated by questions of risk or probability of 
event occurrence by a certain time (Jones & Branton, 2005).  As a duration model, EHA 
assumes that the risk of an event is characterized by two vectors: duration of time and 
event occurrence.  The event history analysis models “both the duration of time spent in 
the initial state and the transition to a subsequent state, that is, the event” (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 8, emphasis in the original).  In contrast to the ordinary 
logistic regression, EHA analyzes not only whether an event occurs but also when it 
occurs; in other words, it considers both the outcome and the timing of an event (Allison, 
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1984; Yamaguchi, 1991; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997, 2004; DesJardins, 2003).  In 
this study, the events are performance funding policy shifts. 
The fundamental dependent variable in EHA, which controls both the occurrence 
and timing of the event, is a hazard rate (Allison, 1984).  The hazard rate is the 
instantaneous probability, or risk, of event occurrence, given that the event has not 
occurred prior to a particular time (Yamaguchi, 1991).  “Instantaneous” in this context 
refers to an infinitesimally small time change.  Thus, the hazard rate “describes the risk a 
unit incurs of having a spell or duration end in some period, given that the spell has lasted 
up to or beyond some length of time” (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 15).  
Therefore, the hazard rate can also be thought of as a conditional failure rate (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  This dependent variable measures the duration of time 
that a unit spends in a given state before it experiences the event of interest.  Of primary 
analytical interest for researchers are the relationships between the observed duration and 
key predictors. 
In this study, the hazard rate is the probability of adopting or abandoning a 
performance funding policy.  It is more correct to say, however, that my dependent 
variable is the hazard rate for shifting from one condition to another among the three 
possible destinations: adoption of a policy or not, abandonment of a policy or not, and 
readoption of a policy or not.  These three conditions exhaustively describe all the 
possible ways in which states can be relative to performance funding at any given time.  
The employed model also requires that I make a distinction among these conditions 
through stratification, which is based on the assumptions of how states move from one 
destination to another.  The model assesses how covariates affect the hazard rate. 
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Another important concept of EHA is the survival function.  The survival function 
is the probability that a unit of analysis will “survive” longer than a certain time, that is, 
the probability of not having the event prior to a particular time (Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 2004; Yamaguchi, 1991).  Expressed differently, it is the proportion of units 
surviving past a specific period and thus exposed to each period’s hazard.  In this study, 
the survival function is the proportion of states that did not adopt (or, alternatively, did 
not terminate) the policy beyond a certain time. 
The notion of the risk set includes units that are at risk of event occurrence at a 
certain time (Allison, 1984).  To paraphrase, it is the set of individuals who are eligible to 
experience the event during a specific interval.  In this study, the risk set is two-fold.  
From the policy adoption perspective, it includes states that are at risk of adopting 
performance funding, or rather states without an operational policy at a given time.  
States are considered at risk of original policy adoption beginning in 1979, the date of 
origin for this study.  Subsequently, states are at risk of policy readoption immediately 
after experiencing failure.  From the position of policy failure, the risk set includes states 
with performance funding which may experience any type of failure.  States are at risk of 
policy failure as soon as the policy is adopted or readopted. 
Because states that have experienced an event are no longer at risk, they exit the 
respective risk set and—due to the mutually interrelated nature of policy adoption and 
failure—immediately enter the risk set for the antithetical event.  Thus, as states 
experience events, the risk set for a respective event diminishes but the risk set for the 
opposite event increases.  Therefore, because the dependent variable is treated as shifts 
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between the three possible conditions, the overall risk set in this study does not diminish 
as units experience various events. 
An inherent feature of the risk set is that it declines in subsequent periods not only 
due to event occurrence but also to censoring.  Censoring occurs “when incomplete 
information is available about the duration of the risk period because of a limited 
observation period” (Yamaguchi, 1991, p. 3).  There are two types of censoring: left 
censoring (event time is unknown because the beginning of time is not observed) and 
right censoring (event time is unknown because event occurrence is not observed).  Left 
censoring is considered much less manageable than right.  In this study, however, left 
censoring is mitigated as the observation begins with the adoption of the first policy in 
1979.  Also, due to the properties of EHA, right-censored units (states that do not 
experience the events of interest during the observation period) still provide useful 
information by offering data on event-nonoccurrence. 
 
Model Estimation 
Event history analysis is a common name for a variety of duration methods 
(Allison, 1984).  For this investigation, I use the Cox proportional hazards model 
modified to account for multiple events of policy adoption and failure that a state can 
experience.  This model is deemed to be “especially amenable to modeling state policy 
adoption” (Jones & Branton, 2005, p. 424) and, by extension, policy failure. 
The Cox proportional hazards model presents several key advantages over 
alternative model specifications (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Jones & Branton, 
2005; Yamaguchi, 1991).  Unlike parametric models, it does not require specifying the 
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baseline hazard function (the functional form of the duration dependence), which helps 
avoid the danger of incorrect estimations if the time dependence parameter is specified 
inaccurately (Jones & Branton, 2005, p. 421).  The Cox model makes no assumptions 
about the shape of the baseline hazard rate; the latter is not estimated and is assumed to 
be common to all observations (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  The hazard rate can 
assume any form suggested by the data.  Although the form of the baseline hazard 
remains unspecified and it is not directly estimated from the data, it is still parameterized 
as a function of independent variables (that is, covariate parameters are estimated).  Due 
to this feature, the Cox model is often referred to as a semi-parametric model (Cox, 1972; 
Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Jones & Branton, 2005). 
Furthermore, the Cox model can be adapted to handle events occurring in the 
same period (known as tied events or ties), which cannot be accounted for with a partial 
likelihood estimation (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  This advantage is especially 
important for my research, which measures time discretely and, as a result, deals with 
multiple tied events. 
Finally, the Cox model can be extended to address issues of multiple events.  The 
possible types of multiple events and respective models include: unordered events of 
different types (competing risk models), ordered events of the same type (repeated 
events/ repeatable events/ conditional risk set models), and ordered events of different 
types (multistate/ competing/ marginal models) (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; 
Cleves, 1999; Jones & Branton, 2005; Therneau & Grambsch, 2000).  Repeated events 
that are dependent upon each other are integral to this study, due to the ordered and 
sequential nature of policy adoption and failure. 
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In this investigation, I use a conditional model, known as PWP, named after 
Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981).  This model “is based on the idea that an 
observation is not at risk for the kth event until the kth–1 event has occurred” (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 161).  In less technical terms, in this model each 
subsequent event is dependent on the one that came before it: A unit cannot enter the next 
stage until it has exited the previous stage.  It means that a unit is not considered at risk 
for an event until it has experienced all prior events (Prentice et al., 1981). 
This model employs stratification by event type and event-specific baseline 
hazards (Ezell, Land, & Cohen, 2009).  Stratification modifies the dataset by creating a 
unique stratum for each possible event; thus, each event is assigned to a separate time-
dependent stratum (Therneau & Grambsch, 2000).  Unlike the alternative Andersen-Gill 
model, which assumes that all events are identical, the PWP model requires that all 
events have their own strata and the hazard rate is allowed to vary by event.  Each 
stratum is different and has its own unique baseline hazard rate, while the coefficients are 
restricted to be the same within each stratum.  The hazard rate for the next event is 
completely different from the hazard rate for the previous one.  “The use of the time-
dependent strata means that the underlying intensity function may vary from event to 
event” (Therneau & Grambsch, 2000, p. 187).  To account for the repeated data, the 
conditional model adjusts the parameter’s variance by clustering on the unit and using the 
robust covariance matrix (Therneau & Grambsch, 2000). 
There are two variations of this model, which differ by time scale.  In the first 
variation, the time to event is measured beginning with entry in the risk set (the elapsed 
time model).  The second variation—called the conditional gap time model—relies on the 
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gap time: It measures time to event from the time of the previous event.  In other words, 
it “uses information about the time in between events” (Therneau & Grambsch, 2000, p. 
159).  The difference between these types is in the dataset structure; in the gap time 
model, the interval variable is reset to zero after each event occurrence. 
The conditional gap time model is appropriate to use when study risks develop 
sequentially, and not simultaneously (Lipschuz & Snapinn, 1997; Therneau & Grambsch, 
2000).  Preserving the order of sequential events in this model makes it preferable to 
other models that rely on variance correction (Cleves, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
2004; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2002).  Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) review 
studies that endorse the use of this model and conclude: “The statistical debate about the 
best model for repeated events when using the variance corrected approach appears to be 
converging on a single best solution, the conditional gap time model” (p. 160). 
The PWP model is more powerful than time-to-first-event specifications.  This 
advantage is created by the number of events available for analysis.  To illustrate, there 
were 27 events of the first-time policy adoptions, 25 first-time policy failures, and only 
18 first-time readoptions.  However, the total of 91 events happened across all states 
during the observation period.  The larger number of events under analysis allows for 
better identification of the individual predictors’ effect, which may not be picked up in 
the time-to-first-event models.  This advantage alleviates the potential problem of the 
lack of degrees of freedom to estimate the entire model, which is discussed in the next 
section.  The nature of my research question and the above arguments for the conditional 
gap time model have converged on the use of the PWP model for this study. 
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The choice of the PWP model is driven by the following considerations.  The goal 
of this study is to examine the entire policy lifecycle.  This task requires analyzing three 
distinct policy changes: adoption, failure, and readoption.  These events are dependent on 
each other: A state cannot be in a group that can have a subsequent event until it has had 
the preceding event.  After the performance funding invention by Tennessee in 1979, all 
states became at risk of adopting it, meaning that any state can adopt or disregard this 
policy.  However, no state is at risk of failure until it has adopted the policy.  Likewise, a 
state is not at risk of policy readoption until it has experienced a prior event of failure.  
Thus, performance funding evolution evinces a rigid sequencing of event occurrence. 
This research problem is different from situations in which all units of analysis 
are at risk of encountering all events.  To illustrate the latter, a study analyzing states’ 
adoption of main accountability policies (performance funding, budgeting, and reporting) 
would have to model the situation in which the risks of these events are identical; in other 
words, a state can adopt any of these policies, and the likelihood of experiencing one 
event does not depend on any other event.  In contrast, in this study, the risk of a policy 
shift is specific to each policy change, and states can encounter different events.  
Moreover, these events (with the exception of the original adoption) can be recurring: 
The same state can have several policy failures and readoptions.  Therefore, the following 
factors determine the likelihood of a given policy change: the prior event, the time that 
has elapsed since the preceding event, and a specific combination of the predictors.  By 
estimating the conditional likelihood of the next event after resetting the time counter to 
zero, the PWP model fits the observed pattern of performance funding evolution.        
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Model Specification 
In this study, I employ the following stratified conditional model: 
hk(t) = hok(t) exp [  β1(ChEnrolkj) + β2(NetCostkj) +β3(LegElectkj) + β4(GovElectkj) + 
β5(NeighborPFkj*NetCostkj) + β6(RepubLegkj) + β7(RepubGovkj) + β8(GovIdeolkj) 
+ β9(NeighborPFkj) + β10(IdeolProxkj) + β11(SuccessPFkj) + β12(BrDrainkj) + 
β13(LegProfkj) + β14(Board1kj) + β15(Board2kj) + β16(Board3kj) + 
β17(NotImposedkj) + β18(AppBillj) + β19(Unempkj) + β20(Appropkj) + β21(Regionkj)] 
where       
t = 1, …, 30 for the 30 years of observation; 
j = individual clusters; 
hk(t) = The proportional hazard of experiencing a shift among any of the three 
conditions (adoption, failure, and readoption), which is allowed to vary by the 
kth event through the use of stratification; 
hok(t) = The unspecified baseline hazard rate, which is the same for all observations 
within each stratum; 
β1-26 = The vector of the following covariates: 
ChEnrol  = Annual change in public-sector enrollment; 
NetCost = Net cost of higher education; 
LegElect = Number of years until the next legislative elections; 
GovElect = Number of years until the next gubernatorial elections; 
NeighborPF = Proportion of bordering states with operational policies; 
RepubLeg = Percentage of Republican legislators in the state legislature; 
RepubGov = Presence of a Republican governor; 
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GovIdeol = Index of political ideology of state incumbent officials; 
IdeolProx = Number of ideologically proximate states that have made a policy shift; 
SuccessPF = Number of states with successful performance funding policies 
moderated by the inverse log of distance to their capitals; 
BrDrain = The ratio of student out-migration to student in-migration; 
LegProf = Index of legislative professionalism; 
Board1, Board2, and Board3, = Dummy variables for the presence of a 
consolidated governing board, and strong and weak coordinating board; 
NotImposed = A dummy variable for policies that were self-initiated by state 
higher education systems; 
AppBill = A dummy variable for policies that were adopted through an 
appropriation bill or budget proviso; 
Unemp = Unemployment rate; 
Approp = State appropriations to higher education per college-age individual; 
Region = A dummy variable for regional higher education compacts. 
 
For ease of interpretation, all coefficients in the model are exponentiated, that is, 
they are expressed in the form of hazard ratios.  Hazard ratios greater than one indicate 
increased risk of the respective policy shift with an increase in the values of predictors.  
Conversely, hazard ratios less than one indicate a negative relationship between the risk 
of the policy shift and the values of independent variables.     
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Solving Other Problems of Estimation 
As explained in the previous section, the conditional gap time model allows for 
overcoming major estimation issues.  The remaining problems that need to be addressed 
include the issue of tied events, the possibility that the proportional hazard assumption of 
the Cox model does not hold, and the lack of degrees of freedom to estimate the final 
comprehensive model. 
Events occurring in the same period (cases that fail at the exact same time) are 
known as tied events or ties.  The problem with ties consists in not knowing the true order 
of event occurrence; however, knowing the exact order of events is necessary for the 
partial likelihood function estimation.  Thus, the presence of ties makes estimation 
mathematically difficult.  Tied events are a considerable issue in this study: Up to eight 
states can experience events of the same type in the same year. 
There are four major approaches to solving the problem of ties, each of which has 
its own advantages and disadvantages: Breslow approximation, Efron approximation, 
Exact Marginal (continuous) approximation, and Exact Partial (discrete) approximation 
(Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  To handle the issue of ties, I employ the Exact-
partial (Discrete-time) method, which assumes that tied events arise from a discrete-time 
model (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, & Marchenko, 2008).  I use this method for the 
following reasons.  First, exact methods are more accurate than the Breslow and Efron 
approaches.  The Exact-partial method is the most rigorous approach to handling ties 
because it involves calculating all possible risk sets at each tied failure time.  Second, this 
method is intended for true discrete temporal data (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004), 
and my data measured at annual intervals meet this criterion.  Finally, trial comparisons 
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of the Efron and Exact Partial methods have shown that the latter produces larger 
standard errors and I opt for estimates that are more conservative. 
Another potential problem of estimation is the possibility that proportionality 
assumption does not hold for all covariates.  This assumption claims that the baseline 
hazard is common to all observations and individual characteristics shift an individual up 
or down from the baseline.  This shift is proportional (that is, it is the same in proportion, 
although the actual “distance” will not be the same—it depends on values of a predictor).  
More specifically, the proportionality assumption states that the hazard rates are 
proportional over time and changes in levels of predictors produce proportionate changes 
in the hazard function, independent of time (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; 
Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005; Therneau & Grambsch, 2000).  This assumption is the basis 
of the Cox model and is, therefore, extremely important for this study.  Several tests, 
including a link test, tests based on analysis of residuals, and graphical methods, are 
available to check whether this assumption is correct, and I use all of them. 
There are three main options of handling the issue of non-proportionality: (a) 
stratifying the covariate that is not proportional, (b) partitioning the time periods and 
running separate models for different time periods, and (c) using an interaction of the 
problematic covariate with a time counter variable.  I choose the third option to address 
the issue of non-proportionality in several model specifications. 
Finally, there may be too many hypotheses and variables in the model for the 
available data on the states.  This potential problem is alleviated by the following 
considerations.  First, the big advantage of EHA is that it uses all information efficiently.  
For instance, in this dataset, it relies on the state-year structure of the data, in which each 
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state has individual values of independent variables in each year; that is, the unit of 
analysis is state-year.   EHA also utilizes data provided by the right-censored 
observations, the states that never experience the events.  The PWP model uses 
information on all events across all states and over the entire observation period, which 
enhances the power of the model.  However, even with such an efficient use of data, the 
number of employed covariates may turn out to be too large for proper estimation. 
I address this problem at two levels: theoretical and technical.  From a theoretical 
perspective, I rely on the conceptual importance of independent variables to make 
decisions about the covariates’ role in the model within each group of hypotheses and 
then examine the statistical significance of individual coefficients.  From a practical 
stance, I use several specifications and then apply the test of collective significance to 
determine whether adding a new group of covariates contributes to the explanatory power 
of the model. 
The approach consists in estimating five models: one for each of the four 
conceptual frames and the respective sets of hypotheses (time-to-first-event 
specifications), and the final model (conditional gap time specification), which includes 
all covariates from all hypotheses.  The Akaike Information Criterion is used to check 
whether independent variables really belong in the model, and the Wald test is conducted 
to determine whether a new group of independent variables significantly improves the 
model fit.  This incremental approach allows me to come up with a parsimonious final 
model.  The estimation results for each model specification are presented in Chapter 5.     
176 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS 
 
Overview of the Analytical Approach 
This study explores the drivers of performance funding policy changes.  It aims to 
identify the specific antecedents of this policy adoption, failure, and readoption.  I study 
the entire performance funding policy lifecycle across 47 states from 1979 through 2009.  
The dependent variable is the hazard rate for transitions among three possible conditions 
relative to performance funding: adopt a new policy or not, abandon an adopted policy or 
not, and readopt a terminated policy or not.  I employ unique definitions of policy 
adoption and failure (section Key Definitions and Chapter 4), which affect the number of 
events under analysis. 
During the observation period, 20 states did not experience any event; in other 
words, they never adopted performance funding and thus were not at risk of terminating 
and readopting it.  These states were censored at the end of the observation, nonetheless 
providing useful information on nonoccurrence of policy adoption.  The remaining 27 
states (three states are excluded from the analysis; section Description of the Dataset) 
experienced a total of 91 events.  Based on the employed definitions, these states could 
have multiple (repeated) events of policy adoption, failure, and readoption. 
Focusing on just the first event of each type, 27 states adopted performance 
funding, 25 of these adopters experienced at least one policy failure, and 18 of 
terminating states readopted the policy at least once.  These numbers are used in the time-
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to-first-event models discussed below.  However, when accounting for multiple failures 
and readoptions, the distribution of events looks different: There were 27 events of 
original performance funding adoption, 38 events of policy failure, and 26 events of 
readoption. 
Figure 3 presents the survival functions for each type of policy shifts in the 
multistate models, which examine all events simultaneously.  Stratum 1 stands for the 
original adoption, stratum 2 for failure, and stratum 3 for readoption.  The analysis time 
(x-axis) is in years; the survival probability (y-axis) ranges between 0 and 1.  To reiterate, 
the models allow for multiple events of policy failure and readoption for the same state. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Function by Stratum       
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
0 10 20 30
Analysis time (years)
Stratum 1: Adoption 
Stratum 2: Failure 
Stratum 3: Readoption 
178 
 
The graph shows that most first-time adoptions (Stratum 1) take place between 15 
and 22 years into the observation period.  Stratum 2 demonstrates that the first-time 
policy failures generally happen within eight years of policy adoption or readoption.  The 
most drastic decline in the survival curve for policy failure happens a year after policy 
adoption or readoption.  My definitions of operational performance funding and policy 
failure (section Key Definitions, Chapter 4) can provide an explanation for this 
observation.  My interpretation of failure includes years in which the policy mandate 
persisted but there was no funding.  In other words, I equate policy failure with its 
nonoperational status, including years when no funding was provided.  Many policies 
were not funded immediately after their original adoption, and the first-year drop in the 
survival curve for failure reflects this type of policy abandonment.  A similar pattern is 
observed for readoptions (Stratum 3): They generally take place within nine years of 
failure.  The most common readoption scenario is funding initiation for a policy that was 
adopted two years prior to that. 
The employed methodology is Event History Analysis in the traditional form (the 
Cox proportional hazard model) and its adaptations to multiple events of policy failure 
and readoption and the presence of tied events.  The Cox model does not require 
specifying baseline hazard function, which is not estimated and can assume any form 
suggested by the data.  Nonetheless, the baseline hazard is still parameterized as a 
function of independent variables. 
In the multistate specifications (including the final model), all types of events are 
included in the same model and stratified by type.  Stratification means that each event is 
allowed to have its own hazard rate.  After experiencing an event, the state leaves one 
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risk set and enters the risk set for subsequent events.  However, after this transition, the 
overall risk set does not diminish—unlike the risk sets in models dealing with singular 
events.  This feature constitutes a major difference of the multistate model from the time-
to-first-event models. 
In this study, I employ the following model specifications: (1) the traditional 
Event History Analysis modeling the time-to-first-event for all types of events of 
interest—policy adoption, failure, and readoption; and (2) the Prentice, Williams, and 
Peterson’s (PWP) conditional gap time model, which assumes that the next event cannot 
take place until a previous one happened and allows each event type to have its own 
hazard (Prentice et al., 2008).  Each time-to-first-event model and multistate specification 
requires its own data sets with unique risk sets and analysis time.  The multistate models 
employ variable stratification to account for various types of events and their hazards. 
The following section, presenting the study results, mirrors my theoretical frames 
and proceeds variable by variable rather than model by model.  I examine each variable’s 
effect on the adoption, failure, and readoption hazards across model specifications.  This 
decision affects the results presentation and structure of the tables.  Model 1 treats the 
original policy adoption as the key event of interest.  Likewise, Model 2 and Model 3 
analyze time to the first failure or the first readoption, respectively.   In contrast, Model 4 
uses PWP to examine the effect of covariates on the hazard rates for adoption, failure, 
and readoption within a multistate framework with all independent variables stratified by 
event type.  I use this order of model specifications in discussing all theoretical frames. 
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To facilitate comparison of results, Models 1-4 are referred to as the restricted 
models and Model 5, which includes relevant covariates from all frames, is referred to as 
the final model. 
For each model specification, I run the following diagnostic tests: the Schoenfeld 
test, multicollinearity test, and test of collective significance.  The Schoenfeld test checks 
the proportionality of hazards assumption of the Cox model, which is addressed in 
Chapter 4.  The global Schoenfeld test checks whether the overall model violates the 
proportionality assumption while local tests do it for individual independent variables.  
Statistically significant Schoenfeld residuals indicate the violation of the proportional 
hazards assumption: The null hypothesis of proportional hazards is rejected.  I verify the 
Schoenfeld test results with graphical methods for checking for the proportionality 
assumption violation.  The multicollinearity test and the test of collective significance 
allow making decisions about inclusion of covariates in the final model. 
The conditional gap time models using variable stratification do not face the issue 
of violating the proportional hazards assumptions of the Cox model.  This finding serves 
as an additional support for the use of multistate models versus the time-to-first-event 
models.  In the latter, the proportionality assumption violation is not infrequent, 
especially in the models that employ many dummy variables, and requires remediation.  
To address this issue, I turn the problematic independent variables into time-varying 
covariates through linear interaction with the analysis time in the respective samples.  
Then the Schoenfeld test and graphical methods are used again to make certain that the 
proportionality assumption violation has been adequately addressed.  These created time-
varying covariates are marked with the pound symbol (#) in the tables of results below. 
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Based on the results of the restricted models, tests of collective significance, and 
multicollinearity tests, the final model includes all covariates in one model and employs 
the conditional gap time framework.  However, for presentation purposes, a respective 
part of the final model is included in separate tables for individual theoretical frames.  
The covariates that are omitted from the final model due to multicollinearity issues are 
marked with the X symbol in the tables. 
The study results are presented in the following tables at the end of this chapter: 
Table 3 for the electoral connection frame, Table 4 for the political environment frame, 
Table 5 for the policy diffusion frame, and Table 6 for the principal-agent frame.  The 
respective part of the final model is included in each table; it should be remembered, 
however, that this model is run simultaneously with variables from all frames.  Each 
frame also includes the same group of control variables: state appropriation per college-
age individual, unemployment rate, and regional identifier; however, these variables are 
not presented in the tables due to the lack of theoretical and statistical significance. 
 
Findings 
This section reviews my hypotheses under each theoretical frame and discusses 
the findings.  The study findings confirm my hypotheses only in part.  Table 3 presents 
results for testing hypotheses under the electoral connection frame.  As the p-values 
demonstrate, the model specifications for adoption and readoption are statistically 
significant; the model for failure and the restricted multistate model do not have much 
explanatory power.  The final model, which includes covariates for all hypotheses, is 
statistically significant. 
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First, I hypothesized that states with a more rapid growth in public enrollment 
would be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to abandon it.  In 
other words, the respective variable was expected to have a positive effect on the 
adoption and readoption hazards and a negative effect on the failure hazard.  In line with 
my hypothesis, I find that the annual change in public enrollment is significantly and 
positively related to the adoption hazard in all relevant specifications.  The magnitude of 
this covariate’s effect varies by model.  In Model 1, a one-percent increase in the public-
sector enrollment increases the hazard for policy adoption by 22 percent; Model 4 
estimates this increase to be about 18 percent.  In the final model, this effect grows to 38 
percent but the estimate precision declines, as shown by a larger confidence interval.  
There is no discernible effect of this covariate on the hazards for policy failure or 
readoption. 
The next hypothesis asserts that as the net cost of college increases, states will be 
more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to discontinue it.  However, I 
find no empirical evidence for the effect of the cost of college attendance on the adoption, 
failure, or readoption hazards in any model specification.  As Table 3 demonstrates, the 
coefficient for this variable approximates one (which means zero effect on the outcome 
of interest) and the confidence interval is so small that it also rounds off to one in all 
models.  In the final model, the variable’s strata for failure and readoption are omitted 
because of multicollinearity issues. 
The next two hypotheses test whether state officials’ responsiveness to voter 
preferences improves as the election time draws nearer.  I expected that proximity of 
legislative and gubernatorial elections would make state officials more likely to adopt 
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presumably popular performance funding and less likely to abandon it.  In general, I find 
no empirical evidence that electoral timing affects performance funding evolution.  There 
is no measurable effect of the timing of legislative elections on hazards for any policy 
shift.  Contrary to my hypothesis, the variable for the timing of gubernatorial elections is 
negatively related to the readoption hazard in one restricted model but it fails to reach 
statistical significance in the multistate models. 
Finally, I anticipated that the number of neighboring states with performance 
funding would affect this policy evolution through yardstick competition among states.  I 
find no evidence for the effect of yardstick competition-driven behavior of voters on the 
hazards for any policy shift.  Similar to the results for the cost of college, the hazard for 
this variable approximates zero and small confidence intervals round off to one in all 
specifications.  In the final model, the failure and readoption strata of this variable are 
omitted due to multicollinearity issues. 
Table 4 presents results for the political environment frame.  None of the 
restricted models of this lens is statistically significant at the conventional level. 
I hypothesized that states with a larger Republican presence in state legislatures 
would be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely to discontinue it.  The 
percent of Republicans in the state legislature exerts a statistically significant effect on 
the adoption hazard in the final model.  Consistent with my expectations, one additional 
percent of Republican legislators increases the hazard for performance funding adoption 
by 6 percent.  As the confidence interval shows, this effect can be anywhere from just 
above zero to 11 percent.  This variable is also significant and negative for the failure 
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hazard in Model 2, which is partly consistent with the hypothesized relationships.  
However, the finding is not confirmed in the final model due to multicollinearity. 
The next two hypotheses under this theoretical frame test the effect of the other 
political factors of interest: the presence of Republican governors and state government 
ideology.  I expected that states with a Republican governor and more conservative 
government ideology would be more likely to adopt performance funding and less likely 
to terminate it.  However, as Table 4 shows, there is no discernible effect of these 
variables on the hazards for any policy shift. 
Table 5 presents results for the policy diffusion frame.  In this theoretical lens, 
both multistate models are statistically significant but the restricted models are not. 
The first hypothesis under this frame tests whether policy diffusion prompted by 
geographic proximity affects the hazard for policy shifts.  I expected that states with a 
higher proportion of immediate neighbors with operational performance funding would 
be more likely to adopt this policy and less likely to discontinue it.  However, there is no 
empirical evidence that this covariate has any effect on the hazard for policy adoption, 
failure, or readoption.  I also tested the hypothesis that performance funding diffusion 
happens along ideological lines.  I hypothesized that states with a larger number of 
“ideological neighbors” that have made a particular policy shift would be more likely to 
follow suit; however, I find no evidence supporting this supposition. 
The next hypothesis tested the idea that states with more contemporaneous 
examples of successful policies would be more likely to adopt performance funding and 
less likely to abandon it.  I find that such emulation-driven policy diffusion affects one 
type of policy shift.  Partly in line with my hypothesis, a greater number of successful 
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examples of policy implementation (coupled with a shorter distance to them) increases 
the likelihood of policy readoption.  Both multistate models show statistically significant 
effect of this variable on the hazard for readoption.  Thus, I find that the presence of 
successful examples (long-standing operational policies), moderated by geographic 
proximity, increases the hazard for policy readoption.  However, as demonstrated by 
large confidence intervals, the precise magnitude of the effect remains unknown. 
These large estimates and confidence intervals require further exploration.  I find 
that a small number of states that readopted performance funding in 2007 are driving this 
finding.  During the observation period, there were 26 cases of performance funding 
readoption in 12 years; some states readopted the policy multiple times (Table 1).  The 
number of successful policy examples in a readoption year ranges from one in 1996 to six 
in 2007, with the mean of 2.8 for all readoption years. 
The year of 2007 is unique for the following reasons: first, there were six 
successful policies in that year, more than in any other readoption year; the second 
highest number of successful policy examples is four in 2008 and 2009.  Second, seven 
states experienced readoption in 2007, which is the highest number of readoptions in one 
year in my dataset; the second closest are 2008 and 2009 with four readopting states in 
each.  Six of these events were adoptions of a new policy and one represented resumption 
of funding.  Finally, four of these states (Virginia, Indiana, Arkansas, and Texas) are 
geographically proximate to most, or some, of the six successful policies as of 2007 (in 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Tennessee, and Oklahoma); as a result, they 
have the highest values of the variable for policy emulation.  This variable—an 
interaction of the dummy variable for successful programs with a reverse log of distances 
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between state capitals—ranges from 0.15 to 0.67 for readopting states in other years.  In 
contrast, its values for the top four readopters in 2007 range from 0.89 for Texas to 1.02 
for Virginia.  In other words, these readopting states had a greater number of successful 
and more proximate policy examples than readopters in other years.  Thus, the four 
outlying states that readopted the policy in 2007 drive the above finding by virtue of 
having many successful regional neighbors. 
As additional verification, I reran my models with these four states removed from 
the sample.  Estimations from this truncated sample were almost identical on other 
variables but produced a statistically insignificant result for the effect of the policy 
emulation variable on the readoption hazard.  I conclude that a small part of the sample 
with a large effect at a particular time causes the estimates of the effect to be imprecise. 
The final hypothesis in this theoretical frame tested the role of interstate 
competition in performance funding evolution.  I expected that states with a higher ratio 
of student out-migration to in-migration would be more likely to adopt performance 
funding and less likely to discontinue it.  However, I find no evidence that diffusion of 
performance funding policies across state lines is driven by considerations of competition 
for students.  The coefficients of different strata of the respective variable fail to reach 
statistical significance in all model specifications. 
Table 6 presents results for the principal-agent frame.  This theoretical lens 
focuses on two key issues: state-level governance of higher education systems and 
characteristics of performance funding programs.  The governance-related covariates are 
analyzed in relation to all hazards; however, I consider programmatic characteristics to 
affect hazards only for policy failure and readoption.  The results presentation in Table 6 
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reflects this difference between the two groups of covariates.  With the exception of the 
failure and readoption models, all other specifications are significant.  Findings in this 
frame are partially consistent with my expectations. 
The first hypothesis of this frame tested the idea that states with more 
professionalized legislatures would be more likely to adopt performance funding and less 
likely to abandon it.  However, I find that legislative professionalism does not have a 
detectable effect on the probability of performance funding policy shifts in any model. 
The next three hypotheses test the role of state governance arrangement in 
performance funding development.  I hypothesized that states with consolidated 
governing boards would be less likely to adopt performance funding and more likely to 
abandon it and these expectations would be reverse for states with coordinating boards. 
My findings are partly in accord with the hypothesized relationships.  Weak and 
strong coordinating boards are found to have statistically significant and positive 
relationships with the adoption hazard, and this effect is consistent almost in all models.  
There is an issue, however, with the magnitude of the effect: Although it is rather 
consistent across models, the already-vague precision of estimates of the restricted 
models falls even further in the final model.  States with weak coordinating boards are 
found to be about six times more likely, and states with strong coordinating boards about 
five or eight times more likely, to adopt performance funding than states in the reference 
category.  Contrary to my expectations and prior research (McLendon et al., 2006), I find 
no measurable effect for the presence of consolidated governing boards on hazards for 
any policy shift. 
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I proposed two hypotheses related to the programmatic characteristics of 
performance funding policies.  First, I expected that states in which performance funding 
was initiated by state boards of higher education would be less likely to terminate the 
policy.  However, I find no evidence that the board-initiated policies are more or less 
likely to experience either failure or readoption.   
Second, I hypothesized that performance funding enacted via an appropriation bill 
or budget proviso would be more likely to fail and less likely to be readopted.  Partly in 
line with this hypothesis, the final model shows that policies adopted via appropriation 
bills are less likely to be readopted after previous abandonment.  In contrast to the 
policies enacted by a legislative mandate or an executive order, programs initiated by an 
appropriation decision are about 88 percent less likely to be readopted. 
In summary, I find that governance arrangement and the mode of program 
initiation affect the likelihood of performance funding policy changes.     
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Table 3. Electoral Connection Frame: Determinants of Performance Funding Policy Lifecycle 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Annual change in public sector enrollment      
Adoption 1.22  **   1.18  * 1.38  *** 
 [1.05, 1.41]   [1.03, 1.35] [1.14, 1.67] 
Failure  1.11  1.12 1.16 
  [0.92, 1. 34]  [0.97, 1.30] [0.99, 1.35] 
Readoption   1.00  # 0.92 0.87 
   [0.93, 1.07] [0.78, 1.09] [0.68, 1.12] 
Net cost of college   (recentered)      
Adoption 1.00   1.00 1.00 
 [1.00, 1.00]   [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] 
Failure  1.00  #  1.00 X 
  [1.00, 1.00]  [1.00, 1.00]  
Readoption   1.00 1.00 X 
   [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00]  
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Table 3, continued 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Proximity of legislative elections      
Adoption 3.30   2.94 3.79 
 [0.99, 11.05]   [0.82, 10.48] [0.91, 15.70] 
Failure  0.81  0.85 0.77 
  [0.33, 1.97]  [0.40, 1.79] [0.35, 1.68] 
Readoption   1.31 0.69 0.77 
   [0.37, 4.65] [0.32, 1.49] [0.28, 2.10] 
Proximity of gubernatorial elections      
Adoption 0.68   0.73 0.68 
 [0.43, 1.09]   [0.46, 1.15] [0.39, 1.19] 
Failure  0.84  0.84 0.88 
  [0.50, 1.41]  [0.55, 1.27] [0.57, 1.36] 
Readoption   0.46  * 0.64 0.57 
   [0.23, 0.92] [0.40, 1.00] [0.31, 1.05] 
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Table 3, continued 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Yardstick competition-driven behavior of voters      
Adoption 1.00   1.00 1.00 
 [1.00, 1.00]   [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00] 
Failure  1.00  1.00 X 
  [1.00, 1.00]  [1.00, 1.00]  
Readoption   1.00  # 1.00 X 
   [1.00, 1.00] [1.00, 1.00]  
Percent of neighbors with performance funding      
Adoption 1.02   1.01 see Table 5 
 [0.99, 1.04]   [0.99, 1.04]  
Failure  1.02  1.01 see Table 5 
  [1.00, 1.05]  [0.99, 1.03]  
Readoption   1.01  # 1.01 see Table 5 
   [1.00, 1.01] [0.99, 1.04]  
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Table 3, continued 
Control variables included: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of subjects 47 27 24 132 132 
Number of failures 27 25 18 91 91 
Likelihood ratio 17.21 8.92 23.96 30.50 101.01 
Probability > Chi2 0.046 0.349 0.004 0.082 0.001 
 
Note.  Control variables: state appropriations to higher education per college-age individual, unemployment rate, and higher education regional 
compact.  The final model is simultaneously run for all theoretical frames; however, only a respective part is presented in the table.  # = interaction 
of the covariate with the time counter variable to address the issue of non-proportionality;  X = omission of the variable due to multicollinearity.  
Percent of neighbors with performance funding is a first-order interaction term in this frame; by itself, it is used to test a separate hypothesis in the 
Policy Diffusion frame (see Table 5). 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4. Political Environment Frame: Determinants of Performance Funding Policy Lifecycle 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Percent of Republicans legislators      
Adoption 1.01   1.00 1.06  * 
 [0.97, 1.05]   [0.97, 1.04] [1.00, 1.11] 
Failure  0.95  *  0.97 X 
  [0.91, 1.00]  [0.93, 1.00]  
Readoption   0.98 0.99 X 
   [0.93, 1.03] [0.95, 1.04]  
Republican governor      
Adoption 1.05   0.97 0.67 
 [0.28, 4.01]   [0.26, 3.63] [0.10, 4.41] 
Failure  0.97  #  0.38 0.38 
  [0.48, 1.96]  [0.10, 1.44] [0.08, 1.83] 
Readoption   0.94  # 0.63 1.66 
   [0.72, 1.22] [0.19, 2.07] [0.31, 8.73] 
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Table 4, continued 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Conservatism of state government      
Adoption 0.99   1.00 0.99 
 [0.96, 1.03]   [0.97, 1.03] [0.95, 1.03] 
Failure  1.01  #  1.02 1.01 
  [0.99, 1.02]  [0.99, 1.05] [0.98, 1.04] 
Readoption   1.00  # 1.02 0.97 
   [1.00, 1.01] [1.00, 1.05] [0.93, 1.01] 
Control variables included: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of subjects 47 27 24 132 132 
Number of failures 27 25 18 91 91 
Likelihood ratio 0.52 10.89 12.02 9.32 101.01 
Probability > Chi2 0.998 0.092 0.062 0.676 0.001 
 
Note.  Control variables: state appropriations to higher education per college-age individual, unemployment rate, and higher education regional 
compact.  The final model is simultaneously run for all theoretical frames; however, only a respective part is presented in the table.  # = interaction 
of the covariate with the time counter variable to address the issue of non-proportionality;  X = omission of the variable due to multicollinearity. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table 5. Policy Diffusion Frame: Determinants of Performance Funding Policy Lifecycle 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Percent of neighbors with performance funding      
Adoption 1.02   1.02 1.02 
 [1.00, 1.05]   [1.00, 1.05] [0.99, 1.05] 
Failure  1.02  1.01 1.01 
  [0.99, 1.04]  [1.00, 1.03] [0.99, 1.03] 
Readoption   1.00 1.00 1.00 
   [0.97, 1.02] [0.98, 1.03] [0.97, 1.04] 
Number of ideological neighbors with  1.43   1.46 1.60 
           performance funding           [Adoption] [0.94, 2.17]   [0.97, 2.20] [0.92, 2.77] 
Number of ideological neighbors who  0.87  #  1.01 0.95 
           abandoned the policy          [Failure]  [0.55, 1.36]  [0.76, 1.34] [0.68, 1.31] 
Number of ideological neighbors with    0.96  # 0.98 1.45 
           performance funding           [Readoption]   [0.70, 1.32] [0.73, 1.31] [0.87, 2.41] 
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Table 5, continued 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Number of successful examples of implementation      
 
    
Adoption 0.00   0.00 X 
 [0.00, 211.42]   [0.00, 325.86]  
Failure  7.78  0.74 0.88 
  [0.21, 293.41]  [0.14, 3.88] [0.14, 5.56] 
Readoption   4.83 13.84  ** 19.29  * 
   [0.30, 77.88] [2.24, 85.60] [1.88, 197.38] 
Ratio of student out-migration to in-migration      
Adoption 1.23   1.26 0.79 
 [0.82, 1.83]   [0.85, 1.86] [0.44, 1.44] 
Failure  1.03  1.18 1.50 
  [0.65, 1.62]  [0.79, 1.77] [0.88, 2.56] 
Readoption   0.36 0.52 0.18 
   [0.07, 2.78] [0.17, 1.57] [0.02, 1.83] 
   
197 
 
Table 5, continued 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
Control variables included: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of subjects 47 27 24 132 132 
Number of failures 27 25 18 91 91 
Likelihood ratio 8.68 6.23 6.67 26.87 101.01 
Probability > Chi2 0.277 0.398 0.353 0.030 0.001 
 
Note.  Control variables: state appropriations to higher education per college-age individual, unemployment rate, and higher education regional 
compact.  The final model is simultaneously run for all theoretical frames; however, only a respective part is presented in the table.  # = interaction 
of the covariate with the time counter variable to address the issue of non-proportionality;  X = omission of the variable due to multicollinearity. 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6. Principal-Agent Frame: Determinants of Performance Funding Policy Lifecycle 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Legislative professionalism      
Adoption 1.25   1.21 1.68 
 [0.74, 2.11]   [0.73, 1.99] [0.86, 3.30] 
Failure  1.34  0.79 0.68 
  [0.63, 2.85]  [0.45, 1.43] [0.34, 1.36] 
Readoption   0.55 0.62 0.43 
   [0.21, 1.42] [0.28, 1.36] [0.16, 1.18] 
Weak coordinating board      
Adoption 6.51  *   6.02  * 6.15  * 
 [1.41, 29.99]   [1.37, 26.47] [1.01, 37.47] 
Failure  1.49  #  0.47 0.27 
  [0.43, 5.19]  [0.09, 2.44] [0.04, 1.79] 
Readoption   0.60 3.52 11.02 
   [0.03, 11.77] [0.51, 24.45] [0.88, 138.16] 
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Table 6, continued 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Strong coordinating board      
Adoption 4.76  *   3.77 8.65 * 
 [1.10, 20.63]   [0.91, 15.54] [1.35, 55.69] 
Failure  2.02  #  0.57 0.46 
  [0.61, 6.61]  [0.13, 2.58] [0.09, 2.43] 
Readoption   0.43 2.46 1.44 
   [0.02, 8.83] [0.40, 15.01] [0.12, 17.88] 
Consolidated governing board      
Adoption 0.62   0.73 0.29 
 [0.12, 3.20]   [0.15, 3.51] [0.04, 1.94] 
Failure  2.31  #  0.28 0.21 
  [0.58, 9.27]  [0.05, 1.60] [0.03, 1.50] 
Readoption   1.70 5.88 5.00 
   [0.07, 41.17] [0.67, 51.46] [0.28, 88.11] 
  
200 
 
Table 6, continued 
 M 1. Adoption M 2. Failure M 3. Readoption M 4. Multistate Final Model 
 Hazard ratio / [Confidence interval – 95] 
Initiated by state higher education board      
Failure  0.64  0.92 0.74 
  [0.15, 2.80]  [0.32, 2.66] [0.21 2.65] 
Readoption   0.47 0.91 1.70 
   [0.14, 1.59] [0.30, 2.81] [0.34, 8.52] 
Adopted by appropriation      
Failure  0.71  1.17 1.36 
  [0.17, 3.02]  [0.43, 3.18] [0.42, 4.46] 
Readoption   0.52 0.39 0.12  ** 
   [0.16, 1.63] [0.14, 1.11] [0.02, 0.56] 
Control variables included: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of subjects 47 27 24 132 132 
Number of failures 27 25 18 91 91 
Likelihood ratio 20.65 9.90 10.83 33.05 101.01 
Probability > Chi2 0.004 0.359 0.094 0.024 0.001 
 
Note.  Control variables: state appropriations to higher education per college-age individual, unemployment rate, and higher education regional 
compact.  The final model is simultaneously run for all frames; however, only a respective part is presented.  # = interaction of the covariate with 
the time counter variable to address the issue of non-proportionality.     * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Implications of the Results 
The results of the analysis uncover some intriguing relationships that shed new 
light on the drivers of evolution of performance funding policy systems.  The discussion 
of the results implications is anchored in the proposed relationships within the conceptual 
framework for the study.  As mentioned above, the key concepts that are operationalized 
in the independent variables aim to capture the main determinants of policy development.  
These forces represent political and social processes and actors that drive states to make 
policy shifts.  Importantly, these influences are deemed to affect all relevant performance 
funding policy changes.  This section discusses which relationships of the conceptual 
framework are supported by empirical findings.  Similar to the results presentation, their 
discussion proceeds by theoretical frame. 
In the electoral connection frame, the only variable that has statistical significance 
is the annual change in public enrollment.  It has a consistent positive effect on the hazard 
for policy adoption in all respective model specifications.  In line with my hypothesis, I 
interpret this finding as follows: Steeper decline in perceived college accessibility—
represented by sharper increases in enrollment—provides for increased voter pressure on 
incumbents to accommodate this dynamic.  To address voters’ concerns about college 
accessibility, policymakers enact performance funding that aims to enhance institutional 
efficiency and performance.  Thus, in years when issues of college access seem most 
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conspicuous, state officials are more likely to adopt performance funding.  This finding 
supports the hypothesized relationship in the conceptual framework. 
It is important to correctly interpret the probable causal mechanism connecting 
this variable and the likelihood of policy adoption.  As mentioned above, voters seldom 
push for a specific type of policy and their demands for accountability and better 
institutional performance are quite general.  Moreover, their perception of college 
accessibility is unlikely to be a direct function of annual changes in college enrollment.  
Therefore, this variable represents the anticipatory response of state officials to assumed 
voter perception of college accessibility rather than direct response to voter pressure for 
greater access.  In enacting performance funding, policymakers respond to a general 
sense of voter preferences, given the changes in enrollment, and not to their constituents’ 
direct demand to address the diminishing availability of college seats. 
Testing the other hypotheses under the electoral connection frame does not offer 
empirical support for the proposed relationships.  I am somewhat surprised to find that 
the net cost of college has no measureable effect on the hazards for any policy shifts.  I 
expected that larger increases in the cost of college attendance (that is, steeper decline in 
higher education affordability) would provide for greater voter pressure on elected 
officials to adopt accountability policies.  Given public concerns over rising tuition, it 
seemed plausible that the rising cost of tuition would create conditions for the emergence 
of rigid accountability policies such as performance funding. 
However, I do not find empirical evidence for a relationship between the net price 
of college and the probability of policy adoption or other policy shifts.  A possible 
explanation for the lack of this effect is the general character of voter demands: When 
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voters call for institutional accountability and tuition caps, as a rule, they do not propose 
or advocate a particular policy.  Most voters are unlikely to be familiar with performance 
funding characteristics.  As a result, their diffuse demands for accountability and tuition 
control do not translate into performance funding adoption.  Besides, even if voters are 
aware of performance funding per se, they do not necessarily view it as a policy that can 
hold institutions accountable for rising tuition.  On the contrary, the public may see it as 
an incentive policy that provides additional funding to institutions at a time when 
colleges are receiving much more revenue through tuition.  Guided by this perception of 
performance funding as an incentive policy, voters may be opposed to its enactment. 
I do not find any support for the hypotheses that electoral timing affects 
performance funding development.  I conclude that, in general, proximity of legislative 
and gubernatorial elections does not affect the likelihood of the respective policy shifts.  
In other words, incumbents do not attempt to enhance their reelection chances by 
adopting presumably popular performance funding as their reelection draws closer.  
Neither are they more likely to terminate this policy in the beginning of their terms.  
Three explanations can be offered for this finding.   First, this lack of the hypothesized 
effect can support the ideas that higher education is a low-priority item on the election 
agenda and that incumbents do not view higher education accountability as an issue that 
provides an electoral advantage.   Second, policymakers may slight performance funding 
as a policy that is too specific and technical in nature, constrained in goals and effects, 
and unfamiliar to most voters to use it in their electoral battles.  Last but not least, 
incumbents may not see performance funding as a policy that addresses the most urgent 
public concerns about access and affordability of higher education. 
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The lack of support for the hypothesis that examples of other of states with 
performance funding could provide for increased voter pressure on incumbents to adopt 
similar programs (yardstick competition idea [Besley & Case, 1995]) may have two 
explanations.  The first one is the actual absence of this effect for this specific policy.  
This explanation is plausible because most voters are unaware of performance funding 
existence in bordering states, and thus, their general demands for higher education 
accountability translate into a variety of other policy responses.  The second explanation 
is technical: Since the employed variable is an interaction of the proportion of bordering 
policy adopters with the variable for the cost of college and the latter is not statistically 
significant, this leads to the lack of significance of the variable for the yardstick 
competition-driven behavior of voters.  Future research of performance funding should 
use other proxy measures to capture the possible workings of yardstick competition. 
The results for the political environment frame support one of three hypotheses.  
The final model confirms my expectation that the extent of the Republican presence in 
state legislatures will have a positive effect on performance funding adoption.  The 
restricted model also shows that this variable is negatively related to the failure hazard, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis.  However, this result is not confirmed in Model 4 
and could not be verified in the final model due to multicollinearity.  In general, the 
evidence for the significant role of legislative partisanship compares favorably with the 
findings of other studies of higher education policymaking (Deaton, 2006; McLendon et 
al., 2005; McLendon et al., 2006; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009).  Importantly, this 
result is consistent with McLendon et al.’s (2006) finding about the critical role of 
Republican legislative strength in adoption of performance funding policies.  This 
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consistency of results between studies using different approaches offers an additional 
proof that legislative partisanship is a decisive factor in performance funding evolution. 
Next, the presence of an incumbent Republican governor does not have any 
significant effect on any hazards, which is also consistent with the finding of McLendon 
et al.’s (2006) study.  This result fails to support my hypothesis and contrasts with 
McLendon et al. (2009) and Archibald & Feldman’s (2006) findings that governor’s 
party identification plays a key role in higher education funding decision-making. 
Finally, the conservatism of state governments does not have any discernible 
effect on the hazard for any policy shift.  This result runs counter to the findings of prior 
research that found government ideology to be a statistically significant factor affecting 
policy change in higher education (Doyle et al., 2010; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  
I conclude that neither governor’s partisanship nor government ideology plays a key role 
in performance funding evolution.  In contrast, the partisanship of state legislators affects 
the likelihood of specific policy changes (adoption).  Thus, the data support one causal 
mechanism under the political environment frame: preference of Republican legislators 
for strict performance accountability policies. 
In the policy diffusion frame, I combine traditional and recent approaches to 
explaining why policies migrate across state lines.  Thus, my conceptual frame includes 
four possible causal mechanisms of policy diffusion.  Traditional policy diffusion studies 
view geographic proximity as a factor facilitating policy migration among states (Berry & 
Berry, 1990, 1992; Doyle, 2006; McLendon et al., 2006; Mintrom, 2000).  Recently, this 
approach has been criticized for lacking true causal explanations of the diffusion process 
and alternative approaches have been proposed (Karch, 2007; Sponsler, 2010; Volden, 
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Ting, & Carpenter, 2008).  Constant failure to find a positive effect of geographic 
proximity on the likelihood of policy enactment has been another driver of new 
approaches to policy diffusion research in higher education arena.  Out of about a dozen 
of higher education diffusion studies, only one found a significant positive diffusion 
effect (McLendon et al., 2005).  In other cases, the diffusion variable was either 
insignificant or negative (Doyle et al., 2010; Sponsler, 2010).  The regional diffusion 
effect was insignificant in the studies of adoption of innovative accountability policies 
(McLendon et al., 2005) and performance funding (McLendon et al., 2006). 
In this study, one finding partially supports the hypothesized relationships within 
the conceptual framework.  I am surprised to discover that geographic proximity does not 
matter by itself but becomes a statistically significant factor when policy sustainability 
(perceived policy success) is also taken into account.  In other words, I find that simply 
being adjacent to a performance funding adopter does not have a detectable effect on the 
likelihood of a given state’s policy shift; however, having a greater number of successful 
and more proximate policy examples exerts a positive effect on the hazard for 
performance funding readoption.  Specifically, I do not find any support for the 
hypothesis that the percent of bordering states with operational performance funding 
determines the likelihood of policy shifts of any type.  This result is consistent with other 
studies of policy innovations in higher education that employed some measure of 
geographic proximity (Doyle, 2006; Doyle et al., 2010; Hearn et al., 2007; McLendon et 
al., 2006; McLendon et al., 2007; Mokher, 2008; Mokher & McLendon, 2009). 
However, the result for the number of successful programs provides evidence for 
policy diffusion operating at the national level: A greater presence of long-standing 
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examples of performance funding, moderated by geographic proximity, increases the 
likelihood of policy readoption in a given state.  The result is significant even after 
controlling for the impact of bordering states and other influences and is consistent in the 
multistate specifications.  This finding offers partial support to Karch’s (2007) idea of 
policy diffusion due to emulation, that is, states following successful examples of policy 
implementation—although this causal mechanism seems to affect only the probability of 
policy readoption.  However, the result lacks any conclusive precision: The point 
estimates are big and confidence intervals are very large.  Additional analyses, described 
in the Findings section, showed that this imprecise finding is driven by a small number of 
states that readopted the policy in 2007and had many proximate and successful policy 
examples.  In general, the intriguing finding of emulation-driven diffusion of certain 
policy changes warrants special attention in future studies of public policy development. 
I find no evidence that the other possible causal mechanisms of diffusion—
imitation based on ideological proximity of state governments and interstate competition 
for students (Karch, 2007)—affect hazards for any performance funding policy shifts. 
The significant results for principal-agent frame partly support the hypothesized 
relationships.  Two of the employed variables were insignificant in all model 
specifications.  First, there is no empirical evidence that legislative professionalism is 
related to any policy shift.  The expectation that more professionalized state legislatures 
would be more likely to adopt innovative performance funding policies and design more 
sustainable programs is not supported by the data.  In preliminary estimations, I also used 
another measure of legislative professionalism, the presence of legislative term limits, 
and found that it was positively related to the adoption hazard in the restricted models but 
208 
 
not in the final model.  However, I omitted this variable from the final models because of 
its redundancy and due to the potentially artificial nature of the discovered effect.  Term 
limits were mostly introduced in the 1990s when most first-generation performance 
funding policies were being adopted.  Therefore, the term limits’ effect could be due to 
simultaneity of these processes and not due just to legislative professionalism. 
The hypotheses about the role of state boards for higher education were supported 
in part.  Prior research repeatedly showed that the type of postsecondary governance 
determines policy outcomes (Doyle, 2006; Hearn & Griswold, 1994; Hearn, Griswold, & 
Marine, 1996; Mokher & McLendon, 2007; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  
Specifically, McLendon et al. (2006) find that states with consolidated governing boards 
are less likely to adopt performance funding and explain this finding by better ability of 
these boards to protect institutional interests in comparison to other types of state boards. 
I expected to confirm McLendon et al.’s (2006) finding and ran two independent 
estimations.  In preliminary estimations, in which consolidated governing boards were in 
the model and all other types of boards were in the reference category, I found a 
consistently negative effect of this covariate on the hazard for adoption.  Thus, 
preliminary models provided support for McLendon et al.’s (2006) finding.  However, 
adding two types of coordinating boards to the model and using the weakest type of 
boards as the reference category changes the picture.  I find that states with coordinating 
boards are more likely to adopt the policy than states in the reference category and the 
presence of consolidated governing boards does not affect any hazard. 
The explanation for the above discrepancy is both substantive and technical: 
When consolidated governing boards are compared to all other types of boards, they are 
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less likely to adopt performance funding because the more-likely-to-adopt coordinating 
boards are in the reference category.  When coordinating boards are in the model, the true 
effect surfaces and, in relation to the new reference category, the consolidated boards are 
no longer significant.  Thus, I have been able to specify the effect of state boards 
discovered by McLendon et al. (2006).  However, my results should be interpreted with 
caution due to large confidence intervals.  Another note of caution is that my reference 
category is relatively small in later years: In 2009, it included eight states with the 
weakest types of boards (advisory boards and planning agencies); however, this number 
was higher in the earlier years.  The reported results show the effects of state boards in 
comparison to the states in the reference category.  Although the size of the reference 
category does not affect statistical significance and validity of the results, it is important 
to keep in mind when discussing their substantive interpretation. 
Regarding the key programmatic characteristics, I find that the mode of policy 
initiation matters but the initiator does not have a detectable effect.  Although the finding 
that policies adopted through an appropriation bill or a budget proviso have a lower 
probability of readoption does not directly confirm qualitative analyses of performance 
funding failures (Burke & Associates, 2002; Dougherty et al., 2012; Natow & Dougherty, 
2008), it follows the same logic that such policies are unstable and stand little chance of 
resurgence.  The lack of significant results for policies initiated by state boards could 
mean that it is not crucial whether performance funding was self-initiated or mandated by 
external actors.  This finding fails to support prior qualitative research on the issue 
(Burke, 1998; Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Modarresi, 2001). 
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In brief, I find only partial support for my hypotheses.  I discover some new 
factors affecting performance funding evolution and find partial evidence for the effects 
proposed in the previous studies.  Also, I fail to find support for certain antecedents of 
policy shifts suggested in the literature or found to be significant in the prior research. 
The conceptual framework offers testable propositions about my research 
question and aims to uncover causal mechanisms behind the relationships among my key 
concepts.  My findings support the following hypothesized causal mechanisms: 
policymakers’ anticipatory response to voter perception of college accessibility, 
Republican preference for performance accountability, policy diffusion driven by 
emulation and proximity, proclivity of weaker state governing boards to respond to 
accountability pressure, and lower institutionalization of non-mandated policies. 
Specifically, I find that the following state-level factors determine the evolution of 
performance funding policies in higher education: increases in public-sector enrollment; 
the extent of the Republican presence in state legislatures; the number of, and distance to, 
sustainable policy examples in other states; type of governance arrangement for state 
systems of higher education; and the mode of the program initiation.  These results 
confirm some prior findings but also shed new light on what affects development of 
performance funding.  More research is necessary to give a more definitive answer to the 
question which factors have driven this policy evolution.  In several years, when more 
states will have adopted and tried out a new generation of performance funding, another 
study will probably be better able to clarify some of the issues that remain unanswered.     
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The limitations of this study comprise three separate areas: omission of 
potentially relevant theoretical frames and predictors, possibly insufficient 
operationalization of certain concepts, and computational limitations of the employed 
models.  Given these limitations, some factors affecting performance funding 
development could remain unidentified and will need to be addressed in future studies. 
First, this investigation does not use all possible theoretical frames that could 
explain performance funding policy shifts.  I consciously omit from the analysis some 
conceptual frames and respective predictors.  This omission provides sufficient statistical 
power for estimation in the final model, which includes all theoretical frames.  Also, 
some omitted theoretical lenses are better fitted for qualitative investigations due to the 
lack of appropriate quantitative measures for the entire observation period. 
To illustrate, I do not employ the Interest-group frame (Pluralist Theory), 
although prior studies uncovered the critical role of particular coalitions in performance 
funding evolution (Burke & Associates, 2002; Natow & Dougherty, 2008).  In the 
preliminary models, I used the percent of manufacturing employment as a proxy measure 
for the extent of business development and strength.  However, I omit this covariate from 
my final model specifications due to inadequate operationalization of the concept of and 
the lack of other variables under this frame.  Further research will have to test the role of 
the business community in this policy development. 
Another potential frame to use in subsequent studies may examine performance 
funding from the position of the state budgeting process, which lies at the heart of the 
political process and all public policies (Gosling, 2009; Wildavsky, 1984).  In this regard, 
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a critical limitation of this study is not considering the relative size of each program in 
percentage of the total budget.  Although difficult to glean for all policies over the entire 
observation period, this variable would provide much needed control for a critical 
programmatic characteristic.  Future studies will need to consider this variable relative to 
the overall financial situation in the state and higher education budget in particular. 
Also, because of the model limitation explained below, I omitted many available 
programmatic characteristics, leaving just two most critical ones.  This omission of 
potentially important policy features undermines the breadth of the analysis and leaves 
much ground to cover in subsequent investigations. 
Second, operationalization of some concepts may not be totally satisfactory and 
may require using alternative variables in future research.  For example, the variables 
employed to capture causal mechanisms of policy diffusion are far from ideal, especially 
the ones used for successful policies and interstate competition.  To be sure, other 
definitions of successful programs are possible, besides the one used in this study, which 
simply equates success with longevity.  Future studies will need to use a more refined 
definition of policy success that, for example, will take into account the nature of the 
policy.  Competition among states can also be examined from other perspectives as 
opposed to using student migration patterns.  In future studies, researchers may also 
operationalize perceived issues of access to higher education in a more comprehensive 
fashion than using the annual change in public sector enrollment.  Likewise, yardstick 
competition among states could be operationalized differently in order to retest this idea. 
Finally, through the course of this analysis, it became apparent that the employed 
model presents a number of computational limitations.  Although having enough 
213 
 
statistical power for all analyses, the model is amenable to the issues of multicollinearity, 
which precluded me from testing all factors of potential importance.  For example, I 
omitted the variable for citizens’ ideology due to its high collinearity with government 
ideology.  The same problem prevented me from including citizen partisanship and 
gubernatorial institutional powers. 
The model also does not cope well with variables representing complex ratios and 
many dummy variables.  This issue precluded me from testing several desired predictors.  
For instance, instead of the net cost of college, originally I intended to use the variable for 
financial burden, which was estimated as the net cost of college over the median family 
income.  However, the coefficients for this variable were improbably large, as were the 
confidence intervals.  A similar problem occurred with the ratio of this year’s enrollment 
to prior five-year average, which was used as a proxy for enrollment demand, and the 
ratio of baccalaureate completion over overall enrollment, which stood for higher 
education performance.  Because of the model’s inability to process many binary 
variables, testing the effect of all programmatic characteristics on the outcome of interest 
no longer fell within the scope of this study. 
I also hope that future studies will address the issue of inaccurate estimations and 
large confidence intervals and will be able to estimate certain effects of interest with 
greater precision than was possible in this study.     
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Contributions of the Study 
This study provides new insight into the phenomenon of the policy development 
process and advances our knowledge of the factors driving states to make policy shifts in 
public higher education.  It makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the field of 
policy studies by testing a set of hypotheses regarding development of performance 
funding policy systems.  This analysis employs four distinct theoretical traditions, 
advanced methodology, and refined definitions of key concepts in order to answer the 
research question in a comprehensive fashion.  Prior studies of performance funding 
uncovered some critical determinants of this policy development.  However, this 
investigation provides contributions in a number of new arenas. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by proposing a new theoretical 
perspective for understanding different statuses of a policy and policy changes.  I draw a 
distinction between an “actual” policy with real implications and a “merely adopted” 
policy existing only in the books.  Making this distinction clear requires strict, easy-to-
apply definitions of policy shifts.  I propose and test unique definitions of operational 
policy and policy adoption and failure.  This perspective provides strict criteria for 
defining policy existence and nonexistence at any given time.  In other words, new 
definitions accurately determine the policy status: preoperational, operational, or 
nonoperational.  This approach also offers enough statistical power to run advanced 
analyses.  Using an example of performance funding in public higher education, I suggest 
specific criteria that define it as an operational, as opposed to latent, policy.  I argue that 
this approach can apply more broadly to examination of various policies and, thus, can 
advance the field of policy studies. 
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The centerpiece of this research is capturing transitions between nonexistent, 
operational, and nonoperational statuses of the policy.  To answer my research question, I 
redefine what it means for a policy to be in place and what it means for a policy to be 
abandoned.  My analysis shows that, specifically, policy failures in the higher education 
arena need to be better understood and more thoroughly conceptualized and examined.  
Thus far, few political science studies have theorized and examined this phenomenon in 
its full and rich variety, and no studies of education policies have empirically tested 
different types of policy failure. 
This study confirms that policies can fail in numerous ways but, for a variety of 
reasons, failure seldom happens by legislative or executive termination of the policy.  
More often than not, policy retraction takes place by other means such as a lack of 
appropriation, lack of other intended incentives or sanctions, tacit substitution with 
another policy, policy shrinking, or failure to meet the original criteria or goals.  Despite 
their ubiquity, these types of policy failure are poorly understood and inadequately 
studied.  By proposing and testing a refined definition of policy failure, this study 
provides a contribution to the higher education policy literature, the education policy 
literature, and the general field of public policy studies. 
This investigation also contributes to the established literature by conceptualizing 
the policy cycle as a more complex phenomenon than merely presence or absence of a 
public policy.  I challenge the assumption that policy studies should focus on conditions 
of a one-way transition from one state of the policy into the other: from non-adoption to 
adoption or from adoption to failure.  Real-life policy development calls for a more 
nuanced conceptualization of this process, and this study adds to the field by allowing for 
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a more dynamic policy history.  Unlike prior research, I examine the entire performance 
funding policy lifecycle and simultaneously analyze determinants of policy adoption, 
failure, and readoption. Thus, I treat performance funding development in a more 
comprehensive fashion than has been done previously in quantitative studies of policy 
enactment, development, diffusion, and failure.  This novel conceptualization and this 
new empirical approach require (a) identifying all possible policy shifts regarding 
performance funding and (b) operationalizing and analyzing their determinants across 
states and over time.  
Applying different theoretical traditions to the examination of multiple policy 
changes provides another important contribution of this research.  The juxtaposition of 
conceptual frames—and simultaneous testing of respective hypotheses—adds conceptual 
clarity to the discussion of policy shifts.  It also provides for comprehensive consideration 
of different antecedents of public policy changes.  In cases of competing explanations of 
policy shifts, this approach may also identify their determinants more precisely.  For the 
purposes of this investigation, I use the following theoretical frameworks: the electoral 
connection, political environment, policy diffusion, and principal-agent frames.  Based on 
this four-pronged approach, I test four sets of theory-driven hypotheses that explain—
each from a different standpoint—evolution of performance funding policy systems.  I 
posit that this approach should apply to the examination of any policy development when 
researchers deal with competing explanations of policy changes, numerous involved 
actors, and multiple presumed determinants of policy shifts.  To be sure, the nature of the 
policy, the research question, and the conceptualized cause-and effect relationships in the 
real world should determine the choice of specific theoretical frames. 
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The use of sophisticated methodology in studying antecedents of multiple 
mutually dependent policy changes is a contribution to the field of policy studies.  I 
employ several model specifications of multiple-failure event history analysis.  The main 
model of the study, the conditional gap time model (PWP), is the best fit to the research 
question, the dynamic of policy development, and the collected data.  It allows for 
estimation of the effects of multiple predictors on the outcome of interest across states 
and over time and provides sufficient statistical power for a comprehensive model.  This 
model also successfully addresses the following issues: different types of policy shifts, 
their dependence on each other, recurring nature of policy changes, existence of tied 
events and censored observations, and time-varying covariates and time-dependent 
effects of predictors.  To the best of my knowledge, in such a comprehensive form, this 
approach has not been used in policy analysis before.  This analytic technique allows me 
to model the complex evolution of performance funding policy systems successfully. 
This study also makes a contribution to the literature by suggesting a more refined 
operationalization of outcomes and predictors than has been used in most previous 
studies.  Analyzing all types of policy shifts provides a contribution to the literature that 
is mostly focused on policy adoption or, occasionally, policy termination.  Incorporating 
all types of state governing boards for higher education is a departure from other studies 
that generally focus on the presence of consolidated governing boards.  Likewise, I 
employ a more nuanced approach to investigating a policy diffusion effect: four distinct 
covariates used in the study represent hypothesized causal mechanisms behind policy 
migration.  I also suggest novel ways to capture the effect of yardstick competition, 
identify ideological neighbors, and estimate a legislative professionalism score. 
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The findings of the study offer several contributions to the field.  Prior qualitative 
studies have discovered the effect of changes in state appropriations on policy changes 
regarding performance funding.  Controlling for state appropriations and other influences, 
this study finds that enrollment pressure, represented by changes in public enrollment, 
provides for adoption of performance funding policies.  The effect of enrollment 
increases on the likelihood of policy changes contributes to the existing literature by 
identifying another important determinant of performance funding evolution. 
The result for diffusion effects is a key contribution from this research.  I find that 
the number of successful neighbors (states with long-standing performance funding 
programs) is positively associated with policy readoption.  This consistent result is 
intriguing, especially given very limited findings on diffusion effects in prior studies of 
higher education policies.  This finding uncovers the workings of the emulation 
mechanism of diffusion whereby policies migrate across states due to incumbents’ efforts 
to imitate successful policies.  This study further provides a contribution by showing that 
the above effect is moderated by the distance to states with sustainable policies.  
Therefore, I find that geographic proximity does matter; however, uncovering this effect 
requires using a more sensitive measure of proximity than has been used in many other 
studies (continuous states or members of the same regional higher education compacts). 
This research specifies the effects of the following determinants of policy shifts 
suggested in previous studies: the type of state governance arrangement for higher 
education and the mode of policy initiation.  This result furnishes evidence that these 
factors—together with partisanship of state policymakers—should be included, and 
properly operationalized, in future studies of higher education policy development. 
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Finally, I believe that despite the academic nature of the study, it also has 
important practical implications.  The practicality of this research resides in valuable 
lessons drawn from the experiences of states that have implemented performance 
funding.  Understanding the antecedents of different policy shifts may enable state 
policymakers to design more sustainable and successful programs.  In addition, based on 
specific findings, it is possible to make tentative predictions about the likelihood of 
respective policy shifts in a given period.  
This study opens up several avenues for future research.  A promising line of 
research includes new possibilities for studying policy changes, especially policy failures 
in higher education.  Future studies may examine in greater depth what it means for a 
policy to be in place and how this understanding affects policy adoption and failure.  This 
approach will require further operationalization of policy statuses and policy changes.  
Policies that do not depend on state allocations or have multiple target audiences will 
present a special challenge in terms of distinguishing between the operational and latent 
status of the policy.  This study suggests some policy-specific criteria for determining 
policy existence; however, it leaves it to subsequent research to elaborate on this issue. 
The other avenues for further research include the following: incorporating other 
theoretical frames and predictors to analyze factors of policy evolution, using alternative 
methodologies, retesting the effects discovered in this and other studies, examining 
performance funding in the context of various accountability policies to understand how 
policy choices affect each other, analyzing the role of programmatic characteristics and 
financial context, and ultimately building an integral theory of policy development.  I 
hope that this study represents an important stepping stone toward these goals.       
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Conditions of performance funding stability and failure 
At this point in a research project, academic and policy audiences tend to ask very 
different questions.  Scholars scrutinize the study results, contributions, and limitations 
and consider directions for future research.  The study’s authors are careful not to make 
bold claims or make broad generalizations about their findings and thoroughly delineate 
limitations of their investigation.  The common format of finishing the results 
presentation is to acknowledge that more research needs to be done and express hope that 
future studies will fill in the remaining gaps.  This study is no exception and takes the 
same cautious approach.  In sharp contrast, real-life policymakers and practitioners tend 
to immediately step over the boundaries of a given research problem and the study’s 
limitations and ask questions that are more general: How do these results relate to a 
bigger context?  How can we apply this new knowledge to practical issues?  What are the 
author’s recommendations for solving particular problems?  In other words, they want the 
author to explain what is in it for them and, when applied, how this new knowledge 
makes the world a better place.  The need to answer these broad questions—given the 
study limitations and their own cautionary leanings—can make academic scholars cringe. 
Having delineated my study results, limitations, and contributions, I am going 
now to answer one critical question that is expected from the policy audience.  I 
understand that any study that examines determining factors of policy adoption and 
failure should focus specifically on conditions under which these policies are more likely 
to be successful and conditions under which they are more likely to fail.  Such a 
description must go beyond the limits of the study and synthesize prior research, 
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implications of the study results, and the author’s convictions.  In brief, it should aim to 
summarize what successful and failing policies look like. 
This section, thus, focuses on general characteristics of stable and failing 
performance funding programs.  I will summarize key conditions of policy stability and 
failure, suggested in the literature and in this study.  In doing so, I owe a great deal to 
prior research by Joseph Burke and associates, Kevin Dougherty and colleagues, Brenda 
Albright, and other scholars and policy analysts who studied performance funding 
development in various contexts.  I also encourage the reader to heed the advice of Burke 
and Modarresi (2001) who undertook a similar endeavor: “Incorporating these 
characteristics will not ensure the stability of a program in any state, but success is 
unlikely without considering them […]. These characteristics represent a reasonable 
check for potential stability rather than an infallible prescription for success” (p. 66). 
I believe that the key factors that create conditions for success or failure of 
performance funding policies fall under five broad areas: (a) Environmental conditions, 
which include different contextual factors of policy evolution; (b) Characteristics of the 
policy adoption process; (c) Policy design, that is, features of the enacted program; (d) 
Conditions of policy implementation; and (e) Attainment of policy goals and policy 
effects.  Each of these broad policy domains includes various specific factors that are 
likely to affect policy stability or failure.  This loose classification is arbitrary and aims 
not to provide a comprehensive taxonomy of factors that lead to success or failure but to 
identify key levels and sublevels of policy systems.  In this section, I will outline what the 
current body of research and practice tells us about the likely conditions for both 
performance funding success and failure.  Table 7 summarizes these key influences.        
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Table 7. Conditions of performance funding stability and failure 
 Conditions of stability Conditions of failure 
I.  ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS                      Contextual factors: 
Fiscal context /  
   Budget constraints 
Stable state funding 
Gradual funding changes 
Budget instability; drastic 
budget cuts; recessions 
Constancy of resources for policy 
   implementation 
Adequate and constant 
resource base 
Inadequate or instable 
resources 
State priorities and goals Stable state priorities Changing priorities and goals 
Continuity of governmental support Constant officials’ support Loss of original supporters 
Continuity of institutional support Constant campus support for 
the policy 
Lack of campus support for 
continuation 
Involvement of business community Continuity of business 
interest and support 
Weakening of business 
interest after adoption 
Maturity of the policy Established policy with 
strong supporters and allies 
Immature policy with few 
supporters and allies 
Perception of the policy Policy perceived as effective, 
fair, and advantageous 
Policy perceived as 
ineffective and/or unfair 
II.  POLICY ADOPTION Characteristics of the adoption process: 
Policy initiator 
Method of adoption 
Higher education agency 
Non-mandated policy 
Legislature/governor/business 
Mandated (not necessarily) 
Mode of adoption Statute or executive order  Budget proviso/ appropr. bill 
State agency support / Collaboration 
   with higher education community 
Important input from higher 
education community 
Low involvement of higher 
education community 
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Table 7, continued 
 Conditions of stability Conditions of failure 
Development of performance 
   indicators, weights, and standards 
Indicators developed by 
higher education community 
Externally prescribed 
indicators 
Assignment of weights to indicators Weights assigned by 
institutions to reflect mission 
Imposed or incorrect weights 
affecting instit’l responses 
Policy introduction Starting small: piloting the 
program and phasing it in 
Drastic policy introduction 
Adequate planning Sufficient time for planning Limited time for planning 
III.  POLICY DESIGN Program features: 
Strength and size of the program Sufficient funding to induce 
changes & motivate colleges 
Too small to produce changes 
Too large: Budget instability 
Budget planning and fiscal 
   predictability 
Stable budget planning and 
implementation 
Wide budget fluctuations 
from period to period 
Complexity of the program Easy-to-implement program 
due to its simplicity 
Too difficult to implement 
because of complexity 
Cost of data collection, analysis, 
   and implementation 
Reasonable cost of data 
collection & implementation 
Too expensive to collect data 
and implement 
Use of incentives or sanctions Only incentive funding Use of sanctions/disincentives 
Type of funding Supplementary / additional Withheld / reallocated 
Restrictions on funding Discretionary funds Non-discretionary funds 
Relationship among institutions Promoting collaboration Promoting competition 
Number of performance indicators Reasonable number Too many and too detailed 
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Table 7, continued 
 Conditions of stability Conditions of failure 
Nature of performance indicators Cleary defined, outcome-
oriented measures 
Too numerous indicators or 
indicators of different types  
Success standards Institutional improvement 
Comparison against self 
Comparison against better 
performing institutions 
Mission diversity Using common and separate 
performance indicators 
Using uniform measures 
across sectors and institutions 
IV.  POLICY IMPLEMENTATION Characteristics of policy implementation: 
Policy requirements Stability of requirements Fluctuating requirements 
Policy review and revision Periodic policy revision No (or too frequent) revisions 
Periodic increases in funding levels Gradual increase in funding Stagnant or reduced funding 
Collaboration among policymakers Continuing collaboration Lack of collaboration 
Consultation among all stakeholders Sustaining dialogue among 
all involved parties  
Not involving stakeholders at 
all stages of implementation 
Policy penetration within 
   institutions 
Involving all actors at all 
levels within colleges 
Low penetration within 
institutions 
V.  POLICY GOALS AND EFFECTS Evidence of / sense of: 
Ensuring external accountability Demonstrating accountability Failing to demonstrate 
accountability 
Responding to state and public 
   priorities 
Achieving policy goals 
related to state needs 
Failing to meet important 
state needs 
Enhancing institutional quality / 
   Improving student outcomes 
Improved institutional 
performance and outcomes 
Lack of noticeable 
improvement 
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Table 7, continued 
 Conditions of stability Conditions of failure 
Increasing / streamlining funding 
   for higher education  
Increased funding for higher 
education 
Lack of noticeable increase 
in state appropriations 
Financial impact on institutions Substantial financial impact Little financial impact 
Increasing attractiveness of 
   institutions / Changing student 
   enrollment & graduation patterns 
Increased attractiveness 
Beating competition for 
students  
No changes in institutional 
attractiveness or student 
enrollment behavior 
Responding to constituent concerns Addressing voter concerns 
through the policy 
Inadequate indicators not 
addressing voter concerns 
Improving public perception of 
   higher education 
Improved public perception 
of higher education  
Lack of improvement in 
public perception 
 
To reiterate, the above conditions are the summary of influences suggested in the 
literature (in key sources cited repeatedly in this work) and in this study. 
Environmental factors create the context for policy development and offer 
multiple stimuli and shocks that reverberate throughout all levels of policy systems.  In 
other words, state-level environmental conditions are part of the super-system that also 
includes economic and social factors, related policy domains, existing policies, and major 
actors.  The key words summarizing the most relevant environmental conditions of policy 
success are stability and continuity: namely, fiscal and resource stability; stability of state 
priorities and goals; continuity of support from the state government, institutions, and 
business community; and continuity of positive perception of the policy and its effects. 
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The general financial situation in the state and availability of adequate resources 
for policy implementation is undoubtedly one of the most important determining factors 
of success and failure.  It is conceivable that declines in state appropriations provided 
stimuli for the emergence of the first-generation of performance funding policies, 
although existing empirical research has yet to demonstrate this causal link.  However, 
there is evidence that declines in state appropriations, and related inadequacy of resources 
for policy implementation, has often led to policy starvation and demise.  Under 
increased competition for scare state resources, supplementary performance funding 
policies may be readily sacrificed to protect the core budget. 
Changing state priorities and goals and rotation of state officials in public offices 
often spell disaster to performance funding policies.  The history of performance funding 
is replete with cases when abrupt changes in the political agenda, changes in the political 
leadership, or the loss of original policy supporters in the state government or 
implementing agencies led to policy demise.  Therefore, a key condition for success is 
constant commitment to the policy despite shifts in leadership and agendas.  One way of 
ensuring this commitment is to emphasize and promote policy values—responsiveness to 
state and public needs, quality, improvement, efficiency, and effectiveness—that may 
strike a chord with policymakers of different political affiliations.  Another option is to 
enact policy initiatives through the law so as to make it harder for the policy to be 
terminated by new officeholders or political appointees. 
Continuity of support from campuses and the business community is also of 
utmost importance.  Some performance funding policies failed partly because institutions, 
originally motivated by prospects of additional money, became uninterested in policy 
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continuation; in some cases, particular institutions or sectors may oppose the policy if 
they perceive it as putting them at a disadvantage.  In a similar vein, business interest in 
the policy, which could be very influential at the policy adoption stage, usually subsides 
after its enactment, and this weakening of interest and support contributes to eventual 
policy failure.  To keep the policy afloat, therefore, it is critical to ensure support from 
these key policy actors.  To be sure, attainment of this goal requires different leverages: 
for example, offering increases in unrestricted funding for campuses and providing better 
educational outcomes that are important to state businesses. 
To a large extent, continuity of support from all the involved actors has to do with 
policy maturity and its perceived effectiveness.  Nascent policies have had less time and 
fewer chances to accumulate strong support above and beyond the efforts of original 
initiators.  In contrast, established policies have gained traction and are likely to have 
accumulated new allies and supporters.  In brief, a growing, or at least constant, support 
base for the policy is a major factor in its stability.  This point is related to importance of 
perception of the policy and its effects.  For a policy to succeed, there should be a 
perception, or an empirical proof, of its effectiveness.  Perceived, or actual, policy 
effectiveness increases its support base and, thus, the likelihood of policy success. 
The above conditions include only the most relevant contextual factors that are 
the closest to the level of the policy system.  These factors transmit the effect of other, 
broader environmental conditions.  For example, a national recession can exert influence 
through sharp declines in state appropriations and changes in the state government and 
business priorities.  Emergence of the national Completion Agenda provides for greater 
commitment and support from various actors, affects the availability of financial and 
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other resources, and changes attitudes towards performance funding and its expected 
effects.  As is clear from the above discussion, these environmental factors, in turn, are 
directly related to the conditions operating at the policy system’s level, such as program 
design and policy effects.  I will now turn to summarizing these factors at the system 
level. 
Conditions that frame the policy adoption process greatly determine the likelihood 
of policy success or failure.  This study and prior research and policy observations have 
shown that characteristics of the policy adoption process are associated with specific 
policy outcomes, although most of these conditions are still in need of empirical testing.  
This set of determining factors includes the following key conditions that shape policy 
adoption: (a) the policy initiator; (b) method and mode of adoption; (c) development of 
performance indicators, weights, and standards, (d) input from higher education 
community during the policy proposal and adoption stages, and (e) approaches to policy 
planning, introduction, and implementation. 
The policy initiator is critical because policies imposed by outsiders, as opposed 
to the ones initiated by the higher education community, may encounter greater 
opposition and implementation difficulties and thus be more prone to failure.  The policy 
initiator may be different from the ultimate policy adopter; for instance, a policy 
proposed by a state board for higher education may be finally adopted by the state 
legislature.  A closely related issue is the method of policy adoption, which differentiates 
between mandated and non-mandated policies.  The difference between the first and the 
second condition lies in the existence of an external public pronouncement mandating the 
policy as opposed to a state board’ vote to launch a policy. 
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To reiterate, self-initiated policies could be eventually mandated by law or an 
executive order.  Observers of the past policies (it is too soon to evaluate the more recent 
Performance Funding 2.0 programs) generally believed that mandated policies could be 
less stable than policies developed and enacted by state boards for higher education.  At 
the same time, an existing mandate—especially when backed up by financial support—
provides for greater commitment to the policy, on the one hand, and makes it more 
difficult to terminate it, on the other hand.  This leads to the importance of another factor, 
the mode of policy adoption.  Past research and this study show that policies put into law 
are more likely to be stable than policies that were enacted via a budget proviso or an 
appropriation bill. 
The next important condition of policy success is the level of involvement of the 
higher education community in the policy development and adoption process.  Policies 
that enjoy greater input from systems and institutions at all stages of policy development 
are more likely to enjoy success and stability as well.  At the pre-adoption stage, this 
involvement is especially important in the development of performance indicators, 
assigned weights, and success standards.  Prior research showed that externally 
prescribed indicators—without much input from institutions and especially when coupled 
with externally imposed policies—were associated with higher policy failure rates than 
policies in which institutions offered input in all these aspects and were involved in 
shaping the proposed policy. 
Last but not least, it is important to launch a policy in the right way.  The right 
way means starting small and giving all the involved actors sufficient time for planning 
and implementation.  A policy should be pilot tested and gradually phased-in, giving 
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policymakers and institutions the possibility to make adjustments and revisions when 
real-world implementation uncovers some difficulties or inherent problems.  There 
should be no expectation or pressure to immediately see the policy functioning 
flawlessly.  Starting small is critical for eventual success. 
The most crucial group of conditions for policy success or failure includes key 
characteristics of policy design.  Proposed and adopted programmatic features determine 
the likelihood of any policy shift, from adoption to termination to readoption.  Although 
all performance funding programs are different from each other, it is possible to identify 
design commonalities among them and predict, with some degree of certainty, which 
characteristics may contribute to policy success or failure.  The main features include the 
size and complexity of the program, consequences for institutions, an employed funding 
scheme, number and type of indicators, and protection of mission diversity. 
Policy analysts and policymakers have struggled to strike a fine balance between 
creating programs that, on the one hand, would be sizeable enough to induce desired 
changes and, on the other hand, would be small enough so as not to create budget 
instability and poor fiscal predictability due to fluctuations in performance funds.  If 
performance funding is small, institutions will not be incentivized to alter their behavior 
and pursue the principals’ goals.  If however, it becomes too large, annual budgeting 
becomes more problematic.  Driven by these and other considerations, most Performance 
Funding 1.0 programs were small, keeping, on average, at around 2 or 3 percent of 
annual state allocations.  Some observers suspect that this programmatic weakness could 
be a partial explanation of the general lack of performance funding effects on various 
outcomes tested in different studies.  However, the new generation of performance 
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funding policies is challenging the assumption of small size and allocates much larger 
proportions of state appropriations to institutions based on performance.  Tennessee, with 
a hundred percent of funding based on outcomes under a new funding formula, is 
spearheading this effort.  It will be extremely interesting to follow development of such 
large-scale policies, as the ones in Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana, in the future.  
Complexity of the program and associated costs of data collection, analysis, and 
implementation are also critical in determining a policy’s fate.  Successful programs are 
generally easy to implement and have reasonable implementation costs.  These features 
are directly related to the number of performance indicators and the amount of data to 
process.  Complexity inhibits implementation and dampens institutional interest in the 
program, especially if the reward size is small.  Institutions incur large costs of data 
collection and analysis; they also have additional bureaucratic burden associated with 
program implementation.  Thus, colleges will only be interested in giving the policy their 
best effort if rewards are appreciably larger than compliance costs.  Ease of 
implementation and rewards outpacing the costs make a policy more attractive to 
institutions and may create conditions for success.  Therefore, simplicity and reasonable 
implementation costs are the cachet of sustainable programs. 
Successful programs are more likely to use incentives for institutions and refrain 
from using sanctions and disincentives.  The prospect of losing additional monies and 
having bad publicity is, in itself, a powerful enough disincentive to persuade institutions 
to comply with the policy.  If however, a program includes actual sanctions for non-
compliance, it is more likely to face strong opposition from campuses.  Strong 
disincentives also include problematic funding schemes.  One example is withholding a 
232 
 
portion of the funds and having institutions earn it back.  Prior research has shown that 
such programs are not sustainable and create opposition to the policy.  Other problematic 
funding schemes are placing restrictions on the use of performance monies and making 
institutions compete for funds.  Thus, successful programs should strive for the 
following: using incentives without resorting to sanctions, providing supplementary and 
discretionary funding that goes above the core budget allocations and has no usage 
restrictions, and promoting collaboration among campus without having them compete 
with each other. 
Both complexity of the program and costs of implementation are to a large extent 
driven by the number of standards and performance indicators that are employed.  Some 
performance funding policies have fallen under the burden of their sophisticated systems 
with a large number of indicators that include measures of different types (output, 
outcome, input, and process-oriented).  South Carolina’s program with its 37 indicators in 
nine broad categories is the most conspicuous example.  Analysts have suggested that 
sustainable policies should strive to use a limited number of clearly defined indicators 
that should be mostly outcome-oriented.  Also, the employed standards should be focused 
on institutional improvement and avoid unfair inter-institutional comparisons.  More 
recently adopted performance funding policies follow through on these suggestions by 
focusing on course degree completion and few other specific outcomes; in these 
programs, outcomes are usually compared against an institution’s past performance.  On 
the other hand, it remains to be seen whether a more sophisticated approach taken by 
Tennessee with its 29 indicators and a hundred-percent-outcomes-driven formula is also a 
viable option. 
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The last critical feature of program design is protection of mission diversity.  A 
common criticism is that performance funding imposes uniform criteria and standards on 
different sectors and institutional types and, thus, disadvantages some institutions or 
offers the wrong incentives for them.  Researchers have suggested that a successful 
policy should use both common and separate indicators for different sectors and take 
mission differences into account.  Again, the example of Tennessee, which uses both 
common and sector-specific measures and mission-specific weights for indicators, could 
be an answer to this criticism and a way of protecting mission diversity. 
The next group of factors of policy stability includes characteristics of its 
implementation.  Stability and collaboration are the key words describing conditions of 
policy success at this level.  Stability pertains to policy requirements, funding, and 
revisions.  For the policy system to attain its goals, its requirements should be stable 
during a pre-specified period, at the end of which a policy should stand for reevaluation.  
Fluctuating requirements disrupt the process and make compliance with the policy 
extremely difficult.  Institutions need time to adjust before producing the desired 
outcomes.  If requirements change too often or policy revisions take place too frequently, 
the policy will not be able to gain traction and institutions will be quick to show their 
unhappiness with the process.  To keep institutions happy, funding, too, should be stable 
and if possible gradually increase over the course of the policy’s life.  Collaboration and 
continuing consultation among all involved parties are critical for implementation.  This 
condition for success also includes involvement of faculty and staff below the level of 
institutions’ senior administrators.  In other words, for the policy to be sustainable, it 
should penetrate deeply within colleges.  Because many important outcomes happen due 
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to interactions between students, faculty, and staff, a general awareness of the policy and 
its requirements within institutions will likely facilitate attainment of its goals. 
Finally, policy success hinges on the extent to which it meets its goals and 
produces the intended effects.  The policy is more likely to persist if there is evidence, or 
perception, of demonstrating accountability, meeting state needs, and improving 
institutional quality and student outcomes.  Stable policies also increase, or optimize, 
funding for higher education and produce appreciable financial impacts on institutions 
and their practices.  Ideally, successful policies should show that their implementation 
positively affects institutional attractiveness and changes student enrollment and 
graduation patterns.  More generally, successful policies create a perception of 
responding to constituent concerns and improve public perception of higher education. 
To be sure, no real-life policy can be expected to meet all the above potential 
conditions for success.  However, considering these contributing factors in designing and 
implementing a performance funding policy will increase its chances for eventual 
success.  Policymakers who contemplate adopting these policies but ignore the factors 
that affect their stability will do so at their own peril.  I am certain that policy research 
will continue to provide actionable ideas to guide policy development in higher education 
and hope that this dissertation has contributed to this important process. 
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